Article 13 of the Value-Added Tax Act

2. The costs of appeal are assessed against the Plaintiffs.

This part of the judgment is the same as the corresponding part of the judgment of the court of first instance, and thus, it is accepted by Article 8(2) of the Administrative Litigation Act and the main sentence of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act.

2. Whether the instant disposition is lawful

A. The plaintiffs' assertion

For the following reasons, the instant disposition is unlawful.

1) Since the terms and conditions of a contract between the plaintiffs and the buyers and the proceeds of the sale of the right of lease received by the plaintiffs are the premium of the nature of the deposit to be returned when the lease contract is terminated in light of the practice of the lease contract, the plaintiffs cannot be deemed to have been definitely reverted to the plaintiffs at the time when they received the said money. Therefore, the said money is an advance, which is a remodeling fee received from the existing lessee, five years, and the amount of the rent received from the new lessee, is treated as the income of the plaintiffs in proportion to the service life of each of the commercial buildings of this case, which is the lease period, and if the lessee collects the amount equivalent to the premium through the transfer of the right of lease during the lease period, it must be treated as income of the plaintiffs. Nevertheless, the defendants are deemed as definitely

2) Although the Plaintiffs received remodeling expenses and the lease proceeds include value-added taxes, the Defendants deemed that the amount of value-added tax is not included, and the Plaintiffs determined the tax base and calculated the tax amount based on the total amount received by the Plaintiffs as the value-added tax amount.

3) If the Plaintiff’s assertion, like the Defendants, deemed that the purchase price of each of the instant commercial buildings is the price for the transfer of the right to lease the remodelling cost and the right to lease the sales of each of the instant commercial buildings, it has the same effect as the sale of each of the instant commercial buildings, and thus, the Defendants should have treated the acquisition price of each of the instant commercial buildings as losses, but the Defendants imposed the instant disposition by treating only the remodeling construction cost

4) The Defendants imposed additional tax while rendering the instant disposition. In light of the fact that most of the remodeling expenses and the purchase-out-out-out-out-out-price received by the Plaintiff were immediately used as construction expenses, personnel expenses, advertising advertising expenses, etc., the Plaintiff understood the above money as the user fee for a given period, the Plaintiff did not contain the case that the Plaintiff imposed tax on the money of the nature as above, and that the non-taxable practices have been established as follows, it is difficult for the Plaintiff to grasp it as the cost for the transfer-out-out-out-out-sale-out-out-sale-sale-sale-sale-sale-sale-sale-sale-sale-related tax return and pay taxes

5) There are many cases where the sales contract of the right of lease in the form as seen in the instant case is made in the Nammun-gu and Dongdaemun-gu. The Plaintiff’s acquisition of each of the instant commercial buildings as well as its subsequent acquisition by regarding it as the price for the transfer of intangible assets is the reason for the instant disposition, and there is no other case. As such, the tax authority’s failure to impose tax, such as the instant disposition, is the reason for the instant disposition. In light of the fact that the transfer of intangible assets, if the sales contract of the right of lease is deemed as the transfer of intangible assets, there is a contradiction between deductible expenses and the method of disposal of intangible assets, and thus, the non-taxation practice that does not impose tax on the sales price of the right of lease as

B. Relevant statutes

This part of the judgment is the same as the corresponding part of the judgment of the court of first instance, and thus, it is accepted by Article 8(2) of the Administrative Litigation Act and the main sentence of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act.

C. Determination

1) As to the first argument

In order to see that the said money is divided in proportion to the lease period, not to the time when it was received as alleged by the Plaintiffs, the contract for the sale of the instant lease rights, which was based on the receipt of the said money, ought to be deemed to have the nature of the lease agreement, at the time when the contract is terminated during the lease period as the player rent. In order to see as above, the contract for the sale of the instant lease rights, which was based on the receipt of the said money, should have the nature of the lease agreement. Accordingly, the following should be examined as to

