B. The Addenda (2) of the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Disposal of State and Public Property (Act No. 1669 of Dec. 31, 1964) provides that with respect to a case in which an administrative litigation was filed before December 31, 64, the provisions on transitional measures are to confirm the relationship of rights as an administrative litigation thereafter.

B. The provisions of the Addenda (2) of the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Disposal of State and Public Property (Act No. 1669) in the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Disposal of State and Public Property (Act No. 1669) are as follows: with respect to a case in which an administrative litigation was filed before December 31, 64.12.

The costs of appeal shall be borne by the plaintiff.

According to the records of the first instance court's second instance trial prior to the remanding of the case, it is reasonable to view that the plaintiff clearly stated that he did not object to the participation in the lawsuit by the defendant joining the second instance court prior to the remanding of the case, and that he has lost his right to object. Therefore, there is no ground to appeal to the effect that there is an error of law in the litigation procedure using the participation in the lawsuit by misunderstanding the legal principles as to the participation in

No. 2, even in the Daegu High Court Decision 63No. 70 decided to dismiss the plaintiff's dismissal judgment against the defendant in this case (Supreme Court Decision 64Nu119) where the decision to dismiss the plaintiff's dismissal judgment became final and conclusive (Supreme Court Decision 64Nu119), such decision to dismiss the plaintiff's claim does not bring about the effect of formation as claimed, but is only a res judicata effect that there is no right to form the claim between the parties concerned (see Supreme Court Decision 4291No. 118 decided Aug. 31, 1960; Supreme Court Decision 4291No. 119 decided Feb. 18, 196). Furthermore, the above decision to dismiss the plaintiff's dismissal judgment does not seem to have a substitute effect as in the theory of lawsuit, and it does not conflict with the validity of the above final judgment to the effect that the plaintiff's dismissal of the claim in this case does not conflict with the above final judgment.

No. 3. The Special Measures Act on the Disposal of Property for Reversion, enacted on May 29, 1963, cannot be applied to the disposal of the property already completed by the public auction prior to the enforcement of the Act. Thus, in determining the legitimacy of the qualification of the purchaser for the sale contract of this case which was completed on July 31, 1962, it shall be based on the Act on the Disposal of Property for Reversion, and shall not be based on the above Act on the Special Measures enforced thereafter. Therefore, the judgment of the court below which held that the lease contract of this case, which was already cancelled on August 18, 1948, cannot be deemed as naturally recovered from the lease contract of this case for the reason that the Plaintiff paid the unpaid rent for the reason that it could not be seen that the lease contract of this case was completed by the lease contract of this person on February 29, 1960.

If the reasoning of the first instance judgment was examined, the original defendant's purchase and sale contract of this case between the original defendant was concluded on July 31, 1962 based on the evidence adopted by the original judgment was confirmed, and the defendant's cancellation disposition of this case was three years after the purchase and sale disposition was based on the premise that it was effective after notification to the plaintiff on July 29, 1965. Thus, it is clear that there was no error in the incomplete hearing or lack of reasoning due to the non-exercise of the right to request the plaintiff's request, such as the theory of lawsuit, and the record was consistent, it cannot be deemed that the plaintiff's request was changed to the claim to confirm the invalidity of the right to request this case, and the original judgment dismissing the plaintiff's request for the cancellation of the administrative disposition of the right to request the revocation of the sale and sale contract of the property belonging to this case shall be deemed that there was no ground for revocation like the plaintiff's head, and there is no error in the misapprehension of the meaning of the right to request the confirmation of nullity.

In light of the records of the first instance court's decision that the above two lease contracts are different from the lessee's selection process and the lessee's selection process of the tenant, and thus, they are a separate contract for the former. Thus, there is no violation of the rules of evidence or any violation of the rules of evidence. Thus, there is no ground for appeal by the court below to the purport that the court below's determination of the legitimate facts and its determination should be criticized on the ground of the evidence rejected.

No. 6. In the transitional measure of Act No. 1669 of Dec. 31, 1964, where an administrative litigation was instituted with respect to the rights under the Act on Special Measures for the Disposal of Property Belonging to the State Property and the Act on Special Cases for the Disposal of Property Belonging to the State Property before December 31, 1964, it was already stipulated that the relationship of rights is determined by an administrative litigation even after January 1, 1965. As to a case in which an administrative litigation was instituted before December 31, 1964, the purport of confirming the relationship of rights through an administrative litigation is that the relationship of rights is determined by the administrative litigation, and the relation with the right to the sale of property belonging to the State property, such as the sales contract of this case, which had not been raised before December 31, 1964, can only be revoked by the result of administrative litigation, and the plaintiff's appeal of this case cannot be seen as legitimate and justifiable. The plaintiff's appeal of this case can not be dismissed for this reason.

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed by the assent of all participating judges, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party and it is so decided as per Disposition.

Judge Han-dong (Presiding Judge) of the Supreme Court