2. The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

A. From December 3, 1998 to December 3, 1998, the Plaintiff is operating the instant childcare center as the president of C Child Care Center, a private child care center located in Seodaemun-gu, Daegu (hereinafter “instant child care center”).

On May 27, 2013, childcare centers of this case were selected as public childcare centers in accordance with the Guidelines for Child Care Services (hereinafter “instant Guidelines”) in 2013.

B. On November 1, 2013, the Defendant issued an order to return KRW 3,20,00 for the following reasons to the Plaintiff pursuant to Article 40 Subparag. 3, 45(1)1, 45-2(1), and 46 Subparag. 4 of the Infant Care Act, and Articles 38 and 39 of the Enforcement Rule of the same Act: (i) imposition of a penalty surcharge of KRW 30,00,00 in lieu of nine months of suspension of operation; (ii) disposition of suspension of qualification for the president for nine months (from October 10 to 9, 2014); (iii) order of return of KRW 6,406,200 (basic infant care fees of KRW 3,206,200 as of April to July 7, 2013; and (iii),200,000 for drivers’ benefits of KRW 3,20,000 for drivers; and (iii) return period: November 21, 2013>

(hereinafter referred to as the “previous Disposition”). The grounds for the disposition (No. 2) are as follows: (a) infant care teacher D provides infant care to an unqualified person (E) for lack of hospital treatment, etc.; and (b) appointed and appointed a driver F for an unfair claim for subsidies (hereinafter “grounds for Disposition 1”); (c) but the actual driving of a infant care teacher G operates a vehicle by G and the supply and demand of F’s wages (hereinafter “grounds for Disposition 2”).

C. On November 21, 2013, the Plaintiff filed a lawsuit seeking revocation of the previous disposition against the Defendant (Seoul District Court 2013Guhap3025, hereinafter “related lawsuit”), but the court of first instance received the Plaintiff on April 18, 2014 since the ground for the previous disposition was “A childcare teacher D did not work every day,” and even if an unqualified E was in charge of infant care services for the Pakistan 4, it is recognized that the Plaintiff claimed basic infant care fees as if D had worked normally.” However, the ground for the previous disposition was legitimate, since the payment of infant care teacher was not specified differently from the payment of infant care teacher.