2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Defendant.

The Plaintiff’s 33,112,029,040 won ( corporate tax 22,338,248,920 won and additional dues 10,773,780,120 won as of May 26, 2015) and the above corporate tax on the Defendant’s 33,112,029,040 won as of May 27, 2015.

2. Purport of appeal

The judgment of the first instance is revoked. The plaintiff's claim is dismissed.

The court's explanation on this case is consistent with the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance, except for the following provisions: Article 8 (2) of the Administrative Litigation Act and Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act, since the part "as to the existence of benefit in confirmation" in Article 4(b) of the judgment of the court of first instance as stated in Paragraph 2.

2. As to the existence of interest in confirmation

A. Whether a judicial claim can be acknowledged as the grounds for interrupting extinctive prescription

1) General civil creditors shall apply for compulsory execution against an obligor’s property in accordance with a final and conclusive judgment after receiving a final and conclusive judgment through a judicial claim for the purpose of compulsory realization of their claims. However, a tax claimant may directly determine the details of the pertinent tax claim, and have the right of self-performance to seize and liquidate the delinquent’s property. Therefore, the benefit of a lawsuit that can determine a tax claim through a separate judicial claim cannot be acknowledged as a general and prior area.

Article 27 of the Framework Act on National Taxes provides for extinctive prescription of the right to collect the national tax, and Article 28(1) of the same Act provides for “tax payment notice, demand notice or demand notice of payment, demand for delivery, and seizure.” As such, in principle, the Framework Act on National Taxes provides for the interruption of extinctive prescription of a tax claim by the method of “tax payment notice, demand notice, demand notice of payment, demand for delivery, request for delivery, and seizure” according to the collection procedure. Thus, it is difficult to view that a judicial claim is generally permissible even as

2) However, Article 27(2) of the Framework Act on National Taxes provides that extinctive prescription of the right to collect national taxes shall be governed by the Civil Act except as otherwise provided for in the Framework Act on National Taxes or the tax-related Acts. Thus, it is a question whether a judicial claim, which is the cause of interruption of extinctive prescription, can be recognized as the cause of interruption of extinctive prescription in a certain case, or whether the cause of interruption of extinctive prescription is not allowed as to a tax claim

3) In full view of the following circumstances, in cases where: (a) a taxpayer is insolvent or is missing and thus the enforcement of seizure is not possible, the extinctive prescription cannot be interrupted according to the method prescribed by the Framework Act on National Taxes, such as in cases where the taxpayer is unable to commence; (b) a taxpayer has not neglected to realize the tax claim by faithfully taking the measures to collect the tax claim; and (c) where special circumstances are acknowledged, such as where the period of extinctive prescription expires near the expiration date, it is reasonable to determine a judicial claim under Article 168 Subparag. 1 of the Civil Act as the grounds for suspending the extinctive

A) If a literal interpretation of Article 27(2) of the Framework Act on National Taxes is made, there is no reason to exclude judicial claims, which are grounds for interruption of extinctive prescription under the Civil Act, from the grounds for interruption of extinctive prescription. If a taxation claim excludes exceptions, etc. to self-performance right, its essence does not differ from general civil claims. However, there is no reason to treat a taxation claim more disadvantageous than general civil claims in the area where the problem is not resolved by such special exceptions, etc. on the grounds that a taxation right holder

B) Under Article 28(1) of the Framework Act on National Taxes, a tax notice, demand notice or demand notice of payment, demand for delivery, seizure, etc., which provides the grounds for interruption of extinctive prescription of a tax claim cannot be deemed as having a relation to a judicial claim or intervention in bankruptcy proceedings, payment order, peremptory notice, etc., which provides for the grounds for interruption of extinctive prescription of a general civil claim under Articles 168 and 170 through 174 of the Civil Act. In light of this, it is difficult to interpret that the grounds for interruption of extinctive prescription under Article 28(1) of the Framework Act on National Taxes

C) In a case where it is impossible to commence the collection procedure due to the unknown whereabouts of a taxpayer, the statute of limitations cannot be interrupted due to the taxpayer’s insolvency or concealment of property, etc., and in such a case, there is a need for a method to suspend the statute of limitations of a tax claim in preparation for the taxpayer’s location or property identification in the future. Furthermore, in the current situation where international transactions are active, such need is more emphasized in terms of responding to the tax collection of a foreign taxpayer, the taxpayer’s property concealment, etc., and securing the period required for international tax administration assistance, etc.

