2. The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

A. On June 13, 2005, the Plaintiff acquired and owned 2,155 square meters in Seo-gu, Incheon Metropolitan City (the same 1,941 square meters in size as of February 9, 2010, the same 214 square meters in size as before the same 2014 square meters) and 198 square meters in the same paddy field (hereinafter referred to as “the farmland in this case”). On February 10, 2014, the Plaintiff completed the registration of transfer of ownership based on an agreement on the land for public use in the Republic of Korea, and acquired substitute land on a lot once after completing the registration of transfer of ownership based on the acquisition of land for public use. On April 30, 2014, the Plaintiff made a preliminary return to the Defendant by applying the provisions on capital gains tax reduction or exemption on farmland substitute land based on Article 70(1) of the former Act on Special Cases Concerning Taxation (amended by Act No. 13560, Dec. 15, 2015).

B. As to this, the Defendant denied the reduction or exemption of capital gains tax on the ground that the Plaintiff did not do so for at least three years, and on March 3, 2015, imposed a disposition of imposition of capital gains tax of KRW 85,007,270 for the Plaintiff (hereinafter “instant disposition”) on the Plaintiff in 2014.

C. The Plaintiff dissatisfied with the instant disposition and filed an appeal with the Tax Tribunal on April 8, 2015, but the Tax Tribunal dismissed the said appeal on June 19, 2015.

[Ground of recognition] Facts without dispute, Gap evidence 1, 2, Eul evidence 1, the purport of the whole pleadings

2. Whether the instant disposition is lawful

A. The plaintiff's assertion

Since the Plaintiff acquired the farmland of this case for not less than three years, the transfer income tax following the transfer of the farmland of this case should be reduced or exempted pursuant to Article 70(1) of the former Restriction of Special Taxation Act. However, the Defendant’s disposition of this case is unlawful.

(b) Related statutes;

It is as shown in the attached Form.

C. Determination

(1) Article 70(1) of the former Restriction of Special Taxation Act provides that a tax amount equivalent to 100/100 of capital gains tax shall be reduced or exempted on income accruing from the substitute farmland which is owned by a resident prescribed by Presidential Decree residing in the seat of farmland in such manner as prescribed by Presidential Decree due to the necessity for cultivation, and Article 67(2) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Restriction of Special Taxation Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 25211, Feb. 21, 2014; hereinafter the same shall apply) provides that "self-Cultivating in such manner as prescribed by Presidential Decree" in the main sentence of Article 70(1) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Restriction of Special Taxation Act means that a resident engages in cultivating or cultivating crops or perennial plants on his/her own farmland at all times or by cultivating or cultivating 1/2 or more of the farmland with his/her own labor for at least three years after residing in the seat of farmland for at least three years (referring to cases where a person who has cultivated farmland in such seat by consultation for at least three years and transfer of farmland in accordance with any other Act.

As above, the purport of the provision that imposes capital gains tax on the substitute land of farmland is to protect farmers through free substitution of farmland or to promote the development and encouragement of agriculture through permission and guarantee of free substitution, and thus, it is limited to the case where the farmland acquired and sold by the self-employed farmer is to substitute land for the purpose of cultivating the farmland owned by the self-employed farmer (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2002Du5924, Sept. 5, 2003).

On the other hand, the burden of proving the direct cultivation of the transferred land as the requirement for reduction or exemption of capital gains tax on self-arable land is against a taxpayer who asserts reduction or exemption of capital gains tax (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2002Du7074, Nov. 22, 2002). As long as a person directly engaged in farming in relation to the requirements for self-cultivation of farmland is concurrently engaged in other occupation, it cannot be deemed that it constitutes a self-cultivation even if he/she concurrently engages in other occupation. However, if he/she indirectly engages in farming in other occupation, it cannot be deemed that the meaning of "self-help" meets the requirements of "direct cultivation" (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2002Du8444, Oct. 11, 2002).

(2) Therefore, in light of the following circumstances, it is not sufficient to recognize that the evidence submitted by the Plaintiff alone is ordinarily engaged in the cultivation of the crops or perennial plants in the farmland in this case for not less than 3 years, or is cultivated or cultivated with the Plaintiff’s labor force by 1/2 or more of the cultivation of the crops or perennial plants in this case, or by the Plaintiff’s labor force, and in light of the overall purport of the pleadings, the evidence submitted by the Plaintiff alone is insufficient to recognize that the Plaintiff was engaged in the cultivation of the crops in this case or with the Plaintiff’s labor force for not less than 3 years, and there is no other evidence to acknowledge otherwise.

(A) The Plaintiff asserted that his child purchased the farmland of this case in order to directly cultivate organic farming day and vegetables for the purpose of treatment, etc. with the aim of treating them, but did not present any evidence to acknowledge that his child, during the period until April 2010 (the date of preparation of evidence A No. 5) acquired the farmland of this case, either asserted on the kinds of crops cultivated in the farmland of this case, yield, etc., or that he self-filled crops.

(B) After April 2010, the Plaintiff was staying in a foreign country, including the Philippines, for about 299 days (nine months) during the three-year period from February 10, 2014, which was the date of the transfer of the farmland in this case, and the Plaintiff cannot be deemed to have voluntarily performed the farmland in this case during the aforesaid period, and even if the Plaintiff cultivated the farmland in Jeonnam as alleged by the Plaintiff, it is difficult to view that the Plaintiff had voluntarily performed the farmland in this case.

(C) The Plaintiff continued to hold the farmland in this case as earned income in the form of KRW 205,54,800,000, total of 2005,554,000, and business income. In light of the fact that the above company’s business place is Seoul and vice versa, it is doubtful whether the Plaintiff was physically able to cultivate the farmland in this case more than 700 square meters (the Plaintiff’s receipt of wages from Australia was from around 2007, and around around 2005, the Plaintiff lent the amount of KRW 300,000 toCC, but the loan was not recovered as a result of its business operation. However, it is difficult to recognize the Plaintiff’s assertion that the Plaintiff’s investment agreement (Evidence No. 14, No. 14) submitted by the Plaintiff was inconsistent with the Plaintiff’s assertion in the form of salary.

(D) Around August 2012, when the Plaintiff purchased a port cancer cream to be cultivated in the farmland of this case, it is difficult to view the Plaintiff as independent evidence supporting the Plaintiff’s racing track because there is no specific statement of fact, such as the cultivation method, the content and subject of the work, and the frequency of the work, and there is no other evidence to prove that the Plaintiff was in charge of one half or more of the farming work in the farmland of this case from the farmland of this case, while the Plaintiff submitted a detailed statement of fact, it is confirmed that the Plaintiff was staying in the Philippines. However, at the same time, the Plaintiff’s certificate of cultivation (No. 13-3) and the certificate of transaction (No. 22-1-5) submitted by the Plaintiff.

(3) Sub-decisions

Therefore, since the instant disposition is lawful, the Plaintiff’s assertion seeking the revocation of the instant disposition on a different premise is without merit.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiff's claim of this case is dismissed, and it is so decided as per Disposition.