[2] Whether the farmland is presumed to have been legally re-divided to B in case where there is an additional entry in the repayment ledger that "the renunciation of A, the payment of the balance," and "the payment of the balance," in the repayment ledger (negative)

[2] In light of the provisions of Article 19(1) of the former Farmland Reform Act, if Party A, who received farmland as originally distributed, renounced the farmland (return to the Government), he/she should have prepared a new repayment term after he/she paid compensation to the Government, and then required Party B, who received new repayment term, to repay the full amount. If Party B, who received new repayment term, did not compensate Party A for the outstanding amount of repayment but paid the outstanding amount of repayment, is not considered to have paid the outstanding amount of the farmland, and Article 38 of the former Farmland Reform Act applies to the case of re-distribution of farmland. Thus, if Party B legally re-distributions the farmland, the provisions on the repayment term under Article 38 of the former Farmland Reform Act are different from the original repayment term, and the repayment term should have been changed from the initial repayment term, or at least the new repayment term correction order, the repayment term column and the repayment term column, and it is difficult to see Party B’s new repayment order by means of new correction and correction, and it is difficult to legally add the remaining amount to Party B’s.

1. On the first ground for appeal

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below rejected the plaintiffs' assertion that the non-party 1 was the owner of the land of this case since the non-party 1 was distributed the land of this case under the Farmland Act enacted on December 21, 1956 (the Farmland Act enacted on December 22, 1994) and the non-party 2 had waived the right to distribute the land of this case and acquired the ownership of this case after the repayment on December 25, 1959. Since the plaintiffs succeeded to the land of this case, the court below rejected the plaintiff's assertion that the non-party 1 was the owner of the land of this case. However, the above non-party 1 was kept only in the farmland repayment register with documents indicating the distribution, re-distribution, and repayment of the land of this case. Since the above non-party 2 gave up the right to distribute the land of this case on December 25, 1958 and the payment of the remaining farmland was made on December 25, 1958.

In light of the fact that there was no farmland re-distribution system prior to the enforcement of the Act on Special Measures for the Adjustment of Farmland Reform Projects among the reasons of the original decision, Article 20 of the Farmland Reform Act is erroneous in view of the fact that the farmland re-distribution system has been stipulated for the government.

(1) However, since re-distribution of farmland distributed under the Farmland Reform Act is also distributed under the Farmland Reform Act, if such re-distribution is conducted, it shall be decided by the procedures prescribed in Article 32 of the Enforcement Decree of the Farmland Reform Act [the Housing Site Survey (the Housing Site Survey), the resolution of the Committee on the Location of Farmland, and the preparation of a 10-day schedule for each farm household distribution] (see Supreme Court Decision 67Da840 delivered on June 20, 1967). Since the re-distribution of farmland without such procedures cannot be deemed as void per se by the party members, it is difficult to view that the above non-party 2 was legally entitled to re-distribution of the farmland in the above non-party 1’s new farmland distribution ledger, and the above non-party 1 cannot be re-distribution of the farmland to the non-party 2, who had already received the above re-distribution of the farmland by calculating the amount of redemption to the non-party 1’s new amount of redemption without such procedures (see Supreme Court Decision 66Da913 delivered on July 19, 1966).

2. On the second ground for appeal

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, we affirm the judgment of the court below that the above non-party 2 and the plaintiffs did not recognize that they possessed the land of this case for not less than 20 years, and there is no violation of the rules of evidence or misunderstanding the legal principles on the prescriptive acquisition as otherwise alleged in the ground of appeal, thereby affecting the conclusion of the judgment.

3. Therefore, all appeals are dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Song Jin-hun (Presiding Justice)