In full view of the following circumstances, Gap evidence 1 and Eul evidence 2 through 9-68's each statement, which can be seen as comprehensively considering the purport of the whole pleadings, the lease contract of this case is not the key point for leasing each of the stores of this case during the lease period, but it appears that the core point for transferring the right to use or lease of the above stores separately from the ownership of the above stores. Accordingly, the lease contract of this case seems to have been the object for transferring the right to use or lease of the above stores, and it cannot be deemed that the lease contract of this case was the object for the transfer of the above authority, and it cannot be deemed that the lease contract of this case was

Therefore, we cannot accept this part of the plaintiffs' assertion on the premise that the above money constitutes the nature of the premium similar to that of the premium which was received in connection with the lease contract (the plaintiffs asserted that the Supreme Court recognizes the duty of return of the premium in certain cases. However, the interpretation of the Supreme Court's decision cited by the plaintiffs is merely related to the premium received in accordance with the lease contract, and it does not apply to the case where the nature of the contract, which is the basis of the premium payment, is not a lease contract, but a transfer contract, such as the lease contract in this case, is not a lease contract.

A) The project strategy review report prepared by the Real Estate Economic Statistics Institute for the purpose of guiding the buyer at the time of parcelling-out of the right to lease of each commercial building of this case is divided into ‘transfer of ownership', ‘general lease', ‘long lease' and ‘long-term lease- superficies only (not later than the time a building exists)'. With respect to the above long-term lease, land shall be paid in FLOW and superficies shall be paid in the form of land in order to reduce inefficiencies in the possession of the store and to reduce inefficiencies in the possession of the store by paying the high price of the land in relation to the purpose of the long-term lease. The superficies (land) shall be paid in FLOW, and the legal review shall be interpreted as ‘the method of securing the ownership right and the right to use the land necessary for the commercial activities by owning only the superficies on the land and superficies,' as ‘the method of guaranteeing the stable right and the right to use the land necessary for the commercial activities', and as regards the liquidity effect in the position of the state shop, it shall secure the rent.

B) In the course of the investigation for the disposition of this case, Plaintiff Sung-A did not register the ownership of a building to a public official of the Seoul regional tax office by the unique method of sale in Seodaemun-gu only, but the buyer has a right to use a building permanently at a shop that was sold in lots and has the right to benefit and to dispose of the building through his office free of office without the consent of the Plaintiffs, and it is possible to inherit, and the buyer has the right to benefit and right to dispose of the building. The prop tax is paid to the land by the buyer, the buyer pays monthly rent and the management fee is paid by the lessor, and the lease contract (contract for the sale in lots) is replaced by the lease contract (the separate receipt of the lease contract and the management fee) at the time of the payment of the balance, but the deposit (10% of the purchase price) stated to the effect that the remainder of the sale price is not returned. In addition, in the process of the aforementioned investigation, many of the buyers of this case stated to the purport that the contents of the sale in lots in this case and the nature of Plaintiff Sung-A.

C) Although the above lease right subscription form or lease agreement contains a provision that can be seen as a usual lease agreement, such as the fact that a lessor’s consent is obtained at the time of lease period, lease deposit, and transfer sublease, the above South South South South South South South South South South South South South South South Korea’s business strategy review document and the statement of the Plaintiff Sung A and the buyer as seen above is a relatively small amount of lease deposit, prop car, etc., the contents indicated in the lease agreement are merely formally written in a standardized form, and it cannot be said that the content of the lease right contract of this case was the content of the contract.

D) As seen earlier, the right to use the commercial building of this case was decided to permanently guarantee the right to use the commercial building of this case, and the remaining amount 10% of the sale price excluding the amount to be converted to lease deposit is to be used for remodeling expenses, advertising propaganda expenses, etc., and not to refund it (the plaintiffs asserted that since the Fair Trade Commission decided that the terms and conditions as above are null and void, it cannot be said that there was an agreement between the parties to not return the above money based on the contents of the terms and conditions of the lease contract of this case. However, the fact that the parties did not return the above money was confirmed by the statement of the plaintiffs SungA and several buyers. Thus, the plaintiffs' above assertion that the agreement was not concluded based on the decision of the Fair Trade Commission as to the terms and conditions cannot be accepted.) In light of the above, the plaintiffs' holding the ownership of each commercial building of this case and transferred the right to use the commercial building of this case to the buyers, and the buyers are able to pay the sale price in return for the sale price to the third parties.

