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(영문) 대법원 1991. 4. 23. 선고 90다15167 판결

[점유방해배제등][공1991.6.15,(898),1458]

Main Issues

(a) The case of denying the implied establishment of a contract to establish a traffic area; and

(b) Requirements for prescriptive acquisition of passage areas; and

C. Whether the right of passage can be asserted on the sole ground that it is more convenient than the existing passage (negative)

Summary of Judgment

A. There is no room to view that an implied regional right contract was established if the sale of the housing site in lots did not provide part of the land as a road for the sale of the housing site, but is merely an implied entry of passage of the owners of other housing sites for the said part as the purchaser of the land.

B. Article 294 of the Civil Act provides that the provisions of Article 245 of the Civil Act shall apply mutatis mutandis only to cases where servitude continues to exist and express, so long as the owner of the dominant estate has opened a passage on the servient tenement and used the passage continuously for the period stipulated in Article 245 of the Civil Act, the prescriptive acquisition of the passage area can be recognized only when the owner of the dominant land continues to use it

(c) If there is a right ofpassing two meters wide from a residential area to a public road, the right of passage cannot be claimed solely on the ground that it is more convenient to use the surrounding land to contribute to a public road.

[Reference Provisions]

A. Article 291 of the Civil Act: Articles 245 and 294 of the Civil Act; Article 219 of the Civil Act

Reference Cases

B. Supreme Court Decision 78Da2482 delivered on April 10, 1979 (Gong1979, 11905) (Gong1905 delivered on June 22, 1982)

Plaintiff-Appellee

Seoul High Court Decision 200Na14488 delivered on August 1, 200

Defendant-Appellant

[Defendant-Appellant] Kim Chang-suk and one other, Counsel for defendant-appellant-appellant

Judgment of the lower court

Seoul Civil District Court Decision 90Na11799 delivered on October 16, 1990

Text

The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal shall be assessed against the defendants.

Reasons

The defendants' attorney's grounds of appeal are examined.

1. As to the contract to establish a traffic area

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below acknowledged, based on the macroficial evidence, that the (A) portion of the instant land divided into the said site in Jongno-gu Seoul, Jongno-gu, 197-1 was used as a connecting passage between a road and a main road, and that it continued to be used as a connecting passage of the said site, and that it continued to be used as a connecting passage between the said residents, and that an implied servitude contract was concluded between the Plaintiff and the purchaser of the said divided site. As to the Defendants’ assertion that an implied servitude contract was concluded between the said divided site and the purchaser of the said divided site, the court below rejected the said assertion on the grounds that there is no evidence to find that the Plaintiff: (a) part of the instant land was opened as a road and provided as

In light of the records, the court below's aforementioned judgment is just and acceptable, and there was no error of misunderstanding the fact that the plaintiff mispercing the facts of the completion of incomplete deliberation or the preparation of evidence and the judgment of value, and the plaintiff's sale of the housing site as a road for the sale site does not provide the part (A) of the land of this case as a road for the sale site, but if the other owners of the land of this case's double (a) part as the purchaser of the land of this case's land knew the passage, it cannot be deemed that the implied servitude contract was established, and there is no error of law by misunderstanding the legal principles as to the implied acquisition of the passage area like the theory of lawsuit.

2. As to the prescriptive acquisition of the passage area

Article 294 of the Civil Act provides that the provisions of Article 245 of the Civil Act shall apply mutatis mutandis only to cases where servitude continues to exist and express, so it is the opinion of the party members that the owner of the dominant estate may recognize the prescriptive acquisition of the right of passage only when the situation in which the owner of the dominant estate opens a passage on the servient tenement and uses the passage continues to exist for the period prescribed in Article 245 of the Civil Act (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 65Da2205, 2306, Sept. 6, 196; 70Da72,773, Jul. 21, 1970; 78Da2482, Apr. 10, 1979).

The court below rejected the defense of prescriptive acquisition by the defendants on the ground that the case does not fall under any of the above cases in this case, on the ground that the owner of the dominant land has established a passage on the dominant estate on his own, or that the owner of the dominant land in a certain area establishes a passage from the dominant estate in installments and sells the land to his contribution to the sale site, and the ownership of the passage part is particularly reserved in the future, or that the seller of the dominant estate and the owner of the dominant estate are different from the owner of the dominant estate, the prescriptive acquisition of the passage part can be recognized only in the case where the owner of the dominant estate opens a private road on the dominant estate under the agreement with the owner of the dominant estate. In light of the records, the above judgment of the court below is just and there is no error of law by misunderstanding the facts against the rules of evidence or misunderstanding the legal principles on the prescriptive acquisition of the passage part. The argument

3. As to the right of passage over the surrounding land

According to the records, since the defendants' roads from their residential areas to their contributions include a right of passage around 2m wide (6m wide) besides the part of the land in this case, the defendants cannot assert their right of passage over the surrounding land solely on the ground that the defendants' use of the part of the land in this case's case's purpose is more convenient to contribute to the public. Thus, the judgment of the court below to the same purport is just and there are no errors in the misapprehension of legal principles, such as the theory of lawsuit,

4. Therefore, all appeals are dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Song Man-man (Presiding Justice)

심급 사건
-서울민사지방법원 1990.10.16.선고 90나11799
본문참조조문