D) The National Tax Collection Act, as the first phase of the collection procedure, presents the procedure for the duty payment notice and then demands the next phase. However, as long as the same content has already been repeated even when the duty payment notice was issued, it is difficult to recognize the validity of interrupting prescription in a repeated tax payment notice. In addition, where the tax authority urged the payment of delinquent taxes or additional dues and then urged the same payment again, it is difficult to recognize the validity of interrupting prescription. In addition, where the tax authority makes the same demand after urgings the payment of delinquent taxes or additional dues, it is an administrative disposition subject to appeal litigation as only the first demand is a collection disposition, and the same demand thereafter becomes subject to appeal litigation, and is merely a simple peremptory notice under the Civil Act, not a demand for suspending extinctive prescription (see Supreme Court Decision 97Nu119, Jul. 13, 199). As long as the duty payment notice and demand are effective only once as the grounds for suspending extinctive prescription, it is necessary to interrupt extinctive prescription by judicial claims, etc.

E) The reason for the existence of the statute of limitations is that respect the permanent state of fact and protect the locked person on the right, and in particular, the latter is meaningful in the extinctive prescription, and thus, when the right holder expresses that he/she is not a locked person on the right by asserting his/her right, the cause for the interruption of extinctive prescription is the cause for interrupting prescription (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 91Da32053, Mar. 31, 192). Prohibiting the means of interrupting extinctive prescription that can no longer be interrupted even if the right holder did not neglect to realize the right of taxation, such as taking necessary measures for the collection of tax claims, etc., even

F) In a case where a civil obligee becomes final and conclusive upon winning a judgment in favor of the civil obligee, if, exceptionally, the ten-year extinctive prescription period of a claim based on a final and conclusive judgment becomes more difficult to enforce compulsory execution, a judicial claim in the same content is inevitable for the interruption of extinctive prescription, regardless of whether compulsory execution is possible prior to the lapse of the extinctive prescription period, and thus, it cannot be deemed that a judicial claim has been violated against the same content lawsuit for the interruption of extinctive prescription or prohibition of double lawsuit (see Supreme Court Decisions 87Da1761, Nov. 10, 1987; 2005Da74764, Apr. 14, 2006). For the same purport, even in a case where a tax claim specifically became final and conclusive by a tax payment notice, etc., even in a case where a tax claim becomes final and conclusive by a tax payment notice, etc., if it is practically difficult to proceed through a judicial claim

G) The Defendant asserts that, in order to prevent the cases where the disposition on default is impossible or the execution of the disposition on default brings about a waste of administrative power, or where the disposition on default brings about a threat to the livelihood of the person liable for tax payment, interruption of extinctive prescription through a judicial claim should not be allowed in terms of systematic and legitimacy as stipulated in the disposition on default system. However, the disposition on default as stipulated in Article 86 of the former National Tax Collection Act is not subject to the obligation of the head of a tax office to make a disposition on default. Moreover, even if a disposition on default is made on a tax claim, it is merely a disposition on default, not a tax claim itself, but a tax claim is not extinguished (see Supreme Court Decision 2005Du2414, Oct. 27, 2006). In addition, the aforementioned provision on the disposition on default was deleted on December 31, 201, which was amended by the National Tax Collection Act.

H) In the case of a taxation claim, the Defendant is not exempted from liability even when the taxpayer is declared bankrupt and immunity (Article 566 subparag. 1 of the Debtor Rehabilitation and Bankruptcy Act). As such, permitting the interruption of extinctive prescription through a judicial claim in respect of such taxation claim may result in a harsh result in the taxpayer’s life-sustaining taxpayers. However, excluding a taxation claim subject to bankruptcy and immunity is based on the legislative policy to protect the taxation claim more strongly than that of the general civil law. As such, excluding the taxation claim subject to bankruptcy and immunity cannot be the grounds for suspending extinctive prescription of the taxation claim as to the taxation claim. Rather, if the interruption of extinctive prescription of a taxation claim based on a judicial claim is denied on the foregoing grounds, contrary to the purport of protecting the taxation claim more strongly than that of the general civil law, there is unreasonable reason for interrupting the extinctive prescription of the taxation claim than that of the general civil law.

