2. The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

A. Details of the Plaintiff’s entrusted training

1) The Plaintiff, as the representative of the C Child Care Center in Seo-gu Incheon, is a business owner, and entered into an entrustment training contract with the C Child Care Center D (hereinafter referred to as the “D”), prepared a document that the Child Care Teachers met the requirements for the completion of entrusted training, and submitted it to the Human Resources Development Service of Korea, thereby compensating for the training expenses incurred in relation to their own account pursuant to Article 27 of the Employment Insurance Act, etc. [Article 8 of the Employment Insurance Act (Public Notice of the Ministry of Employment and Labor)], the Plaintiff should be present at least 80% of the training hours and complete the relevant training course.

2) The Plaintiff, from December 14, 2012 to April 04, 2014, had seven workers under his/her jurisdiction receive training courses for vocational skills development training for 29 business owners, including 'Guidein 1', and received subsidies of KRW 8,337,914 as expenses for vocational skills development training.

B. 1) During the investigation into D, which is an entrusted training institution, the Incheon Bupyeong Police Station: (a) prepared and published a false commission contract and tax invoice as if the business owner of 488 childcare centers, including the Plaintiff, did not preferentially pay training expenses; and (b) notified the Defendant that the trainee’s infant care teachers did not attend the training course for at least 80%, and did not meet the completion standards, but did not meet the completion standards, and received training expenses.”

2) Accordingly, on October 14, 2016, the Defendant issued a return disposition of KRW 1.8 million and an additional collection disposition of KRW 1.8 million (hereinafter “each disposition of this case”) after excluding the portion for which extinctive prescription has lapsed, among the illegal amount received by the Plaintiff.

(c) Criminal punishment for D representatives, etc.;

1) On November 17, 2014, related persons, including D’s representatives, were indicted for violating the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Economic Crimes (Fraud) and the Act on the Management of Subsidies. On December 15, 2016, the part of the crime of fraud was pronounced guilty (the part of the violation of the Subsidy Management Act was acquitted on the grounds that the Defendants were not the recipient of subsidies even though the two crimes were charged with ordinary concurrent crimes), Seoul High Court 201759, but appealed as Seoul High Court 2017, but the appeal was dismissed on April 27, 2017, and again appealed as Supreme Court 2017Do7147, but the first instance judgment became final and conclusive by dismissal of the appeal on August 18, 2017 (hereinafter referred to as “criminal judgment”).

2) The main point of the criminal judgment is as follows.

From May 6, 2012 to June 30, 2014, the Defendants submitted to the Corporation a false report on implementation and completion of training as shown in the attached list of crimes to the effect that childcare teachers did not attend or attend the training, 30 hours in the case of child care teachers for 4 hours a day, 50 hours in the case of 13 hours a day, and 8 hours a day a day a day a day a day a day 50 hours training was conducted, and in the case of Sundays 8 hours training, the actual training hours of child care teachers do not fall short of 80/100 of the training hours a day a day a day 4 hours a day a day a day a day a day a day a day a day 13 hours a day a day a day a day a day a day a day a day a day a day a day a day a day a day a day a day a day a day, a day a day a day an eight hours a day a day a day a day a day 8 hours a day a day a day 8 hours a day a day a day a day a day a day a day a day.

[Ground of Recognition] Unsatisfy, Gap evidence 1 to 4, Eul evidence 1 to 11

2. Whether each of the dispositions of this case is legitimate

A. The plaintiff's assertion

The Defendant was unable to prove the facts of the instant disposition as the disposition agency. Furthermore, since the Plaintiff was aware of D’s completion certificate and applied for training allowances under the absence of authority to investigate training hours, it is merely deceivingd from D, and thus cannot be deemed to have applied for training allowances unlawfully. Since subsidies are transferred to D’s account via the Plaintiff’s account, the Plaintiff is merely an intentional tool and thus, the subject of additional collection and refund of subsidies should be D.

B. Determination

1) Whether the attendance of less than 80% of the training courses was conducted

In full view of the following circumstances, comprehensively taking into account the evidence presented above and the purport of the entire pleadings, the Plaintiff’s infant care teacher may be deemed to have attended less than 80% of the training course.

