Since it is a minor, legal representative C

The appeal concerning the primary claim and the primary claim shall be dismissed.

1. As to the primary claim, the court shall determine whether the allegation of facts is true in accordance with logical and empirical rules on the basis of social justice and equity, by taking into account the overall purport of the pleadings and the result of the examination of evidence (Article 202 of the Civil Procedure Act). The court below shall bind the Re-appeal Court (Article 432 of the same Act) as to the facts duly confirmed, as the judgment below did not go beyond the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence. On the grounds as indicated in its reasoning, the court below, on the grounds as indicated in its reasoning, registered transfer of ownership in the F name of the land of this case from E

After recognizing that the owner immediately completed the future F as the trustee, there is insufficient evidence to prove that F was an agreement to pay the Plaintiff KRW 50 million in return for the payment of the Plaintiff’s share in the instant land or for the future disposal, and that the agreement between the Plaintiff and F cannot be deemed to have been concluded.

The part of the grounds of appeal disputing the lower court’s fact-finding is merely an error in the selection of evidence and the determination of value of evidence, which belong to the free evaluation of the lower court. In addition, even if examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the aforementioned legal doctrine and the evidence duly admitted, the lower court did not err by misapprehending the legal doctrine regarding association agreement and association property distribution agreement, or by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence

2. In a case where a title trust relationship is established between a person who actually bears the burden of purchase price and a title holder in purchasing real estate for the first preliminary claim, even if they agreed among themselves to return the proceeds of disposal of real estate under title trust to the title truster, such agreement shall also be deemed null and void as it belongs to the category of the property under title trust under the premise of a title trust agreement null and void under the Act on the Registration of Real Estate under Actual Titleholder’s Name (hereinafter “Real Estate Real Name Act”). (See, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 2006Da35117, Nov. 9, 2006; 201Da103472, Mar. 14, 2013).

The lower court determined that, when disposing of the instant land in the future between the Plaintiff and F, the agreement between F and F that F pay to the Plaintiff the amount equivalent to half of the sale price was null and void, based on the premise that the invalid title trust agreement is null and void.

Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the evidence duly admitted, the above judgment of the court below is based on the legal principles as seen earlier, and there is no error of law by misapprehending the legal principles as to damages due to nonperformance of obligation.

3. As to the second preliminary claim

A. According to the Real Estate Real Name Act, in the case of a three-party registered title trust, the period of grace stipulated in the Real Estate Real Name Act, when the purchaser trusted the name of a third party who is not a contracting party, and completed the registration, the existing title trust agreement and the registration pursuant thereto becomes null and void, and as a result, the real estate trusted in title is returned to the seller’s ownership. Therefore, the seller may seek cancellation of the registered title trust, which is null and void, from the seller. Meanwhile, even after the expiration of the grace period stipulated in the Real Estate Real Name Act, the sales contract between the seller and the title truster still remains valid. As such, the title truster may file a claim for the registration of ownership transfer pursuant to

However, in cases where the registration of transfer is completed in the name of a third party purchaser with respect to the trusted real estate due to voluntary disposal by the title trustee, compulsory expropriation, consultation on public land acquisition, etc. after the grace period under the Real Estate Real Name Act has expired, such third party purchaser shall acquire the ownership (Article 4(3) of the Real Estate Real Name Act), and thus, the seller's obligation to transfer ownership to the title truster is impossible, and as a result, the title truster shall transfer the ownership of the trusted real estate.

On the other hand, while a title trustee suffers loss of the right to receive a trust property, the title trustee obtains the proceeds from the disposal of the property held in trust or the benefits from the acquisition of compensation, and the title trustee is obligated to return such gains to the title truster as unjust enrichment (see Supreme Court Decision 2009Da49193, 49209, Sept. 8, 201). Such a legal principle can be equally applied to cases where a three-party title trust agreement was made after the enforcement of the Real Estate Real Name Act and the registration was completed pursuant

B. The reasoning of the lower judgment reveals the following facts.

(1) On December 2, 1997, the Plaintiff was a party to the sales contract for the instant land, and entered into a sales contract for the purchase of the instant land from E, its owner, and completed the registration of ownership transfer for the instant land in the future of F on February 16, 1998, pursuant to a three-party registered title trust agreement between the F, which agrees to take half of the purchase price.

(2) On April 9, 2007, the mediation date of F and C’s judicial divorce case (In Incheon District Court Decision 2006Ra18693) was divorced by F and C, and F paid consolation money in KRW 35 million to C, and F made a procedure for ownership transfer registration on the land of this case on the basis of property division date.

(3) On September 27, 2007, the ownership transfer registration for the instant land was completed on the grounds of sale as of April 9, 2007, and again on June 20, 2013, the ownership transfer registration for the instant land was completed on the grounds of sale as of May 9, 2013.

C. Examining the above facts in light of the legal principles as seen earlier, barring any special circumstance, C, a third-party purchaser, has acquired the ownership of the instant real estate as effective by completing the registration of ownership transfer in the future C with respect to the instant real estate. Accordingly, E, a seller, is unable to perform, and as a result, the Plaintiff would lose the right to transfer the ownership of the instant real estate. On the other hand, F, a title trustee, obtained profits from the disposal of the instant real estate, and thus, F, a title trustee, is obligated to return such profits to the Plaintiff with unjust enrichment.

Nevertheless, the lower court determined otherwise, solely on the grounds that the registration of transfer of ownership completed in the future in F from E is invalidated under a third party title trust with respect to the instant real estate, and determined that the Plaintiff, the title truster, could seek cancellation of the registration of transfer of ownership and seek another transfer of ownership against the Defendant, the sole heir of F, in subrogation of the seller, in lieu of E, the seller, and subsequently rejected the Plaintiff’s assertion seeking the return of the profits acquired by F in accordance with the disposition of

In so determining, the lower court erred by misapprehending the legal doctrine on a legal relationship where a title trustee in a three-party registered title trust disposes of real estate held in trust, thereby adversely affecting the conclusion of the judgment. The allegation contained in the grounds of

4. Conclusion

Therefore, the part of the judgment of the court below regarding the second preliminary claim shall be reversed, and that part of the case shall be remanded to the court below for a new trial and determination, and the appeal regarding the main claim and the first preliminary claim shall be dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Lee In-bok

Justices Kim In-bok, Counsel for the defendant

Justices Go Young-young