[2] The case holding that there is no validity as a lawful publication method which serves as the requirement for recognition of opposing power under Article 3 (1) of the Housing Lease Protection Act when the resident registration is made in the state of being an owner on the register

[3] In a case where a house was knocked due to the execution of a subordinated mortgage, whether a lessee who has an opposing power between a senior mortgage and a junior mortgage can claim the effect of the right of lease against the successful bidder (negative)

[2] The case holding that it was difficult for a third party to recognize that the ownership transfer registration under the name of Eul was made on August 30, 198, and the ownership transfer registration under the name of Eul was made on October 1, 198, and it was made on October 23, 1993, and he sold the house to Eul and sold it again to Eul on October 23, 1993, and the lease was made from December 23, 1993, which was the due date for the purchase and sale payment, and the lease was changed to the residential relation and continued to reside under the agreement that Gap would be a lessee's qualification, but the ownership transfer registration under the above sale was made only on March 9, 194, and it was not valid for Gap to recognize that it was an possession under the right of lease, not on the ownership transfer registration under the name of Eul before the ownership transfer registration is made. Thus, the ownership transfer registration under the name of Eul, and it was not valid for Gap to recognize the right of lease after March 9, 19999.

[3] Article 608 (2) of the Civil Procedure Act provides that the right to lease on a deposit basis, the period of which expires within six months after the registration of Article 611 of the same Act, shall be deemed extinguished along with the right to lease on a deposit basis of the preferential basis of the right to lease on a deposit basis of the right to lease on a deposit basis. Thus, this shall be deemed as a provision on the right to lease that exists in a state where there is no prior mortgage, and even if it is extinguished due to auction, it shall not be deemed as a matter of course. In addition, the above provision does not provide on whether the right to lease on a deposit basis with the right to lease on a deposit basis or the right to lease with the right to lease on a deposit basis is extinguished due to auction or not. Therefore, the issue of extinction of the right to lease on a deposit basis of the right to lease on a deposit basis shall be decided by interpretation. In this case, since the prior mortgage is extinguished as a matter of course, even if the right to lease on a junior mortgagee can not be asserted against the successful bidder, the transferee of the housing cannot be included in the Housing Lease Protection Act.

1. On the first ground for appeal

A. According to the reasoning of the judgment below, even if the defendant acquired the above right of lease on August 30, 198, by taking account of the evidence adopted by the defendant's decision 9. The court below's decision 9,000 won as to the above apartment 19. The defendant's non-party 1 and the non-party 2 acquired the above right of lease 9. The non-party 1 and the non-party 1 and the non-party 9. The non-party 1 and the non-party 9. The non-party 1 and the non-party 9. The non-party 1 and the non-party 9. The non-party 1 and the non-party 9. The non-party 1 and the non-party 1 had the right of lease 9. The non-party 1 and the non-party 1 had the right of lease 9. The non-party 1 and the non-party 1 had the right of lease 9. The non-party 1 and the non-party 1 had the right of lease 9.

B. Article 3(1) of the Housing Lease Protection Act provides as the requirements for opposing power along with the delivery of a house, and as a means of public announcement that enables a third party to clearly recognize the existence of a right of lease for the safety of transaction, the issue of whether the validity of a public announcement of a lease is determined depending on which the third party can recognize the existence of a right of lease as a resident registration. Therefore, it is insufficient to say that a method of public announcement that can satisfy the requirements for opposing power of resident registration is simply a formal resident registration for the sake of a method of public announcement that can satisfy the requirements for opposing power of resident registration. It should be sufficient to say that the third party can recognize that the possession relationship indicated on the basis of resident registration is the possession that is

According to the facts duly admitted by the court below, the defendant completed the registration of transfer of ownership in his name on August 30, 198, and completed the move-in report on October 1, 1993, and sold the apartment of this case to the non-party 1 at the same time on October 23, 1993, and thereafter, he had agreed to change the residential relation of the apartment of this case from December 23, 1993, and continued to reside in this case as the lessee's qualification. However, although the registration of transfer of ownership in the name of the non-party 1 was completed on March 9, 1994, the third party did not recognize that the ownership transfer of the apartment of this case was occupied by the right of lease, not by the defendant, before the registration of transfer of ownership was completed in the name of the non-party 1 in the name of the non-party 1 in the name of the non-party 1 in this case, it was impossible to recognize that the ownership transfer was valid after the non-party 1 in this case's name.