2) As to the second argument

In full view of the statement in Eul evidence No. 1, in calculating the value-added tax on the remodeling cost and the rent-sale amount received by the plaintiffs, the director of the tax office of Nam-gu may recognize the fact that the value-added tax is calculated by dividing it by 1.1 on the premise that the above amount is included in the value-added tax, and then the tax amount is calculated on the basis of the tax base. Accordingly, the plaintiff's assertion

3) As to the third argument

Article 27 (1) of the Income Tax Act provides that "The amount to be included in necessary expenses shall be the total amount of expenses corresponding to the total amount of income in the year concerned which is generally accepted, and Article 19 (2) of the Corporate Tax Act provides that "the losses or expenses incurred in connection with the business of the corporation shall be losses or expenses generally accepted or directly related to profit."

As seen earlier, as long as the sales contract of the right to lease does not transfer each of the instant commercial buildings itself, but the right to use or lease is transferred (the plaintiffs asserted to the effect that each of the instant commercial buildings has the same effect as the sale of each of the instant commercial buildings by transferring the right to use or lease. However, in light of the fact that the plaintiffs and buyers transfer the ownership of each of the instant commercial buildings under mutual agreement or excludes the form of general lease agreement and set the sales contract of the instant right as the form of transaction, without special circumstances, they cannot assert the legal effect that is contrary to the above parties' intent without any special circumstances). Accordingly, the ordinary or direct expenses generally accepted in response to its revenues are limited to only remodeling construction costs, personnel expenses, compensation, etc., and cannot be viewed as falling under the acquisition price of each of the instant commercial buildings (the acquisition price of each of the instant commercial buildings claimed by the plaintiffs is equivalent to the expenses corresponding to the income accrued from the transfer of each of the instant commercial buildings itself (the plaintiffs hold the right to manage and dispose of each of the instant commercial buildings except the right to use of each of each of the instant commercial buildings, and thus they cannot receive profits from each of each of the Plaintiff.

4) On the fourth argument

Under the tax law, where a taxpayer violates various obligations, such as a return and tax payment, as prescribed by the Act without justifiable grounds, an administrative sanction is imposed as prescribed by the Act, and where there is an unreasonable reason to believe that it is difficult to expect the taxpayer to fulfill his/her obligations, etc. (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 98Du17685, Aug. 22, 2000).

As seen earlier, in light of the fact that the plaintiffs stated that the remainder except 10% of the total amount of remodeling expenses and the total amount of the right to lease received by the plaintiffs had no obligation to return, it shall not be deemed that there exists a justifiable reason as mentioned above in the above-mentioned failure to report and pay obligations merely for the reasons that the plaintiffs asserted (in relation to the part that non-taxable practice was established, it shall not be deemed that the non-taxable practice was established as follows). Accordingly, this part of the plaintiffs' assertion

5) As to the fifth argument

Article 18(3) of the Framework Act on National Taxes provides that "an interpretation of tax-related Acts or practices in tax administration accepted by taxpayers" refers to a wrongful interpretation or practice that is accepted by an unspecified general taxpayer, who is not a specific taxpayer, without any objection, to the extent that it is not unreasonable for the taxpayer to trust such interpretation or practice. In order to establish such non-taxable practice, there is an objective fact not imposed for a considerable period of time, and the tax authority must express its intention not to impose tax due to any special circumstance even though it knows that it can be taxed on the matter. Such public opinion is also acknowledged when the situation of non-taxation continues over a long period of time (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 2008Du15350, Dec. 24, 2009; 2008Du15350, May 13, 2011).

Based on these legal principles, this case is examined.

Not only cannot be deemed to have satisfied the requirements for the establishment of non-taxable practice as mentioned above, but also there is no particular evidence to acknowledge that there was a fact that the tax was not imposed for a considerable period of time and that there was a declaration of intention that the tax authority would not impose tax due to any special circumstance, and this part of the Plaintiff’s assertion that the non-taxable practice was established cannot be accepted.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, all of the plaintiffs' claims should be dismissed due to the lack of reasons. The judgment of the court of first instance is just in conclusion, and the plaintiffs' appeal is dismissed as it is without merit.