[2] In a case where the failure to designate or alter the specific use area, etc. at a specific point of time is for the implementation of a specific public project, whether the land price should be assessed by considering the designation or alteration of the specific use area, etc. as a restriction directly for the implementation of a public project (affirmative), and the requirements to deem that the specific use area, etc. was not designated or altered for the implementation of a specific public project

[3] The meaning that two or more land, etc. are “Indivisibility relationship for specific purposes” where the method of appraising two or more land, etc. and a lump sum assessment are exceptionally permitted

[2] In a case where the designation or alteration of a specific use area, district, or zone (hereinafter “specific use area, etc.”) is intended for the implementation of a specific public project at a specific time, such designation or alteration of a specific use area, etc. should be considered as a restriction directly for the implementation of the relevant public project, and the land price should be assessed by considering the status where the specific use area, etc. was designated or altered. Here, if it is intended to deem that a specific use area, etc. was not designated or altered for the implementation of a specific public project, it should be objectively obvious that an act without designating or altering a specific use area, etc. constitutes a deviation

[3] In principle, an appraisal of two or more lands, etc. shall be based on an individual appraisal, but in exceptional cases where an indivisible relationship is acknowledged with two or more lands, etc. for the purpose of transaction, a blanket appraisal shall be allowed. Here, “Indivisibility relationship for use” refers to a case where a situation used as a group of lands is deemed reasonable in terms of social, economic, and administrative aspects, as well as the formation of the value of the land.

1. Plaintiff’s ground of appeal

A. According to the relevant provisions of the Act on Acquisition of and Compensation for Land, etc. for Public Works Projects and the Enforcement Rule thereof, when calculating the amount of compensation for land subject to restrictions in the public law, if the relevant restrictions in the public law are a general limitation on planning that achieves the purpose of restrictions, such as designation or alteration of specific use areas, districts, and zones (hereinafter “specific use areas, etc.”) under the former Urban Planning Act, and are not directly related to specific urban planning projects, such restrictions should be evaluated as they are. On the other hand, even if the specific use areas, etc. are subject to restrictions, such as the determination of plans for the installation of specific urban planning facilities, such as roads and parks, or are subject to restrictions on the designation or alteration of specific use areas, etc., which fall under general use areas, for the implementation of specific public projects, if such restrictions are intended for the designation or alteration of specific use areas, etc., such specific use areas, etc. shall be considered as restrictions directly aiming at the implementation of the relevant public works and evaluated by

In addition, if it is for the implementation of a specific public project without designating or altering a specific use area, etc. at a specific point of time, it is deemed a restriction directly for the implementation of the relevant public project and thus, it is reasonable to assess the price of land by considering the status of designation or alteration of the specific use area, etc. for the implementation of a specific public project. Here, if it is intended to deem that a specific use area, etc. was not designated or altered for the implementation of a specific public project, the act of not designating or altering a specific use area, etc. is objectively obvious to fall under abuse of the right of planning discretion (see Supreme Court Decision 2012Du7950, Aug. 27, 2015

B. The court below rejected the Plaintiff’s assertion on the ground that (i) since the land was designated as a development-restricted zone on June 27, 1973, its designation has been maintained up to now, and (ii) the project of this case creating a parking lot within a development-restricted zone can be implemented with permission from an administrative agency without separately cancelling the designation of a development-restricted zone under the relevant Acts and subordinate statutes.

C. Such determination by the lower court is based on the legal doctrine as seen earlier. In so doing, it did not err by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the deviation and abuse of the right to discretion.

2. As to the Defendant’s first ground of appeal

A. Article 31 of the former Public Notice of Values and Appraisal Act (wholly amended by Act No. 13796, Jan. 19, 2016) provides that “The principles and standards to be observed by an appraisal business entity to ensure fairness and rationality in the appraisal of land, etc. shall be prescribed by Ordinance of the Ministry of Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs.” Article 15(1) of the former Rules on the Appraisal and Evaluation of Land (wholly amended by Act No. 508, Aug. 2, 2012) provides that “The assessment shall be conducted separately for each object: Provided, That where two or more objects are traded jointly or among the objects, they may be assessed collectively in an indivisible relationship for their use.” Therefore, an assessment of two or more land, etc. is permitted in cases where it is deemed that a single transaction relationship or an indivisible relationship for two or more land, etc. is recognized in terms of trade, etc. Here, whether it is an indivisible relationship with the purpose of use is reasonable and reasonable in terms of social and economic relation, 2017.

B. The court below determined that it is reasonable to evaluate the land of this case as two parcels, namely, the land of this case, i.e., the land of this case, i., the land of this case, 260 square meters (number 1 omitted), 211 square meters (hereinafter referred to as "land number 1 omitted), i.e., the land number 1,211 square meters (hereinafter referred to as "land number 2 omitted), and i.e., the land of this case, the land of this case, which was originally one parcel, was leased by the non-party who was the former owner of this case, and the plaintiff purchased the land of this case as it was, and the situation of its use was not particularly changed before and after the Plaintiff filed an application for change of land category or partition of the land of this case, and the neighboring residents continued to use it as a simplified rest area and a toilet and a parking lot attached thereto.

