2. The defendant's remaining appeal is dismissed.

3. The total costs of a lawsuit shall be three-minutes, and such two-minutes shall be borne by the plaintiff, and the remainder by the defendant respectively.

1. Regarding ground of appeal No. 1

The admission of evidence and fact-finding belong to the full power of the fact-finding court, and this is not a legitimate ground for appeal unless it goes beyond the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 2001Da33048, Aug. 24, 2001; 2003Da61689, Jul. 15, 2005). Meanwhile, the State's liability is established when the form of harmful act by public officials can be determined, and it does not require that specific actors be specified.

The court below, which cited the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance, acknowledged the facts that the investigators of the Central Information Department under the defendant employed the plaintiff illegally detained the plaintiff and received a false confession. The court below determined that the defendant has a duty to compensate for mental damages suffered by the plaintiff due to the tort as stated in its judgment.

In light of the above legal principles and records, the above fact-finding and judgment of the court below are just and acceptable, and there is no error of law by misunderstanding the legal principles as to facts beyond the limit of the principle of free evaluation of evidence or state liability.

2. Regarding ground of appeal No. 2

The exercise of a debtor's right of defense based on the statute of limitations is also governed by the principle of good faith and the prohibition of abuse of rights, which are the major principles of our Civil Act. Thus, in special circumstances, where the debtor acted to make it impossible or considerably difficult for the creditor to exercise his right or interruption of prescription prior to the completion of the statute of limitations, or such measures were unnecessary, or the creditor was objectively obstructed from exercising his right, or the debtor was unable to invoke the statute of limitations after the expiration of the statute of limitations, or where the creditor made the creditor trust it, or where there are special circumstances, such as where the creditor's refusal to perform his/her obligation is remarkably unfair or unfair, such as where some of the creditors of the conditions that require to protect the creditor already receive the performance of the obligation, etc., and where the debtor claims the completion of the statute of limitations cannot be allowed as an abuse of rights against the principle of good faith (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2004Da

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below determined that the defendant's defense of extinctive prescription cannot be allowed as abuse of rights against the principle of good faith, since the plaintiff's right to claim compensation for damages is considerably unfair or unfair to recognize the plaintiff's refusal to perform his/her obligations, since three years of extinctive prescription under Article 766 (1) of the Civil Act or five years of extinctive prescription under Article 96 (2) of the National Finance Act have already expired since the date when the plaintiff's right to claim compensation for damages became final and conclusive or the plaintiff's release date, and considering all the circumstances as stated in the judgment, it is reasonable to conclude that the plaintiffs had an objective obstacle to exercise the right to claim compensation of this case against the defendant until December 26, 2008 when the new judgment against

In light of the above legal principles and records, the above fact-finding and judgment of the court below are just, and there are no errors in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the defense of extinctive prescription and abuse of rights which are recognized as facts contrary to logical and empirical rules and beyond the bounds of the principle

3. As to the third ground for appeal

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below determined that the consolation money calculated based on the monetary value at the time of the closing of argument cannot be deemed as double benefit to the plaintiff, since the plaintiff was illegally detained for 11 days without a warrant, and was found guilty due to false confessions, and returned to approximately 5 years thereafter, it was difficult for the plaintiff to live a normal life due to restrictions on the transfer of residence, etc. according to the security surveillance disposition for about 15 years. Furthermore, considering all the circumstances revealed in the arguments in this case, the court below calculated consolation money of KRW 30 million against the plaintiff after deducting the amount of the compensation received by the plaintiff, and calculated consolation money of KRW 30 million from the plaintiff. Furthermore, since it was determined by the fact-finding court in consideration of all the circumstances revealed after the date of the tort and the date of the closing of argument at the fact-finding court, the consolation money cannot be deemed as having been calculated based on the monetary value at the time of the closing of argument, and it is reasonable to deem the plaintiff's judgment as unlawful from 29 billion won to the plaintiff's damages.

However, it is difficult to accept the part concerning delay damages in the above judgment of the court below for the following reasons.

Of course, inasmuch as the victim could have continuously enjoyed legal interests that he suffered without tort, as a matter of principle, liability for damages arising from tort should be established at the same time in light of the concept of fairness, even if there is no other peremptory notice. However, in calculating consolation money, all circumstances that occurred even at the time of the conclusion of fact-finding proceedings should be considered, as well as the national income level or monetary value, which serves as the basis for calculating consolation money, should also be reflected at the time of the conclusion of arguments. If the amount of consolation money is determined without any specific change in the monetary value at the time of the occurrence of tort, it would be particularly problematic even if damages for delay occur at the time of tort. However, if it is deemed that there was a considerable change in the monetary value at the time of the conclusion of arguments at the time of the tort and at the time of the conclusion of arguments, the amount of consolation money should be calculated at the time of the conclusion of arguments at least 10 years after the lapse of three months, which would have to be considered at the time of the conclusion of arguments at the time of conclusion of arguments at the court-finding. This is clearly reasonable.

Ultimately, the judgment of the court below is erroneous in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the interest on delay in payment of consolation money due to tort, and such illegality has influenced the judgment. The defendant's ground of appeal pointing this out is with merit.

Meanwhile, in exceptional cases where delay damages due to tort occurred from the date of the closing of argument, which is the basis for calculating consolation money, the court below should calculate the original amount of consolation money at the time of closing of argument, considering the circumstances where the amount of consolation money should be paid immediately as at the time of closing of argument at the time of the conclusion of fact-finding proceedings, as well as the circumstances where the amount of consolation money should be determined as at the time of the conclusion of argument at the time of causing delay from the time of the tort to the time of closing of argument. In addition to these circumstances, in full view of the contents and degree of human rights violations committed by public officials in this case, and the content and period of the suffering suffered by the victims and their family members, there may be room to view that the principal amount of consolation money recognized by the court below against the plaintiff is somewhat little little, but in this case, the part against the plaintiff is not included in the scope of adjudication at the time of the party hearing, and as at the time of the plaintiff's appeal, the court below's decision against the plaintiff cannot be reversed even if the plaintiff lost part of the judgment against the defendant.

In addition, the allegation in the grounds of appeal that the court below erred in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the subject matter of a lawsuit and in violation of the principle of disposition authority by taking into account the lost profit and active damages that the plaintiff did not claim even though it is not difficult to calculate the lost profit, it cannot be a legitimate ground of appeal because it was written first in the supplemental appellate brief dated March 18, 2010 after the expiration of the period for submitting the appellate brief, and it was not related to the initial grounds of appeal

4. As to the fourth ground for appeal

The ground of appeal on this part is that the claim for damages for delay in this case should be cited, but as long as the part on damages for delay until the date of closing argument in the court below is reversed on the ground of the above paragraph (3), this part is not further determined

5. Conclusion

Therefore, the part against the defendant as to damages for delay of the judgment of the court below shall be reversed. Since this part is sufficient for this court to directly judge, this part shall be cut down pursuant to Article 437 of the Civil Procedure Act. Of the part concerning damages for delay of the court below, the part against the defendant ordering payment of KRW 300 million to the plaintiff in excess of 5% per annum from November 11, 2009, which is the date of closing argument of the court below to January 27, 201, which is the date of this decision, and 20% per annum from the next day to the date of full payment, shall be reversed, and the part of the judgment of the court of first instance shall be revoked, and the part

As above, the part concerning delay damages in the Defendant’s appeal is partially reasonable, and it is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench. The remaining grounds of appeal are dismissed as they are without merit. Two-thirds of the total costs of appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiff and the remainder by the Defendant. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices

Justices Park Si-hwan (Presiding Justice)