A. The Defendants pay to each of the Plaintiff 23,00,000 won with 20% interest per annum from November 12, 2009 to the full payment date, Defendant 2 paid 5% interest per annum from March 24, 2009 to November 18, 2010, and 20% interest per annum from the next day to the full payment date.

B. The plaintiff's remaining claims against the defendant 2 are dismissed.

(c) Paragraph (a) may be provisionally executed.

2. All remaining appeals by the plaintiff and defendant 1 are dismissed.

3. The total costs of the lawsuit shall be borne by the Defendants.

The defendants jointly and severally pay to the plaintiff 23 million won and to the plaintiff 20% interest per annum from the day following the delivery of a copy of the complaint of this case to the day of full payment.

The purport of the Plaintiff’s appeal

The part against the plaintiff in the judgment of the court of first instance shall be revoked. This decision is identical to the purport of the claim.

Defendant 1’s purport of appeal

The part of the judgment of the first instance against the defendant shall be revoked. The plaintiff's claim against the defendant 1 shall be dismissed.

A. A. Around January 10, 1995, the Plaintiff entered into a lease agreement with Defendant 1 by setting the lease deposit amount of KRW 23 million and the lease term from January 10, 1995 to January 10, 1996 with regard to 3 Dong, Seo-gu, Incheon Metropolitan City (hereinafter “instant building”).

B. Around that time, the Plaintiff completed a move-in report on January 11, 1995 after paying the deposit to Defendant 1, and went to another place on September 14, 1996 after the expiration of the lease term.

C. On August 14, 1995, Defendant 2, who actually owned the instant building, issued a promissory note with the face value of KRW 23 million to the Plaintiff, and signed a notarial deed with the South-North General Law Firm 1995 and No. 4524 on the same day.

[Evidence Evidence] Facts without dispute, Gap evidence Nos. 1 and 3, the purport of the whole pleadings

2. The assertion and judgment

A. Determination on the cause of the claim

1) The part on Defendant 1

According to the above facts, since the lease contract of this case was terminated upon the expiration of the period on January 10, 1996, Defendant 1 is obligated to pay deposit 23 million won and damages for delay to the Plaintiff, unless there are special circumstances as a party to the lease contract of this case.

2) The part as to Defendant 2

Defendant 2, the actual owner of the building of this case, prepared and executed a promissory note No. 23 million won as to the deposit under the instant lease agreement to the Plaintiff. As seen earlier, it is reasonable to deem that Defendant 2 expressed with Defendant 1 that he would be liable for the return of the lease deposit under the instant lease agreement to the Plaintiff. Accordingly, Defendant 2 is liable to pay the Plaintiff the above KRW 23 million and its delay damages, barring any special circumstance.

3) Obligations of the Defendants

On the other hand, it is reasonable to view that the defendants' obligation to pay each of the above amounts is an indivisible joint and several obligation to be fulfilled together by the defendants due to its nature.

B. Determination as to the defendants' defense

As to this, the Defendants asserted that the above lease deposit return obligation (or the contract deposit obligation based on the above promissory note No. 2, Defendant 2) of the Defendants had expired 10 years after the lapse of 10 years. Thus, it is recognized that the Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit on March 12, 2009, which is apparent from the fact that the Plaintiff had been able to claim the return of the lease deposit against the Defendants. Meanwhile, according to the evidence No. 4, it is recognized that the Plaintiff completed the execution of provisional seizure of corporeal movables against the Defendants as Seoul District Court Branch Branch of Seoul District Court No. 96Kadan158777, the extinctive prescription of the claim for the return of the lease deposit of this case (the contract deposit based on the authentic deed of promissorysory note No. 4) was interrupted. Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s re-claim pointing this out has merit, and the extinctive prescription of the Defendants’ aforementioned claim is groundless.

C. Sub-committee

Therefore, the Defendants are liable to pay to the Plaintiff 23 million won and to pay to the Plaintiff 23 million won with 20% interest per annum as stipulated by the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings from November 12, 2009 to the full payment date on the record that the above Defendant was served with a duplicate of the complaint of this case, and Defendant 2, from March 24, 2009 to November 18, 2010, who is the date when the above Defendant was served with a duplicate of the complaint of this case, is an obvious objection as to the existence and scope of the obligation of this case by the above Defendant from March 24, 2009 to March 24, 2009.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiff's claim against the defendant 1 is justified, and the plaintiff's claim against the defendant 2 shall be accepted within the extent of the above recognition, and the remainder of the claim (damage for delay) shall be dismissed as it is without merit. Since the judgment of the court of first instance is partially different from this conclusion, the plaintiff's appeal pointing this out and the defendant 1's appeal 3) shall be partially accepted, and the judgment of the court of first instance shall be modified as prescribed in the disposition 1, and all remaining appeals of the plaintiff's appeal (damage for delay) and defendant 1 shall be dismissed, and the total cost for the lawsuit shall be borne by the defendants as per the disposition.

Judges Kim Jae-hwan (Presiding Judge)

1) Article 168 of the Civil Act provides for provisional seizure as a cause of interrupting prescription because the creditor can be deemed to have exercised his/her right by provisional seizure. Since the preservation of execution by provisional seizure continues to exist during the effectiveness of the preservation of execution by provisional seizure, the interruption of prescription by provisional seizure shall continue during the duration of the preservation of execution by provisional seizure (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2000Da1102, Apr. 25, 2000). Thus, the preservation of execution by provisional seizure by provisional seizure shall continue to exist during the duration of the preservation of execution by provisional seizure (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 200Da1102

2) Article 3(2) of the Act on Special Cases Concerning Expedition, etc. of Legal Proceedings (hereinafter “Promotion Act”) provides that, if it is deemed reasonable for an obligor to resist the existence or scope of the obligation until the obligor is declared a fact-finding court that declares the existence of the obligation, the interest rate prescribed in paragraph (1) shall not apply to a reasonable extent. Here, when it is deemed reasonable for the obligor to resist the existence or scope of the obligation, the obligor’s assertion is deemed to have a reasonable ground for the existence or scope of the obligation. If the obligor contests the existence or scope of the obligation, and the obligor’s assertion was accepted in the first instance trial because it contests the existence or scope of the obligation, it can be deemed that there is a reasonable ground even if the claim is rejected later in the appellate trial (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 29Da23827, Oct. 13, 1992; 200Da49797, Jul. 197, 197).

Note 3) The judgment of the first instance court was rendered on November 11, 2009 on the day of separation, but the trial was rendered on November 12, 2009, and thus, Defendant 1’s appeal on that part is with merit.