2. Determination

A. We examine the prosecutor’s assertion of unfair sentencing, and there is no change in the conditions of sentencing compared to the original judgment, as the prosecutor’s new sentencing data was not submitted in the trial, and in full view of all the reasons for sentencing as indicated in the records and arguments of this case, it cannot be deemed that the lower court’s punishment was too unfeasible and exceeded the reasonable scope of discretion.

Therefore, prosecutor's assertion is without merit.

B. Article 29-3(1) of the Child Welfare Act (Act No. 1589) enacted on June 12, 2019, provides that where a court declares a sentence of imprisonment or medical treatment and custody for committing child abuse-related crimes, the court shall make an order to operate a child-related institution or to prevent employment or actual labor to a child-related institution (hereinafter referred to as “employment restriction order”) for a certain period from the date the execution of the sentence or medical treatment and custody is terminated in whole or in part, or suspended or exempted (where a fine is sentenced, the date on which the sentence becomes final and conclusive) is suspended or exempted by its judgment. The proviso provides that where the risk of recidivism is remarkably low or there is no special reason to determine that the employment should not be restricted.

In addition, Article 2 (1) of the Addenda to the Child Welfare Act (Act No. 15889, Dec. 11, 2018) provides that Article 29-3 (1) of the Child Welfare Act applies to a person who committed a crime related to child abuse before the enforcement of the above Act and did not receive a final and conclusive judgment.

The crime of violation of the Child Welfare Act constitutes a child abuse-related crime to which Article 29-3(1) of the above Act applies, and this court issued or exempted an employment restriction order to the defendant.