2. The plaintiff's claim extended in the trial is dismissed.

3. The costs of appeal (including the costs arising from the extension of the claim) shall be borne by the plaintiff.

The following facts may be acknowledged as either a dispute between the parties, or as a whole by taking into account the following facts: Gap evidence of Nos. 1 through 8, Eul evidence of No. 1 and the testimony of the non-party witness of the first instance trial.

A. On July 6, 1987, the plaintiff joined the defendant company with the consent of the defendant, and started his full-time service with the planning director of the planning director of the headquarters of the Korea Trade Union Federation of the Korea Workers' Federation of Gyeonggi-do headquarters (hereinafter referred to as the "Korea Workers' Federation") which is the higher organization of the defendant company's trade union from March 4, 1997, and completed his full-time service as the full-time officer by January 20, 2009, when he was in charge of the duties of the head of the branch office around 2006. The plaintiff was dismissed from the defendant company on the same day.

B. On February 21, 2007, the Defendant paid the same salary as the previous salary to the Plaintiff during the former service period, and notified the Plaintiff of his intention to suspend the payment of salary from March 5, 2007 to the Korea Labor-Management Group.

2. Determination of the parties' arguments

A. The plaintiff asserts that as wage under the Labor Standards Act or remuneration under an employment contract under the Civil Act, the defendant is obligated to pay the plaintiff a total of 69,268,260 won from March 2007 to January 20, 209, and that suspending the payment of continuous salary for ten years is also contrary to the principle of good faith.

In this regard, the defendant asserted that the plaintiff could not respond to the plaintiff's claim because he decided to treat the plaintiff as a unpaid leave of absence through a collective agreement that has gone through labor-management consultation of the labor-management council.

B. Even if an agreement on working conditions and other labor-management relations between a trade union and an employer was reached through consultation between the labor-management council, if both parties to the agreement are prepared in writing with intent to make it a collective agreement and if both parties to the agreement meet the actual and formal requirements of a collective agreement by signing and sealing on behalf of each trade union and the employer, it shall be deemed a collective agreement (see Supreme Court Decision 2003Da27429, Mar. 11, 2005). Under the principle of the autonomy of the agreement, a trade union may enter into a collective agreement to change working conditions in favor of the employer as well as the collective agreement to unfavorablely change working conditions between the employer and the employer, barring special circumstances such as where the collective agreement to change the working conditions so disadvantageously goes beyond the purpose of the trade union, it shall not be deemed null and void, and a trade union does not need to obtain an individual consent or authorization from workers in advance for such agreement, and whether the collective agreement significantly lacks rationality, etc. shall be determined in light of the contents of the collective agreement and its execution circumstances at the time of the collective agreement (see, etc.

Article 23(3) of the Civil Act provides that “[t]he evidence No. 2 through 10, No. 11-2, No. 12, No. 13, and No. 14 of the Evidence No. 11-2, No. 12, No. 13, and No. 14 of the Civil Act and the testimony of the non-party witness of the first instance trial, the collective agreement in 2006 provides that the defendant may order a temporary retirement for a period of time when a member who has served for more than one year is engaged in business other than the defendant company with the name of the defendant or the defendant's permission (Article 22(5)), and that the defendant's rules of employment do not pay wages during the period of temporary retirement (Article 22(4)) according to his mission, the defendant company did not pay wages during the period of temporary retirement of other private organizations (Article 22(5) of the Civil Act). The defendant company opened a temporary labor-management council on February 22, 2007 and changed the executive officer under the collective agreement to 20.

In light of the various circumstances revealed in the above facts, it is reasonable to view the above minutes as a collective agreement since they meet the actual and formal requirements of the collective agreement since a substantive agreement between the parties to the labor and management regarding the working conditions has been formed and signed as a document to make it a collective agreement. In light of the contents of the collective agreement or rules of employment and the resolution of the labor-management council at the time of engaging in affairs other than the defendant company, such as other companies and employees working in the non-private organizations, etc., and the details of the collective agreement or rules of employment or the resolution of the labor-management council, the management status of the defendant company at the time of the suspension of employment and the labor union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act at the time of the suspension of employment provide that the full-time officer of the labor union shall not receive any benefits from the employer during the period of their transfer, and thus, the above contents of the collective agreement that the plaintiff

The plaintiff's assertion is without merit, since the employment contract relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant cannot be deemed to have been established under the Civil Act, and the suspension of payment pursuant to a collective agreement cannot be deemed to have violated the principle of good faith.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiff's claim of this case is dismissed as it is without merit, and the judgment of the court of first instance is just, so the plaintiff's appeal and the plaintiff's claim expanded in the court of first instance are dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition.

Judges Cho Jong-sung (Presiding Judge)