2. The lower court determined the Defendant’s punishment on the grounds of sentencing as stated in its reasoning. In full view of the circumstances stated by the lower court and all other sentencing conditions in the proceedings of the instant case, it cannot be deemed that the lower court’s punishment is too unreasonable.

Therefore, the defendant's assertion is without merit.

3. Ex officio determination on an employment restriction order was amended by Act No. 15889, Dec. 11, 2018; and effective June 12, 2019 (hereinafter “Revised Child Welfare Act”) Article 29-3 of the Child Welfare Act provides that where a court declares a punishment for a child abuse-related crime, it shall simultaneously issue an employment restriction order to operate a child-related institution for a certain period not exceeding 10 years, or to provide employment or actual labor to a child-related institution, and where the risk of recidivism is significantly low or other special circumstances are determined not to restrict employment, an employment restriction order may not be imposed. Article 2(1) of the Addenda to the amended Child Welfare Act provides that Article 29-3 of the Child Welfare Act provides that the aforementioned amended provisions also apply to a person who committed a child abuse-related crime before the Child Welfare Act enters into force and has not been finally determined.

Therefore, the court below omitted the determination on whether the defendant who committed a crime of child abuse before the revision of the Child Welfare Act was sentenced to the employment restriction order.

However, since the principle of prohibition of disadvantageous change in this case, which only the defendant appealed, cannot change the punishment more unfavorable to the defendant than the original judgment, the original judgment shall not be reversed on the ground that the above error was found in the original judgment.

4. Conclusion.