1. 원심은, 제1심판결의 이유를 일부 인용하여, 원고가 소외 김종진과 사이에 그의 소유인 판시 화물자동차(이하 원고측 차량이라고 한다)에 관하여, 피고 전국화물자동차운송사업조합 연합회(이하 피고 조합이라고 한다)가 피고 피고 1 합자회사(이하 피고 회사라고 한다)와 사이에 피고 회사 소유인 판시 트레일러(이하 피고측 차량이라고 한다)에 관하여 판시와 같은 자동차보험계약 또는 화물공제계약을 각 체결한 사실, 소외 1이 1997. 3. 28. 11:00경 원고측 차량을 운전하여 충남 부여군 규암면 모리 29 앞 편도 1차선 도로를 규암 방면에서 은산 방면으로 과속 진행하던 중 전방에서 좌회전하기 위하여 정차하고 있던 소외 한광자 운전의 판시 승용차(이하 피해 차량이라고 한다)를 뒤늦게 발견한 잘못으로 급히 제동조치를 취하였으나 미치지 못하여 원고측 차량의 적재함 좌측 가운데 부분으로 위 피해 차량의 우측 뒤 범퍼 부분을 비스듬히 추돌하는 바람에 그 충격으로 위 피해 차량으로 하여금 대향차선으로 튕겨져 나가면서 마침 반대 방향에서 마주 진행하여 오던 소외 2운전의 피고측 차량의 우측 앞 범퍼 부분에 연쇄 충돌하게 함으로써 피해 차량에 타고 있던 구순배 등이 사망하는 등의 판시와 같은 사고(이하 이 사건 사고라고 한다)를 일으킨 사실을 인정한 다음, 피고들의 면책 주장에 대하여 판단함에 있어, 우선 차량의 제동거리를 구하는 판시와 같은 물리학 공식에다가 이 사건 도로 현황 등에 따른 판시와 같은 변수 값을 적용하여 피고측 차량이 이 사건 도로를 그 제한속도인 시속 60km를 지켜 주행하였을 경우의 제동거리를 산출하면 공주거리는 11.666m, 활주거리는 17.71m∼23.62m 가량이 된다고 전제하고, 이어 판시 채택 증거들에 의하여 위 소외 2가 이 사건 사고 당시 제한속도인 시속 60km를 26.4km나 초과한 시속 86.4km로 피고측 차량을 운행한 사실, 피고측 차량의 총 길이는 19.19m(트랙터 6.76m＋트레일러 12.43m)인 사실을 인정하고 나서, 여기에 이 사건 사고장소의 도로상태, 도로 폭, 차선(편도 1차선), 스키드마크의 길이(우측 앞바퀴 13.4m, 우측 뒷바퀴 36.8m, 좌측 뒷바퀴 34.2m), 중앙선 침범형태, 피해 차량의 발견지점, 피고측 차량과의 거리 등 제반 사정을 덧붙여 볼 때, 피고측 차량 운전자인 소외 2가 원고측 차량에 의하여 추돌을 당해 자신의 진행차선 쪽으로 튕겨져 나오는 피해 차량을 발견하고 제동하기 시작한 지점은 우측 뒷바퀴의 스키드마크 길이인 36.8m에서 피고측 차량의 총 길이 19.19m를 뺀 17.16m(피고측 차량이 피해 차량과 추돌한 후의 스키드마크 길이를 포함하였으므로 실제로는 그 이하일 것으로 추측됨) 내외라 할 것인 반면, 시속 60km로 운행하는 차량이 제동하기 위해 필요한 거리(활주거리)는 앞에서 본 것처럼 17.71m∼23.62m 정도나 되므로, 가사 소외 2가 위 제한속도를 지켜 운행하였다 하더라도 피해 차량과의 충돌을 피할 수 없었다 할 것이니, 소외 2에 대하여 과속운행 책임을 물을 수 없고, 달리 이 사건 사고 발생의 원인이 된 과실이 있다고 볼 만한 증거가 없으며, 그 밖에 소외 2에게 반대차선에서 좌회전하기 위하여 정차 중이던 차량이 제3의 차량에 의하여 추돌을 당해 그 충격으로 자신의 진행차선 쪽으로 넘어올 경우까지 미리 예견하고 이를 방지하여야 할 주의의무는 없다는 이유를 들어 피고측의 책임은 면제된다는 취지로 판단하였다.

2. However, the lower court’s determination on the Defendants’ assertion of exemption is difficult to accept for the following reasons.

