2. The costs of the lawsuit are assessed against the defendant.

3. Paragraph 1 can be provisionally executed.

In full view of the facts stated in Gap evidence Nos. 1 through 4 and the whole purport of the arguments as a result of the request for appraisal of rent against non-party Nos. 2 of this Court, the plaintiff filed an application for the payment order (Seoul Central District Court 2016 tea9873) against the relatives association of this case for the payment of the agreed deposit amount equivalent to KRW 124,603,000 against the members association of Pyeongtaek-si (hereinafter "the relatives association of this case"). The payment order accepting the above application was issued and confirmed, and the payment order accepting the above application was issued and confirmed on June 21, 2016, the plaintiff's "the defendant was against the defendant" of Geumcheon-gu, Seoul High Court 200.9m266m20 (hereinafter "the land of this case"), and the provisional attachment order of this case from April 11, 201 to 206, 206.36m206.

2. Determination on the cause of the claim

According to the above facts of recognition, the defendant, the garnishee of the instant order, is obligated to pay to the plaintiff, the collection obligee, 124,603,000 won, and delay damages calculated at the rate of 15% per annum from July 12, 2016 (the day following the day on which the complaint of this case was served to the defendant) to the day of complete payment, barring special circumstances.

3. Judgment on the defendant's defense

A. Defendant’s defense

The defendant asserts that the plaintiff's claim should be dismissed because there is no claim subject to seizure (the claim for return of unjust enrichment against the defendant of the corporation of this case) under the order of this case as stated below.

[Around July 31, 1987, when the land of this case was owned by Nonparty 1 (the Nonparty), the Defendant constructed a new building on the land of this case. On June 13, 1994, Nonparty 1 bequeathed the land of this case to the Religious Council on the land of this case. On April 11, 2001, Nonparty 1 died on November 1, 1999, the ownership transfer registration was completed in the family council of this case on the land of this case. Nonparty 1 permitted the Defendant’s free use of the land of this case before the birth, or waived the right to use the land of this case. Nonparty 1 bequeathed the land of this case to the Religious Council of this case. Nonparty 1 is a specific legacy, and it is not possible to request the testamentary donee to extinguish a third party’s right to testamentary gift at the time of testamentary gift, and even after the Religious Council of this case acquired the ownership of this case, the Defendant did not have obtained the right to use the land of this case or the right to use the land of this case.

B. Determination

Comprehensively taking account of the purport of evidence Nos. 1-1, 2, 2-2, 17-1, and 2-2, Nonparty 1 owned the land of this case before October 11, 1976, Nonparty 1 established the Defendant Corporation on October 16, 1971 (the title at the time was “social Welfare Corporation”) and operated the Defendant Corporation on July 31, 1987 on the land of this case, which was owned by Nonparty 1, the building of this case was completed by the Defendant on July 31, 1987; the Defendant did not pay the usage fee of the land of this case to Nonparty 1; Nonparty 1 bequeathed the land of this case to the Religious Association on June 13, 1994; and Nonparty 1 died on the land of this case on the grounds of the ownership transfer registration of this case on January 1, 1991; and each of this case on the land of this case.

According to the above facts, there is room to view that the defendant used the land of this case without compensation until the plaintiff acquired the ownership of the land of this case, but even if so, the defendant cannot oppose the plaintiff who acquired the ownership of the land of this case on April 11, 2001 with the right of free use against the non-party 1.

The defendant's assertion that the testamentary donee cannot make a claim to extinguish a third person's right to the testamentary gift at the time of testamentary gift. Article 1085 of the Civil Act provides that "where the subject matter of testamentary gift or the right of a third person is the subject matter of the right at the time of the death of the testator, the testamentary donee shall not demand to extinguish the right of the third person against the latter." However, this provision is limited to the purport that the testamentary donee does not demand the extinction of the right of the third person against the latter (in this case, Nonparty 1's inheritor) and does not limit the exercise of the right against the defendant who has no opposing power against the testamentary donee (including the plaintiff who is the collection obligee).

Although the Defendant alleged that Nonparty 1 renounced the right to use and benefit from the instant land, there is no evidence to acknowledge this (the Nonparty 1 and the instant clan Association do not have the right to use and benefit from the instant land and do not seem to have the reason to receive the legacy).

In addition, the defendant asserts that the plaintiff allowed the free use of the land of this case or renounced the right to use the land of this case. According to the evidence Nos. 5 and 6 of this case, on February 15, 2000, the board of directors of the family council of this case made a resolution as shown in the above argument with the purport that the ownership of the land of this case is transferred to the non-party 3, the new representative director of the corporation of this case, and the fact that the certificate of transfer was prepared on March 6 of the same year according to the above resolution of the board of directors. However, in order to dispose of the property owned by the family council, the above fact of recognition requires a resolution of the general meeting of the family council. Thus, it is insufficient to recognize that the plaintiff allowed the non-party to use the land of this case or renounced the right to use it

The defendant's defense that the seized claim does not exist under the order of this case is groundless.

4. Conclusion

The plaintiff's claim is justified and accepted.

Judges Nam-ju