A) Above all, even if a criminal judgment is not bound by the fact-finding in a criminal trial, the fact that a criminal judgment already finalized on the same factual basis was guilty is significant evidence. Thus, barring any special circumstance where it is deemed difficult to adopt a factual judgment in the criminal trial in light of other evidence submitted in the administrative trial (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2011-28240, May 24, 2012). However, the criminal judgment held that: (a) in the case of the Plaintiff’s consignment training for 4 hours a day, D, which provided the education to the childcare teachers, did not do so for 3 hours a day and 5 hours a day a day a day a day a day a day a day a day a day a day a day a day a day a day a day a day a day a day a day a day a day a day a day a day a day a day a day a day a day a day a day a day a day a day a day a day a day a day a day a day a day a day a day a day a week a day a day a day a day a day a day a day asss.

B) Also, not only D’s chapter E, but also D’s instructors agreed to provide lectures for three hours a day and five hours a Saturday, and on Sundays, there was no lectures, and there was no infant care teacher who had completed all training courses normally (No. 7’s No. 1, 2, and 3).

C) Ultimately, according to the fact-finding conducted in each of the training courses, recognition training hours, and actual training hours in which the Plaintiff’s infant care teachers participated, the training hours are as listed below, and the training hours including Saturdays and Sundays are less than 80% as a matter of course, and it can be recognized that the 3-1 course, which is conducted on the ordinary day, is less than 9 hours out of total 12 hours and less than 80%.

A person shall be appointed.

2) Whether it constitutes an illegal receipt

Article 16 (2) 2 of the former Act on the Development of Workplace Skills of Workers (amended by Act No. 9316 of Dec. 31, 2008; hereinafter referred to as the "former Act on the Development of Workplace Skills") generally refers to the affirmative and passive act that may affect the decision-making on the payment of training fees by a person who is not eligible to receive training expenses, as if he/she were qualified or not able to conceal the fact that he/she is not qualified. Article 16 (1), (2), and (3) of the former Act on the Development of Workplace Skills and Article 16 (6) of the former Enforcement Decree of the former Act on the Development of Workplace Skills (amended by Act No. 9316 of Mar. 31, 2009; hereinafter referred to as the "former Act on the Development of Workplace Skills"), and Article 13 (4) 1 of the former Act on the Development of Workplace Skills provides that the same method shall be applied to cases where he/she has committed an intentional act or gross negligence as one of a person who violated.

However, as seen earlier, the Plaintiff confirmed that D was responsible for its own infant care teachers to properly train D and then applied for subsidies to the Human Resources Development Service of Korea with the receipts attached thereto.

In addition, the Plaintiff is obligated to pay the price to D after confirming whether the training has been normally conducted for its teachers. This is not attributable to the fact that the Plaintiff had no administrative investigation authority over D. Therefore, if it is found that D failed to conduct the training properly, the Plaintiff must return training expenses that it received to the Human Resources Development Service of Korea, and the Defendant may impose a disposition to return training expenses on the Plaintiff. In addition, since the beneficiary of training expenses is the same business owner as the Plaintiff, it is apparent that the beneficiary of the training expenses is also the Plaintiff. Ultimately, the attendance below 80% of the training courses for infant care teachers is recognized.

Of each disposition of this case, the part of the refund of training costs is justifiable.

Furthermore, in full view of the Plaintiff’s gross negligence is recognized and the Plaintiff received subsidies by fraud or other improper means, taking account of the fact that the Plaintiff did not perform his/her duty to verify the completion of training trainees’ application for training expenses, the appropriateness of the application for training expenses, and the fact that he/she attached the training expenses by issuing a false tax invoice even though he/she did not have paid the training expenses to D (in cases of the Plaintiff’s assertion, it is deemed that he/she entrusted his/her account to D with the application for training expenses in lieu of D or paid them by means of account transfer without confirmation). This does not necessarily change because the Plaintiff received subsidies by fraud or other improper means as long as it does not necessarily require awareness of illegal payment or intention of public offering. Ultimately, the disposition of additional collection on the premise of the supply and demand by improper means is justifiable during the instant disposition.

3) Therefore, the instant disposition is lawful.

4. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiff's claim is dismissed as it is without merit, and it is so decided as per Disposition.