B. Limit of presumption of possession with autonomy under Article 197 of the Civil Code

C. Requirements for the acquisition by prescription of the registry under Article 245(2) of the Civil Act

2. Article 197 of the Civil Act is presumed to have been possessed by an occupant with the intention of possession, not to apply to the case where the possessor, by nature, is deemed to have no intention of possession.

3. The purport of Article 245(2) of the Civil Act is that the period registered as the owner of real estate and the period of occupation of the owner is required to be ten years as the same.

The costs of appeal shall be borne by each appellant.

1. As to the Plaintiff’s appeal:

The designation, change, and continuation of the date in the civil procedure shall be within the jurisdiction of the presiding judge. However, Article 152 of the Civil Procedure Act provides that the change of the first date for pleading or the first date for preparatory procedure shall be permitted even if there is no obvious reason to the contrary, so even if the Defendant country and the Plaintiff applied for the change of the date on the fourth date for pleading in the first instance trial, even if there is no evidence to deem that there was no permission by the presiding judge in charge, the said date for pleading shall be implemented as designated.

According to the records, the court ordered the case at the same date, and the litigation performers of both the plaintiff and the defendant country are clear that they were absent, so that the effect of both the plaintiff and the defendant's absence has occurred. However, although the statement of postponement is stated in the statement of pleading on the same date, it is said that it is the purport of delaying the pleading in relation to other defendants.

(This case is not a requisite co-litigation relationship).

In addition, according to the records, it is clear that the litigation performers of the plaintiff and defendant country were absent on the date of pleading 10:00 of September 26, 197, the later date of pleading 197, and therefore, it is clear that the lawsuit between the plaintiff and defendant will bring about the effect of deemed withdrawal.

Thus, although the principal lawsuit between the plaintiff and the defendant is terminated and the lawsuit cannot be tried or judged above, the court of first instance shall be judged on the merits of the case although there is no need to say that the court shall not have been able to continue the lawsuit, it shall be deemed that the judgment of the court of first instance has been made on the merits of the case without the continuation of the lawsuit. Whether the lawsuit is in progress or not shall be subject to ex officio investigation, and the judgment of the court of first instance shall be revoked and the judgment of the court of first instance shall be revoked and the decision of the court of first instance has been declared, and the lawsuit against the court of first instance shall not be adopted with different opinions

2. As to the Defendant’s appeal:

(A) According to the judgment of the court below, the land of this case was purchased from Nonparty 1 in March 15, 1912 and completed the registration of ownership transfer in around 1943, and the Plaintiff registered in the name of ○○○○ (○○○) (○○), a creative name, was recorded on the land cadastre in around 1943, and Nonparty 2 reported his ownership to the competent tax office in accordance with the Act on Special Measures for the Registration of Transfer of Ownership of General Farmland on December 5, 1964 and recognized that the registration of ownership transfer was completed in its name at the same time in accordance with the records.

The theory of the lawsuit, as recognized by the Plaintiff as being subject to the land-related circumstances on March 15, 1912, states the theory by misunderstanding it, but it cannot be adopted.

(B) Furthermore, the court below rejected the Defendant’s motion to preserve ownership as of December 21, 197, on the ground that: (a) although it was impossible for Nonparty 3 to cultivate the above land without clearing it; (b) since around 1944, Nonparty 3 renounced the land in transit; and (c) Nonparty 2 left the land as it was left unattended; and (d) Nonparty 2 cultivated the land in transit from 1957 to 5 December 1964; (b) subsequently, Nonparty 4 and the Defendant acquired the ownership registration in succession; and (c) Nonparty 4 and the Defendant purchased the land in succession; and (d) on the basis of the fact that the Plaintiff cultivated the land abandoned without clearly recording that the date of filing the suit was February 21, 197, it cannot be deemed that the Plaintiff commenced possession with the intention of possession by nature of the source of right; and (e) there was no evidence to deem that Nonparty 2 occupied the above land with the intention of possession; and (e) Nonparty 2 did not express his intention to preserve the acquisition registration of ownership from 1257.

From Article 197 of the Civil Act, the provision that the possessor shall be presumed to possess as his own intention does not apply to cases where it shall be deemed to have no intention to own as the possessor in view of the nature of the title (see Supreme Court Decision 63Da262, Jun. 20, 1963). Thus, the above judgment below is justifiable in its purport that the non-party 2 cultivated part of the land of this case from 1957 to 1957 cannot be deemed to have occupied as his own intention in view of the nature of the title. The above judgment below shall not be deemed to have been registered, and the defendant did not assert the short-term prescription period of 10 years at the court below, and the purport of Article 245(2) of the Civil Act shall not be deemed to have been 10 years since the expiration of the period of possession as the owner of real estate and the period of possession of the land by the non-party 2 from the expiration of the period of 197Da1505, Mar. 23, 1976.

Therefore, all appeals are dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against each losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Jeong Tae-won (Presiding Justice)