(hereinafter the meaning of the abbreviationd language used in this case is the same as the judgment of the court of first instance). 2. It is as shown in the relevant statutes attached to the relevant statutes.

3. The reasoning for the court’s explanation as to this part of the disposition of this case is as follows: (a) the pertinent part of the judgment of the first instance (Articles 8(2) and 420 of the Administrative Litigation Act, and the main text of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act, except for the following additions to the written judgment No. 5, No. 4 of the judgment of the first instance.

In addition, since gift tax is based on the premise of a gratuitous property grant relationship, if there is a quid pro quo contribution between a donor and a donee, it shall not be deemed a gift. Therefore, it is natural that gift tax may not be imposed on a case where an executive officer of a company takes over shares of the company concerned from the company to which he belongs in return for the contribution that improved the management status of the company (see Supreme Court Decision 95Nu4353, Sept. 15, 1995).

4. Whether the rejection disposition of this case is legitimate

A. The Plaintiff’s assertion 1) As the Plaintiff received the instant shares as compensation for labor relations, Article 41-3 of the Inheritance and Gift Tax Act (hereinafter “instant provision”).

(2) Even if the acquisition of the Plaintiff’s shares constitutes a case where the acquisition of the Plaintiff’s shares is made with compensation, the Defendant’s evaluation of the increase in the market price under Article 63 of the Inheritance and Gift Tax Act is unlawful in the following point. The date for settlement of accounts under Article 41-3(2) of the Inheritance and Gift Tax Act is only the basic date for calculating the market price profits, and whether the evaluation is conducted with respect to the increase in the market price.