Therefore, the court below is just in rejecting the defendant's defense that the defendant cannot respond to the plaintiff's request for surrender before receiving the refund of the lease deposit of this case on October 23, 1993 on the ground that he acquired the opposing power of the right of lease of this case from the plaintiff on the ground that the defendant acquired the opposing power of the right of lease of this case on October 23, 1993, which was before the creation of the right of lease of this case in the name of the non-party non-party 1 bank, since the defendant was able to acquire the opposing power under the Housing Lease Protection Act only after the owner on the register and the lessee were transferred from the defendant to the non-party 1 on March 9, 1994 when the ownership of the apartment of this case was transferred to the non-party 1, and there is no error of law by misunderstanding the scope of the transferee

2. On the second, third, and fourth grounds

Article 608(2) of the Civil Procedure Act provides that the right to lease on a deposit basis, the period of which expires within 6 months after the registration under Article 611 of the same Act, shall be deemed extinguished along with the right to lease on a deposit basis of the right to preferential payment of the right to lease on a deposit basis. Thus, it shall be deemed that the right to lease on a deposit basis existing in a state where there is no prior mortgage, and it shall not be deemed that the prior mortgage exists and that the right to lease is naturally applicable even when the right to lease on a deposit basis is extinguished due to an auction. In addition, the above provision does not provide for whether the right to lease on a deposit basis with the right to lease on a deposit basis is extinguished or not. Therefore, the issue of extinguishment of the right to lease on a deposit basis

However, in the event of a successful bid of the immovable property subject to the execution of subordinated mortgage, the priority mortgage is naturally extinguished pursuant to the provisions of Articles 728 and 608 (2) of the Civil Procedure Act. In this case, even if the right of lease is possible to oppose the subordinated mortgagee, the right of lease with the opposing power or registered after the extinguished mortgage is extinguished, and therefore, the successful bidder cannot be deemed to be included in the assignee of the leased house under Article 3 of the Housing Lease Protection Act. Thus, the right of lease cannot be asserted against the successful bidder (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 86Meu1936, Feb. 24, 1987; 86Meu1718, Mar. 10, 1987; 89Meu3043, Jan. 23, 1990).

According to the facts duly established by the court below, on December 16, 1993 with respect to the apartment of this case, the registration of the establishment of a neighboring mortgage was completed on December 16, 1993, and on March 12, 1994, the registration of the establishment of a neighboring apartment of this case was completed on March 2, 1994, and the plaintiff acquired the apartment of this case by winning a successful bid in the auction procedure due to the execution of the right to collateral security on March 9, 1994. As seen above, the defendant's right to lease that should be viewed as having the opposing power under the Housing Lease Protection Act was extinguished only after March 9, 194 pursuant to the above legal principles, and the defendant cannot assert the effect of the right to lease of this case against the plaintiff. In this case, Article 608 (2) of the Civil Procedure Act is not applicable.

In the same purport, the decision of the court below which rejected the defendant's simultaneous performance defense is just, and there is no error of law by misunderstanding the legal principles as to the existence of opposing power against the successful bidder of the lessee with opposing power or the precedence thereof, and as otherwise alleged in the ground of appeal, the court below did not render a decision as to the defendant's assertion that the lease right of this case cannot be extinguished pursuant to Article 608 (2) of the Civil Procedure Act, even if the court below did not render a decision as to the above argument, as long as it is obvious that the above argument cannot be accepted, it does not affect the conclusion of the judgment. All of the grounds of appeal as to this point are not acceptable.

3. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the defendant who is the appellant. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Jeong Jong-ho (Presiding Justice)