The following facts may be acknowledged in full view of the purport of the entire pleadings in each of the evidence Nos. 1 and 2-1, 2, and 3-1, 2-1, and 3-1.

A. On April 11, 2014, the Defendant passed a resolution on the “Ordinance of the Ministry of Transport and Maritime Affairs” (hereinafter “Ordinance of this case”) regarding the promotion of the transportation welfare of residents in the area of public transportation in the Chang Chang-gun, which was proposed by its affiliated members, and transferred the Ordinance to the Plaintiff around that time. The Plaintiff demanded reconsideration from the Defendant on April 30, 2014 on the ground that the Ordinance of this case was in violation of the statutes. However, the Defendant re-resolutioned the Ordinance of this case on May 7, 2014.

B. The Ordinance of this case was enacted based on Article 9(2)2(a) of the Local Autonomy Act to promote the traffic and welfare of residents living in the non-party public transportation area in the Seocho-gun. The purport of the Ordinance is to stipulate matters concerning the operation of a taxi upon the residents’ prior request and the subsidization of the operating fee for the relevant residents (Articles 1 and 5, etc.). The purport is that the registered taxi in the Seocho-gun shall be named as “village taxi” without establishing the operation system in the non-party public transportation area in which the buses in the Chang-gun-gun are not operated in the non-party public transportation area, and the registered taxi in the non-party area shall be named as “village taxi” at the residents’ request without establishing the operation system in the non-party area. The community taxi operation committee shall ensure that the residents living in the area designated as the village taxi operation area use the village taxi at the time and place requested in advance and pay the fees, and all or part of the additional charges, other than the prescribed charges to be borne by themselves, such as the basic charges per capita per person (Articles 1, 2,

2. Whether the Ordinance of this case is null and void by stipulating matters concerning delegated affairs of an agency without delegation of statutes

A. According to Article 50(1)2 and (2) of the Passenger Transport Service Act, Article 3 of the Ordinance on Subsidies for Passenger Transport Service, etc., the Plaintiff asserts to the purport that granting subsidies to a passenger transport service provider in a non-party public transport area in Jeollabuk-do belongs to the authority and duties of Jeollabuk-do, and the Plaintiff is able to perform its duties with the authority delegated by the Governor of Jeollabuk-do. In this case, the Plaintiff’s duties fall under the so-called “agency delegated duties” and thus, the local government to which the Plaintiff belongs should have the authority delegated by the law in order to enact the ordinances. Accordingly, there is no statutory delegation with respect to the instant Ordinance

B. However, in light of the legislative purpose and purport of the Ordinance of this case, the subsidy support project of Jeollabuk-do based on relevant provisions, such as Passenger Transport Service Act, which is based on the aforementioned provision, is to grant subsidies to the passenger transport service provider, and the affairs of this case are directly provided to residents who use a village taxi, and it cannot be deemed that both are identical. The subsidy support project of this case belongs to the "resident welfare-related project" as provided by Article 9 (2) 2 (a) of the Local Autonomy Act. It can be seen that the affairs of this case are planned to be executed in the own budget of the Chang Chang-gun group.

Therefore, the instant administrative affairs fall under the autonomous affairs that can be regulated by ordinances without delegation of statutes, rather than the delegated affairs of an agency, as alleged by the Plaintiff, and thus, the Plaintiff’s assertion is without merit.

3. Whether the Ordinance of this case is null and void as it violates any statute

A. Whether the proposed bill of this case violates the provisions prohibiting concurrent inheritance under the Passenger Transport Service Act

The Plaintiff asserts that the passenger transport service provider of a taxi under the Passenger Transport Service Act is prohibited from engaging in the act of combined passengers (Article 26(1)4 of the Passenger Transport Service Act). The purpose of the Ordinance of this case is to order a general taxi as a "village taxi" and to allow and recommend a general taxi to be operated by combining many unspecified passengers, such as a bus. Thus, the Ordinance of this case is invalid as it violates the above prohibition provision.

However, the Ordinance of this case only stipulates that residents who intend to use a village taxi request the operation of the taxi transport business entity by setting time and place in advance, and that the transport business entity in receipt of such request shall decide whether to permit or recommend the joint boarding (Articles 5(1) and 6(1)), and does not include any provision that allows or recommend the joint boarding (see Articles 5(1) and 6(1)). According to the aforementioned legal provision prohibiting the act of having passengers join the taxi, according to the principle of systematic and harmonious interpretation of the legal rules, the Ordinance of this case should be deemed to be premised on the prohibition of the joint boarding by the taxi transport business entity.

