2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Defendant.

A. The primary purport of the claim is to revoke the Defendant’s revocation of permission to change the place of business on June 13, 2012.

B. Preliminary claim: The Defendant’s revocation of the disposition of non-permission to change the construction waste interim disposal business for the Plaintiff on June 13, 2012.

2. Purport of appeal

The judgment of the first instance is revoked. The plaintiff's claim is dismissed.

The reasoning of this court's reasoning is as follows. ① The part in the 8th, 8, and 10th, the 8th, 6, and 10th, the 8th, 8, and 10th, the 14, 6, and 6th, the 14th, 6, and 6th, the 10th, the 8th, the 8th, 10th, and the 14th, 6th, and 6th, the 14th, the 10th, the

2. Additional determination

A. The defendant's argument

(1) The document (Evidence No. 3) submitted by the Plaintiff to the Defendant in relation to the relocation of the existing place of business of this case cannot be deemed as an application for permission for relocation of the existing place of business, and even when considering the language, form, and conditions of the notice of permission (Evidence No. 4) of this case, it is not a document that permits the relocation of the existing place of business of this case, but a reply to the Plaintiff’s civil petition or inquiry about the possibility of relocation of the said place of business of this case, and the Plaintiff’s notice of permission of this case is not a document that permits the relocation of the said place of business of this case, and the Plaintiff’s notice of permission of this case is not a disposition that permits the relocation of the

Therefore, with respect to the disposition of this case where the notice of permission of this case constitutes a beneficial administrative act, the legal principle of ex officio revocation of the disposition of this case where the said notice is revoked shall not be deemed to apply.

(2) In full view of the relevant laws and regulations that serve as the basis for the instant disposition, the administrative agency may add necessary measures to the conditions of permission in order to suppress the generation of scattering dust, noise, etc. and to prevent environmental ion. salt and damage to the residents’ property, etc. In light of the location of the site scheduled for the instant relocation (hereinafter referred to as the “land scheduled for the instant transfer”), the toxicity of scattering dust and scattering dust, etc., it is clear that the measures alleged by the Plaintiff alone cannot prevent environmental pollution in the vicinity of the instant land scheduled for the instant transfer and any harm to the residents’ property health. Accordingly, the instant disposition is deemed lawful rather than the disadvantages suffered by the Plaintiff.

B. Determination

(1) As to the first argument

(A) In light of the substance and purport of relevant statutes, the subject, content, form, and procedure of the act, substantial relation between the act and the disadvantage suffered by interested parties such as the other party, and the attitude of an administrative agency and interested parties related to the pertinent act, etc., based on the fact that an administrative disposition is a law enforcement with respect to a specific fact conducted by an administrative agency as a public authority, and is an act that directly affects the rights and obligations of the public (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2010Du3541, Sept. 27, 2012).

(B) However, in light of the following: (a) if the Plaintiff’s application content, the content and form of the instant permission notification, the Defendant’s previous attitude and the instant permission notification are not recognized as an administrative disposition, it cannot be deemed that the instant permission notification is merely a “civil petition reply or a quality reply” as alleged by the Defendant; and (b) it is reasonable to view it as an administrative disposition. Ultimately, the Defendant’s assertion based on the different premise is without merit. According to the evidence No. 3, the Plaintiff’s request for consultation on the relocation of business place as of October 25, 201 (hereinafter referred to as “application of this case”), the Plaintiff’s application submitted to the Defendant on the part of the Defendant (see, e.g., “the instant application of this case”) is not a type of application as stipulated in Article 13(2) of the Enforcement Rule of the Construction Waste Recycling Promotion Act, such as the Defendant’s assertion, but the Plaintiff did not have the content and content of the previous application of the instant construction waste transfer report to the public official prior to the instant business site.

② In addition, according to the purport of Gap evidence No. 4 and the entire argument, the permission notice of this case (refer to the records No. 36 pages) was prepared in the form of a regular official document with the Defendant’s official seal affixed along with the Defendant’s official seal affixed to the Defendant’s public official in charge, and the content explicitly stated that the permission of transfer was granted on the condition of taking measures, and that the attached document attached to the "relevant department (law) that allows the Plaintiff to take necessary administrative procedures on the premise of the change of the place of business of the construction waste interim disposal business pursuant to the transfer of the place of business." Thus, even if the Defendant did not deliver the Plaintiff a certificate of change of the place of business of the construction waste interim disposal business, it seems that the Plaintiff, the other party to the permission notice of this case, as the Plaintiff, had no choice but to understand the Defendant’s disposition of change of the place of business of the construction waste disposal

③ Meanwhile, according to the overall purport of evidence Nos. 16 and 17 as well as the entire pleadings, following the notice of permission in this case, the residents filed a civil petition against the moving of the Plaintiff’s place of business collectively and reported this fact through the media, etc., the Defendant’s public official in charge of the Defendant appears to have clearly expressed his intention that it is difficult to cancel the permission of moving the Plaintiff’s place of business due to the Defendant’s payment of compensation for the amount equivalent to ten billion won, including the purchase cost of the Plaintiff’s site, etc. If the cancellation is made, it is difficult for the Defendant to cancel the permission of moving the Plaintiff’s place of business due to the Defendant’s payment of compensation to the reporter who reported the same fact. Accordingly, it appears that the Defendant had assumed that the interim disposal of construction waste disposal business before the place of business was conducted through the notice of permission

(4) Although it is acknowledged that, around May 15, 2012, the Plaintiff’s D head of the Defendant’s D team issued the instant permit after the instant permit notice: (a) was written with the purport that “A had the ownership to transfer the site to the Plaintiff at the time of the instant permit was not vested in the future; (b) the Defendant did not have any condition to file an application for change of the construction waste interim disposal business site; (c) however, according to the description of evidence No. 23-1 and the purport of oral argument, the Plaintiff purchased the instant land as a condition for cancellation that the Plaintiff could not obtain a permit for change of the relocation of the place of business as of October 25, 201, prior to the date of the instant permit notice; (d) the Plaintiff purchased the instant land as of December 1, 2011 from the seller, and the Plaintiff did not have any special agreement between the seller and the seller to use the said land at the time of the instant permit (see, e.g., records 33) and C, the evidence prepared by the Defendant alone based on the content of the instant permit.