A. First, we examine the duty of care of Nonparty 2, who is the driver of the Defendant’s vehicle.

기록에 의하면, 이 사건 사고 지점은 노견을 제외한 도로 폭이 6.9ｍ에 불과한 편도 1차선의 곧게 뻗은 도로로서 피고측 차량의 진행 방향을 기준으로 오른쪽으로는 모리 마을로 들어가는 길과 연결되고, 왼쪽으로는 차마의 통행이 가능한 농로와 연결되는 교차로이며, 따로 신호기 등에 의한 교통정리는 행하여지고 있지 아니하고, 그 교차로의 중심에서 보아 피고측 차량이 진행하여 오는 방향 쪽으로 보행인의 통행을 위한 횡단보도가 설치되어 있고 그 길가 양쪽에 횡단보도 표지판도 세워져 있는 사실, 위 사고 당시 위 교차로에는 피고측 차량과 반대 방향에서 피해 차량이 좌회전하여 모리 마을 쪽으로 들어가기 위하여 좌측 깜박이 신호를 넣은 채 대기 중이었는데, 당시의 날씨나 시간대, 도로조건 등이 운전자의 시야에 어떤 장애를 일으킬 만한 상태가 아니었으므로 이와 같은 피해 차량의 존재나 그 움직임 등은 피고측 차량을 운전하여 위 교차로를 향해 질주하여 오던 소외 2에게 멀리서부터 충분히 목격될 수 있었던 사실을 알 수 있다.

If the present situation of the accident point and the traffic situation at the time of the accident are as above, as Non-Party 2, who is the driver of the Defendant side, did not neglect to turn to the left as in this case, even if the damaged vehicle waiting to turn to the left without any choice by the shock, it can be sufficiently predicted that the damaged vehicle has a duty of care to prevent the traffic accidents and comprehensive traffic speed through the intersection, such as failure to stop to turn to the left from the Plaintiff side, even if it comes to go to the speed without any choice by the shock, it can be sufficiently predicted that the damaged vehicle has a duty of care to turn to the left to the left by entering the intersection. Thus, it is sufficient to say that the damaged vehicle has a duty of care to check the traffic safety through the intersection, such as failure to stop to stop the intersection, and that it does not have any specific duty of care to regulate the traffic under Article 17 of the Road Traffic Act (see Article 2 of the Road Traffic Act).

In addition, the Supreme Court's decision cited by the court below does not discuss whether or not the above non-party 2 who driven the defendant's vehicle with the above judgment is liable for the duty of care, since the case is different from the case of this case where the collision accident occurred at the intersection where the left-hand turn is permitted in the opposite direction when the plaintiff tried to turn to the left-hand turn with the driver's central line.

B. Next, we examine the causal relationship between the non-party 2's continuous operation and the accident (the second collision with the damaged vehicle).

(1) In light of the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below assumed that, of the skiing mark of the defendant's vehicle, the front and the right side wheeler's front and the rear wheeler's front right side was formed, and again, that the operation of the brake system of the non-party 2 was placed on the front side of the defendant's vehicle at the point where the operation of the brake system of the non-party 2 could be seen as being first shown on the defendant's first side, and that this situation was the starting point. If the accident occurred at the time, instead of the actual operation speed presumed to be 86.4 km at the time, it seems that the non-party 2, who operated the defendant's side, could avoid collision with the damaged vehicle at a speed of 60 km as soon as the actual speed of the accident occurred, and as a result, it is the premise that the operation of the brake system of this case, even if the point was operated at a normal speed without complying with the first operation speed of the damaged vehicle.

However, as the judgment of the court below has also been properly decided, it is judged that the driver of the vehicle finds obstacles and finds it necessary to take a rapid action, and that the vehicle operation distance is in proportion to the operating speed of the vehicle and the running time of the vehicle, i.e., operation of each brake system until the actual operation of the system first occurs, but it requires a certain period of time, and the vehicle is in progress between this inspection or net situation (the running distance for this period is called a "air route"; furthermore, after the beginning of the first operation of the vehicle after the beginning of the first operation effect, the vehicle is called a "active distance" and the vehicle begins until the last stop due to the continuous operation of the power, and it is obvious that the vehicle operation distance is in proportion to the first operation speed of the vehicle and the running time of the vehicle, so it is obvious that there is no special reason to see the same driving speed as the first operation risk even if the driver is found at the same point and there is no difference in the same time (the same as the first operation risk).

Nevertheless, the court below, in determining whether the other defendant's vehicle, as such natural sacrifies, could avoid collision with the damaged vehicle if it maintained a limited speed, presumed that the non-party 2, who is the driver of the defendant's vehicle, would have been able to avoid the collision with the damaged vehicle, first presumed the expected point where the defendant's driver observed the course of the damaged vehicle, and did not seem to have the same effect since the end of the restricted speed, based on the anticipated official distance when the restricted speed was maintained at that point, and it did not seem to have the same effect from the beginning point of the skiing mark of this case where the restricted speed was formed far away from the actual running of the speed. Accordingly, the judgment of the court below is unreasonable.