(E) The Defendant asserts that a judicial claim is not permissible as a ground for suspending the extinctive prescription against a tax claim in Supreme Court Decision 75Da385 Decided December 9, 1975. However, the above judgment held that “Inasmuch as the interruption of the extinctive prescription has the effect of interrupting a payment notice pursuant to Article 73 of the former Budget and Accounts Act (amended by Act No. 2826, Dec. 31, 1975; hereinafter the same shall apply), there is no benefit in filing a civil lawsuit, barring any special circumstance to bring a lawsuit in order to discontinue the extinctive prescription of a claim for indemnity pursuant to a final and conclusive decision of compensation.” Rather, it may be interpreted to the effect that the interruption of extinctive prescription by a judicial claim may be recognized even in the event of special circumstances (in addition, the former Budget and Accounts Act did not provide for the provision of extinctive prescription provisions under the Civil Act, such as Article 27(2)

B. Whether a special circumstance exists for a judicial claim seeking interruption of extinctive prescription of the instant taxation claim

Comprehensively taking account of the overall purport of arguments in Gap 1, 3 through 5, and Eul 4 (including the number of pages) as a whole, on March 2, 201, the KUG issued 22,338,248,920 won (13,643,072,950 won belonging to year 2006 + 8,695,970 won belonging to year 2007) to the defendant on March 31, 201. The defendant did not own property in Korea and did not deliver the defendant's letter of urge 201 to the defendant on March 31, 201, which was sent to the Director of the Korea Tax Office of 201, which was sent to the defendant the notice of demand for payment of the above corporate tax and additional dues (hereinafter "the tax claims of this case") to the defendant on April 8, 2011, which was sent to the defendant on March 21, 2011.

According to the above facts, with respect to the fact that the Defendant, a taxpayer of the instant taxation claim, normally runs a golf course business in Japan without holding any property in Korea, the Plaintiff adequately performed all necessary measures for collecting the instant taxation claim, such as sending a reminder after the notice of tax payment, proceeding with international tax administration assistance procedures, and sending a peremptory notice of payment, and despite such measures, the expiration of the extinctive prescription period of five years (the five-year period from the day after March 31, 201, which is the time limit for the payment notice) for five years (the five-year period from the day after March 31, 2011, which is the time limit for the payment notice) in a state where the instant taxation claim is not collected, the Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit in order to suspend the extinctive prescription period on May 26, 2015, and thus, the Plaintiff’s filing of the instant lawsuit seeking confirmation of the existence of the instant taxation claim as a judicial claim can be recognized as benefits in the instant lawsuit.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the judgment of the first instance court is just, and the defendant's appeal is dismissed as it is without merit.

Judges highest (Presiding Judge)

(1) Article 86 (Disposition on Deficits) (1) of the former National Tax Collection Act (amended by Act No. 11125, Dec. 31, 2011; hereinafter the same shall apply) (1) Where a taxpayer falls under any of the following cases, the head of a tax office may take a disposition on deficits. 1. Where a disposition on default is terminated and the amount appropriated to the amount in arrears falls short of the amount in arrears, if the amount in arrears falls short of the amount in arrears, 2. Where the amount in arrears falls under Article 85, 3. Where the extinctive prescription of the right to collect the national tax is completed:

2) Article 30 (Entrustment of Tax Collection) (1) Where it is deemed inevitable to collect taxes from a Contracting State because it is difficult to collect the taxes to be paid in Korea, the head of a tax office or local government having jurisdiction over the place for tax payment may request the Commissioner of the National Tax Service to take measures necessary for tax collection from the Contracting State.

3) Article 11 (Collection of Tax Claims) 1. On the request of the requesting State, the requested State shall take necessary measures to collect the tax claims of the State Party first referred to in Articles 14 and 15, subject to the provisions of Articles 15.

4) Article 27(1) of the former Framework Act on National Taxes (amended by Act No. 11604, Jan. 1, 2013) which was enforced at the time of the said notice of tax payment, which was issued on March 2, 2011, stipulates the period of extinctive prescription uniformly for five years, irrespective of the amount of national taxes, unlike the current Act.