Therefore, the plaintiff's above assertion based on the opposite interpretation of the bill of this case is without merit.

B. Whether the Ordinance of this case violates the provisions on the business form of “regional passenger transport business” under the Enforcement Decree of the Passenger Transport Service Act

The Plaintiff asserts that Article 3 subparag. 2(c) and (d) of the Enforcement Decree of the Passenger Transport Service Act provides that the business form of taxi transport business, which belongs to “regional passenger transport business, shall be the business of transporting passengers according to one transport contract without establishing any operation system.” However, the Ordinance of the instant case stipulates that the operation of a village taxi will be scheduled by setting the operating area, frequency, and operating time zone, and that regardless of the number of passengers, the Ordinance of the instant case goes against the above superior laws and regulations by providing that residents, regardless of the number of passengers, shall bear only the basic bus charges and allow them to use only the basic bus charges, thereby resulting in allowing them to operate the village taxi belonging to the taxi transport business in the form of transporting passengers “in accordance with two or more transport contracts

First of all, the issue of whether the Ordinance of this case stipulates that the village taxi shall be operated " by designating the operation system", and the Ordinance of this case explicitly stipulates that the village taxi shall be operated " without establishing the operation system" (Article 2 subparagraph 2 and Article 5 (1)), and the operation system prescribed by the Enforcement Decree of the Passenger Transport Service Act refers to "the overall term of operation route, distance, frequency of operation, frequency of operation between the starting point, terminal point, and terminal point of the route" (Article 2 subparagraph 2). The purport of the Ordinance of this case setting the operation area, frequency, time of operation, etc. of the village taxi in order to achieve the administrative purpose such as appropriate operation of the village taxi system and prevention of abuse thereof, it cannot be deemed that the Ordinance of this case set a certain limit on the operation area, etc., such as the bus transportation business.

Furthermore, as seen earlier, the Ordinance of this case assumes that it is operated by one "one transport contract" by prohibiting the combination of village taxis. In light of the interpretation of Articles 5 (2) and 6 (2) and 15 (1) of the Ordinance of this case, it is nothing more than that a village taxi user pays a charge based on the general fare system to a taxi transport business entity, not by applying a different fare system from the general public, but by paying a charge to the general taxi business entity, and the part of the charge is received ex post facto from the plaintiff. Thus, it cannot be deemed that the fare system violates the purport of "one transport contract".

Therefore, the plaintiff's assertion on this part is without merit.

C. Whether the Constitution violates the principle of equality under the Constitution

(1) The Plaintiff limited the scope of the Ordinance to the “resident in the village taxi operation area” without reasonable grounds. The Plaintiff asserted that it is against the principle of equality as it discriminates against the resident in the village taxi operation area and that it is against the principle of equality. However, unlike the Ordinance that restricts residents’ rights or imposes new obligations, the Ordinance that grants benefits to residents, such as the Ordinance of this case, is recognized to have the authority to enact ordinances that consider it reasonable in consideration of the purpose of the enactment of the Ordinance, the beneficiary’s situation, the budget, and other various matters, such as the purpose of the Ordinance, the beneficiary’s budget, etc., and it cannot be deemed that the Ordinance of this case violates the Constitution unless the contents of the Ordinance of this case are considerably lack rationality (see Supreme Court Decision 2007Do42, Jun. 12, 2008). The restriction of the scope of its application and scope to a certain group is merely based on the difference in the budget situation of the Seocho-gun and the use of public transportation by region, and thus it cannot be deemed that it violates the principle of equality.

(2) In addition, the Plaintiff asserts that the part of the Ordinance of this case, which provides that the Plaintiff may take necessary measures, such as collecting subsidies, “in a case where boarding costs are applied or subsidized by false or unlawful means, violates the principle of clarity under the Constitution, and thus, is null and void. However, the term “illegal means” in this context can be reasonably interpreted to mean “an affirmative and passive act that may affect the decision-making on the grant of subsidies, such as deceptive scheme and other acts recognized as unlawful by social norms, even though it is not entitled to receive subsidies through normal procedures,” and thus, it cannot be viewed as contrary to the principle of clarity under the Constitution (see Supreme Court Decision 2011Du30182, Dec. 27, 2012).

(3) Therefore, this part of the Plaintiff’s assertion is without merit.

4. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiff's claim of this case is dismissed as it is without merit, and the costs of lawsuit are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Park Poe-young (Presiding Justice)