C. However, the lower court’s determination is difficult to accept for the following reasons.

(1) Comprehensively taking account of the reasoning of the lower judgment and the evidence duly admitted by the lower court, the following facts are revealed.

(A) The Defendant leased 1,471 square meters from the Nonparty to the Nonparty, prior to the Daejeon Seodong-dong (number 1 omitted), set up a public parking lot [the part divided into a parking lot (number 2 omitted)] to be used by the residents entering the waterside in the mountain of the mountain of Gyeyang-gu, Daejeon. The Defendant newly constructed a public toilet and a public resting room with the total floor area of 130.51 square meters (hereinafter “the instant building”) as an annex to the parking lot, and completed the registration of the preservation of ownership on the building on January 13, 1998.

(B) On October 9, 2009, the Plaintiff purchased the instant expropriated land from the Nonparty and completed the registration of ownership transfer on November 3, 2009, and changed the land category to the site (number 1 omitted) and (number 2 omitted) parking lot.

(C) Meanwhile, around March 2012, the Defendant removed the instant building and completed the registration of destruction thereof on April 5, 2012. Residents continued to use the said (number 2 omitted) parking lot as a parking lot, and the said parking lot was packed in asphalt and the parking zone line was opened.

(D) On March 19, 2015, the Daejeon Metropolitan City Land Expropriation Committee rendered a ruling of expropriation on April 23, 2015, for compensating for losses for the instant expropriated land, KRW 679,263,100, and the date of commencement of expropriation. The compensation includes compensation equivalent to the relocation cost of the boundary stone (land number 1 omitted) which is the obstacles to the site (land number 1 omitted).

(2) Examining the following circumstances revealed through such facts in light of the legal principles as seen earlier, it is difficult to recognize that (number 1 omitted) the site and (number 2 omitted) parking lot were indivisible for the purpose of use as of the date of the decision of expropriation, which is the time of evaluation.

(A) First of all, the land category is classified into “building site” (number 1 omitted) and (number 2 omitted) parking lots are classified into “parking lot”, and the land category is different from each other, and it cannot be deemed that the actual state of use of two land around March 19, 2015, which is the date of the adjudication on expropriation, is also the same.

(B) On March 21, 2012, the Defendant removed the instant building, thereby losing its role as a site for the instant building, which is a facility attached to the parking lot. From that time, it was in the state of site (B) where no permanent building was constructed for about three years until March 19, 2015, which is the date of the ruling on expropriation.

(C) The Plaintiff conducted the procedure for land division and land category change to newly construct a building upon obtaining permission for development activities for the building site (number 1 omitted). In order to divide the building site and (number 1 omitted) parking lot into the boundary of both land, the Plaintiff appears to have changed the shape of the site (number 1 omitted) by covering the miscellaneous stone into the site (number 1 omitted) site and packaging part of it into concrete. On the other hand, the parking lot (number 2 omitted) parking lot was packaged for asphalt and the parking lot line was continuously used as the parking lot until the commencement date of expropriation.

(D) Ultimately, it is reasonable to view that the relationship between the site and (number 1 omitted) parking lot was terminated as the site of the parking lot and its appurtenant facilities, due to a series of changes in circumstances, such as a land division and land category change, the removal of the building of this case, and the (number 1 omitted) shape change, etc.

(E) On the other hand, even if there was a case in which a resident who uses a river duct has parked on the (number 1 omitted), it can only be deemed a temporary situation of use, and there is no circumstance to deem that (number 1 omitted) the building site and (number 2 omitted) parking lot were managed and used as a whole in social, economic, and administrative aspects or value formation aspects.

D. Nevertheless, the lower court, on the erroneous premise that the instant expropriated land is used as a simplified rest area for the residents using the river basin continuously and a toilet and a parking lot annexed thereto (number 1 omitted), determined that the site and (number 2 omitted) parking lot were indivisible for the purpose of use. In so determining, the lower court erred by misapprehending the legal doctrine as to the requirements for collective assessment of two or more lands, etc., thereby adversely affecting the conclusion of the judgment, and the allegation in the grounds of appeal assigning this error is with merit (where a child individually evaluates the instant expropriated land (number 2 omitted), it is also pointed out that a standard should be selected to conform to the actual use and land category as to the parking lot).

3. Conclusion

Therefore, without further proceeding to decide on the remaining grounds of appeal by the Defendant, the part against the Defendant is reversed, and that part of the case is remanded to the court below for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. The Plaintiff’s appeal is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices

Justices Kim Shin (Presiding Justice)