(2) Furthermore, considering the causal relationship between the continuous operation of Nonparty 2 and the accident of this case (the second collision between the damaged vehicle and the damaged vehicle) by accepting the physical science formula and the application of its variables (no objective material is shown in the record) on the same distance premised on the lower court’s premise in mind in mind, as seen below, even if Nonparty 2, who driven the Defendant’s vehicle, operated the vehicle without speed limit as indicated in the lower court’s holding, it would be difficult to conclude that it was difficult to avoid any collision with the damaged vehicle entering its course without any choice but without speed. Therefore, the lower court’s decision is unreasonable in this regard.

(A) Although the record of Non-Party 2’s witnessed vehicle at one point, which is the driver of the above vehicle, is not clearly indicated. However, according to the facts acknowledged by the court below, it is presumed that the defendant’s vehicle runs at a speed of 86.4 km at the time of the accident [the operating speed is presumed to be the result of the investigative agency’s skid length converted from the point of accident. According to the records, it is likely that the skid mark will be calculated to be less than the actual operating speed of the damaged vehicle, considering the fact that the vehicle’s skid part, which is the front part of the above 4th line, would be less than the front part of the vehicle’s skid's length, which constitutes the front part of the 8th line of the above skid's length, and the front part of the 19th line of the skid's length, which constitutes the front part of the vehicle’s skid's length from the front part of the 8th line.

(나) 그런데, 소외 2가 이 사건 도로의 일반적 제한속도인 원심 판시의 시속 60km로 주행하여 오다가 위 추정 목격지점에서 충돌 위험을 느끼고 즉각 제동조치에 나아갔다고 가정하는 경우 피고측 차량은 계산상 원심 판시의 예상 공주거리(11.666ｍ)와 활주거리(17.71ｍ∼23.62ｍ)를 더 진행한 끝에 위 지점으로부터 29.376ｍ(11.666ｍ＋17.71ｍ) 내지 35.286ｍ(11.666ｍ＋23.62ｍ) 가량 떨어진 지점(위 횡단보도 교차로 쪽 끝선에서 3∼9ｍ 가량 더 지나친 곳이다)에 최종 정지하였을 것이라는 결론에 이르고, 한편 기록에 의하면 피고측 차량은 가장 앞부분이 횡단보도를 막 지나쳐 교차로에 진입하자마자 피해 차량과 충돌하였음을 알 수 있으므로(다만, 기록상 횡단보도 끝선부터 충돌 추정 지점까지의 실측거리에 관한 자료는 없다.), 이에 의하면 피고측 차량이 제한속도를 지킨 채 진행하여 왔더라도 일응 피해 차량과의 충돌을 피할 수 없었을 것처럼 보인다.

(C) However, it is difficult to say that the collision is inevitable due to the difference between the two points of the above calculation result and the point of the presumption of collision. Furthermore, even though there is no clear and substantial survey data on the record, it is inevitable to take such measures for the convenience of calculation. However, as the presumption point of Non-party 2, who was the Daejeon in the above calculation process, was placed in the future as seen earlier, compared to the original expected point of the length between the rear side of the vehicle on the part of the defendant, and neglected the distance from the end of the crosswalk to the point of the presumption of collision. In order to maintain the difference between the defendant's vehicle's total length at the time of the accident and the point of the point of the presumption of collision, it is difficult to say that the difference was inevitable due to the difference between the two points and the point of the point of the presumption of collision, and even if it was conducted through a thorough on-site investigation, it is difficult to readily conclude that there was a difference between the defendant's vehicle and the above method of appraisal.

(3) Furthermore, as seen earlier, the above non-party 2 has a duty of care to drive the road at least along the intersection in order to perform the duty of traffic along the intersection under the Road Traffic Act, and furthermore, the duty of care to reduce the operating speed. Thus, the court below determined whether the non-party 2 fulfilled such duty of care by taking into account the remaining distance, etc. at the time of the completion of witnessing the presumption point into account the point at which the operation speed would reach a certain level at the time of the intersection. If the operation speed is under the speed limit, the court below should have determined the possibility of collision with the damaged vehicle on the basis of the driving speed rather than the restricted speed, and immediately without taking such measures, it was determined that the defendant's vehicle could not avoid the collision with the damaged vehicle. In this regard, the judgment of the court below is also unreasonable.

3. Therefore, the court below erred by misapprehending the legal principles as to the duty of care of drivers of vehicles intending to pass along the intersection, or by misunderstanding facts against the rules of evidence, which affected the conclusion of the judgment, on the erroneous premise that, in the process of the operation of the vehicle, Non-party 2, who is the driver of the defendant's vehicle, met the remaining speed of restriction, which is naturally different from the distance of the vehicle, if the speed of operation differs without sufficient deliberation as to various circumstances as seen above, such as the point where the defendant's driver observed the course of the damaged vehicle, or the point where the operation is conducted, or the operation is the same as the point where the operation is conducted, of the vehicle in the same manner, the defendant's vehicle might not avoid any collision with the damaged vehicle even if the vehicle operates the vehicle in compliance with the speed limit.

The ground of appeal pointing this out is with merit.

Therefore, the judgment of the court below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the court below. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Seo Sung-sung (Presiding Justice)