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(영문) 서울고등법원 2013. 6. 27. 선고 2012누16710 판결

[사업시행인가무효확인][미간행]

Plaintiff and appellant

Plaintiff (Attorney Kim Young-hun et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Defendant, Appellant

The head of Mapo-gu Seoul Metropolitan Government

Intervenor joining the Defendant

Afol Partnership Co., Ltd. (Law Firm Boo, Attorneys Jin-sik et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellant)

Conclusion of Pleadings

May 9, 2013

The first instance judgment

Seoul Administrative Court Decision 2011Guhap37718 decided May 18, 2012

Text

1. The plaintiff's appeal is dismissed.

2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

Purport of claim and appeal

The judgment of the first instance court is revoked. On April 8, 2010, the defendant confirmed that the defendant's action against the defendant joining the defendant to authorize the implementation of an urban environment rearrangement project is invalid.

Reasons

1. Quotation of judgment of the first instance;

The reasoning for this Court’s explanation concerning this case is as stated in the reasoning of the judgment of the first instance, except for adding or adding part of the reasons for the judgment of the first instance as set forth in paragraph (2) below, and adding judgment on the Plaintiff’s assertion as set forth in paragraph (3). As such, this Court cites it as it is in accordance with Article 8(2) of the Administrative Litigation Act and the main sentence of

2. A portion used for adding or cutting;

A. Part 11 of the Second Part of the Act on the Maintenance and Improvement of Urban Areas and Dwelling Conditions for Residents (hereinafter “Urban Improvement Act”) shall be applied to the Act on the Maintenance and Improvement of Urban Areas and Dwelling Conditions for Residents (amended by Act No. 10268, Apr. 15, 2010; hereinafter “Urban Improvement Act”).

(b)Article 28(1)1(c) of the Enforcement Decree of the Urban Improvement Act providing that “If one person owns a lot of land or a large number of buildings, it shall be calculated as one person regardless of the number of the lots or buildings, pursuant to the main sentence of Article 28(1)1(c).”

(c) in accordance with paragraph 12 of the seventh part, the term “self-regulation” shall be applied to “self-government”;

(d) 25 and 31 parts per annum in the 11st page shall be written in the following order:

(1) On September 28, 2006, on September 18, 2010, the date of the first contract for the ownership (based on the date of prohibition of contract) of the former lot number in the main sentence, the date of the management and disposal of the trust (based on the date of prohibition of contract) and the date of the trust for the transfer of ownership (based on the trust company’s lot number 1 omitted) to the intervenor after the remainder payment of the outstanding payment, Nonparty 3, Nonparty 3, and Nonparty 4 on September 29, 2006, on May 18, 2010 (based on lot number 2 omitted) (number 3 omitted) (number 4 omitted) Nonparty 31 (number 4 omitted) (number 5 omitted) (number 5 omitted) on September 29, 2006, September 28, 2010.

E. Part 2 of the Second Part of the Act on the Maintenance and Improvement of Urban Areas and Dwelling Conditions for Residents (amended by Act No. 10268, Apr. 15, 2010) was added to the "Gu Act on the Maintenance and Improvement of Urban Areas and Dwelling Conditions for Residents".

3. Additional determination

A. The plaintiff's assertion

(1) Article 28(7) of the Urban Improvement Act requires the consent of the owners of land, etc. regarding the project implementation plan. The date of preparation of written consent attached at the time of the instant application for the approval is most around December 18, 2009, while most of the date of issuance of a certificate of seal imprint is ahead of the date of preparation of the written consent around August 2009. Therefore, the above consent is not related to the project implementation plan, and it should be excluded from the calculation of the consent rate, but the instant disposition that calculated the consent rate without excluding it is unlawful and invalid.

(2) Where the owner of land, etc. becomes a project implementer, whether the project implementer constitutes the owner of the land, etc. should be determined on the basis of the date of authorization disposition. At the time of the instant disposition, the owner of the real estate at issue is not the intervenor but the trustee, and thus the intervenor cannot be the project implementer. Therefore, the instant disposition granting the project implementation right to an unqualified participant

B. Determination

(1) Determination as to the claim above (1)

Article 28 (7) of the Urban Improvement Act provides that when owners of land, etc. intend to implement an urban environment improvement project, they shall obtain consent from at least 3/4 of the owners of land, etc. before applying for authorization to implement the urban environment improvement project.

However, according to Gap evidence No. 1, most of the written consent submitted to the defendant at the time of the application for the authorization of this case was prepared on or around December 2009, and the date of issuance of certificate of personal seal impression attached to that written consent was mostly acknowledged as around August 2009, but there is no evidence to deem that the owners of land, etc. consented as above without knowing the project implementation plan as alleged by the plaintiff. Rather, according to Gap evidence No. 1, it is only recognized that the above written consent was stated to the purport that the owners of land, etc. sufficiently understand and consent the project implementation plan prepared by

Therefore, the plaintiff's above assertion is without merit.

(2) Determination as to the claim above (2)

Before the disposition of this case, the Intervenor completed the registration of ownership transfer for the key real estate and completed the registration of ownership transfer for the new bank based on trust. The fact that the title of the key real estate at the time of the disposition of this case was in the future of the new bank, the trustee, is not disputed

However, it is reasonable to regard the owner of land, etc. as an intervenor rather than a new bank, the trustee, in such cases, as the court of first instance properly explained.

Therefore, the plaintiff's above assertion is without merit.

4. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiff's claim of this case is dismissed as it is without merit, and the judgment of the court of first instance is just, and the plaintiff's appeal is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition.

Judges Park Jong-nam (Presiding Judge)