(2) Prescription acquisition of farmland and whether to certify sale and purchase of farmland

(3) Whether the seller is liable for default on the buyer who acquired the object by prescription or not.

(2) The certification of farmland trade under Article 19 of the Farmland Reform Act shall be necessary only where the ownership of farmland is changed by the intention of the party concerned and it is not necessary for extinctive acquisition.

(3) If the seller delivers the land and the delivery buyer continuously possesses the ownership transfer registration due to the acquisition by prescription, the seller’s obligation is ultimately fulfilled, and there is no liability for damages due to default.

Of the costs of appeal, the part arising from the appeal by the plaintiff is assessed against each of the defendant 2.

(1) On December 1, 1963, Defendant 2 performed the registration procedure for ownership transfer on the said real estate by prescription on the part of the Plaintiff.

(2) On behalf of the Defendant Incorporated Foundation, a private teaching institute shall pay KRW 312,00 if the claim under the foregoing paragraph (3) is unable to be met.

The costs of lawsuit were assessed against the defendant, etc., and the declaration of provisional execution was sought.

A judgment that all the costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the defendant in the first and second instances, and the defendant 2's agent shall revoke the original judgment.

The plaintiff's claim is dismissed.

The court costs were assessed against all the plaintiff in the first and second instances.

The plaintiff's assertion was originally owned by the non-party 1 of the court below. The non-party 1 of the court below asserted that the non-party 2 of the court below and the non-party 1 of the court below claiming the sale of the land in collusion with the defendant 2 of Sep. 23, 1963, when the non-party 1 did not follow the procedure for the registration of ownership transfer to the plaintiff on December 1, 1943, since the private teaching institute purchased the land in front of the same defendant's school site and playground as the land in front of the same defendant's school site and playground operated by the same defendant on December 1, 1943, and used it. The plaintiff's claim against the non-party 1 of the court below as a result of the plaintiff's non-party 1's non-party 2 of the court below's non-party 1's claim for the registration of ownership transfer, such as the cancellation of the above false registration and the statement of the purport of the claim, were the most void of the registration.

Then, the plaintiff asserted that the plaintiff continued to occupy the land of this case on December 1, 1943 and acquired it on March 12, 1957 and sold it to the plaintiff on March 12, 1957. The plaintiff transferred it to the plaintiff on March 12, 1963. Thus, considering the testimony of non-party 2 and non-party 3 of the court below and the trial witness non-party 3, the land of this case was originally owned by the non-party 1 of the court below, and used it as a practical training place on December 1, 1943. Since it sold it to the plaintiff on March 12, 1957, the plaintiff cultivated it as a dry field with the plaintiff's acquisition on March 12, 1967, and the plaintiff continued to occupy it for 20 years by adding up the former possession to the right of public performance by December 1, 1963.

Therefore, the plaintiff should have the right to file a claim for the registration of ownership transfer with defendant 2 upon completion of the acquisition by prescription (the acquisition by prescription shall be deemed to have been completed on the theoretical basis of the acquisition by prescription). However, as to this point, defendant 2 purchased the land from defendant 1 on September 23, 1963 before the completion of the above acquisition by prescription, and passed the registration of ownership transfer. Although the plaintiff asserted that it cannot be asserted against the defendant without registration, the sale and purchase of real estate or transit through the registration of ownership transfer cannot be asserted against the defendant, and the title holder at the time of the completion of the acquisition by prescription is at a disadvantage (see Supreme Court Decision 60Da440, Dec. 15, 1960). According to the above reasoning, the plaintiff's assertion that the plaintiff's claim for the acquisition by prescription cannot be acquired as long as it did not pass through the registration even if the plaintiff completed the acquisition by prescription, it cannot be asserted that the plaintiff's claim for the change of ownership transfer of farmland under the former Farmland Act is without merit.

(1) According to the testimony of the non-party 2, the plaintiff used this case as school practice after the purchase of the private teaching institute instead of the foundation foundation, and used it as farmland after the defendant acquired for 2,3 years ago. Thus, the issue is whether to require certification of farmland sale pursuant to Article 9 (2) of the Farmland Reform Act, but the above certification pursuant to the Farmland Reform Act is necessary for all cases where the ownership of farmland is changed by the party's intent (see Supreme Court Decision 9Da11, 8, 1962, Supreme Court Decision 62Da602, Nov. 8, 1962, Supreme Court Decision 62Da602, Nov. 8, 1962, Supreme Court Decision 62Da602, etc.). Thus, the plaintiff's conjunctive claim on this point is justified. However, if the plaintiff's conjunctive foundation did not pass through the registration of ownership transfer due to the purchase and sale of the land, the plaintiff's conjunctive claim on the land which was the object of the transfer of ownership transfer.

Therefore, the judgment of the court that shares the same conclusion is just and the appeal by the plaintiff and the defendant 2 are without merit, and they are dismissed by Article 384 of the Civil Procedure Act, and the costs of the lawsuit are borne by them are assessed as per Disposition by applying Articles 95 and 89 of the same Act.

Judges Cho Jong-dae (Presiding Judge)