(2) As to the second argument

(A) If a citizen acquires a certain benefit and right due to a certain administrative disposition, the administrative disposition revoking the previous administrative disposition must be a separate administrative disposition that deprives the person who already acquired the existing benefit and right, and the public need to cancel the administrative disposition to be cancelled. Furthermore, even if there is a defect in the administrative disposition, the administrative disposition may be cancelled only if it is a strong measure to justify the disadvantage of the party to the public interest, such as the necessity of the public interest and the infringement of the right to obtain benefits and the protection of trust, and the stability of legal life, etc. due to the cancellation, and then it is possible to cancel the administrative disposition that has violated the existing interest and rights (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2011Du2375, Mar. 29, 2012).

(나) 따라서 피고가 이 사건 처분으로 주장한 사유들이 원고가 이 사건 처분을 통하여 입게 될 불이익을 정당화할 정도로 강한 공익상 필요가 있는 사정들에 해당하는지에 대하여 보건대, ① 먼저, 이 사건 처분사유 중에서 원고가 이 사건 예정지에 설치할 '폐기물 처리시설 및 야적장'을 바닥·벽면·지붕이 있는 건축물로 조성하는 것에 관하여는, 앞서 인용한 사실과 증거 등에 의할 때, 이 사건 처분 당시를 기준으로 국내의 폐기물 처리업체 중에서 소수 업체만이 폐기물 처리시설 및 야적장을 모두 옥내화한 것으로 보이고(기록 337쪽, 356쪽 참조), 피고가 항소심에서 추가로 제출한 을 제13 내지 28호증(가지번호가 있는 것은 가지번호 생략)의 각 기재 등 그 제출의 모든 증거및 이 법원의 환경부에 대한 사실조회 결과만으로는 이를 뒤집기에 부족한 이상, 피고의 위 폐기물 처리시설 및 야적장의 옥내화 요구는 객관적으로 합리성이 있다고 보기 어려운 점, ② 또한, 이 사건 처분사유 중 진입도로 교통 소통 문제에 관하여도, 갑 제10, 11, 12호증의 각 기재에 의하면, 원고는 피고의 2012. 5. 7.자 보완 통보에 대한 답변 형식으로 이 사건 처분 전인 2012. 5. 25.자로 제출한 서면 등을 통하여 이 사건 예정지 등 그 사업부지 일부를 제공하여 1개 차로를 신설하는 내용의 진입도로 확보 방안을 제시하였고(기록 143쪽 참조), 이에 대해 피고는 2012. 5. 30.자 2차 보완 통보에서는 교통소통 문제에 대하여 추가로 명시적인 보완을 원고에게 요구하지는 않았던 점(기록 144쪽 참조), ③ 나아가, 이 사건 처분사유 중 이 사건 예정지 인근의 안양천 오염 예방 대책 등에 대하여 보면, 비록 원고가 이 사건 예정지에서 건설폐기물 중간처 리업을 운영할 경우에 그에 따른 소음, 진동, 비산먼지 등이 발생하는 것은 불가피할 것으로 보이지만, 이는 원고가 그 방지대책으로 제시한 비산먼지 방지시설 등을 제대로 설치하여 가동할 경우 그에 따른 피해를 상당 부분 줄일 수 있을 것으로 보임에도 불구하고, 피고는 예상되는 소음, 진동, 비산먼지의 정도와 그로 인한 이 사건 예정지 인근 주민이나 안양천 등 주변지역에 발생할 재산상 환경상 피해에 대한 구체적인 근거 자료 등을 충분히 제시함이 없이 막연하게 이 사건 예정지 주변의 환경오염과 주민의 재산상 건강상 위해가 발생할 수 있다는 점을 주장하고 있을 뿐이며, 앞서 인용한 바와 같이 원고가 수립한 비산먼지 등의 방지대책을 고려해 볼 때, 피고가 항소심에 이르기까지 제출한 모든 증거에 의하더라도 이 사건 예정지에서 원고의 사업장이 설치될 경우에 사회 통념상 일반적으로 인용하여야 할 수인한도를 초과하는 구체적인 피해가 인근 주민 등에게 발생한다고 단정하기도 부족한 점, ④) 갑 제16 내지 18호증의 각각 기재와 변론 전체의 취지에 의하면, 피고는 이 사건 허가통지 이후에 이 사건 예정지 인근 주민이 집단으로 원고의 사업장 이전에 반대하자 원고에게 그 사업장 이전에 따른 인근 주민 피해 방지 대책 등의 수립을 좀 더 적극적·구체적으로 요구하였던 것으로 보이는데, 원고로서는 이 사건 허가통지 등을 신뢰하여 이 사건 예정지를 매입하는 등 많은 자금과 노력을 투자하여 그 사업장을 이전함에 필요한 준비를 진행함과 아울러 주변 환경에 대한 피해 방지대책까지 수립하였음에도 불구하고, 피고가 이 사건 예정지 인근 주민의 반대에 따른 이 사건 예정지 주변의 피해 가능성을 문제 삼는 것은 원고에게 민원의 해결에 대한 책임을 전가하는 것이라고 볼 여지도 있는 점, ⑤ 한편, 피고는 원고가 이 사건 예정지로 사업장을 이전한 후에 그 시설을 가동하는 단계에서 비산먼지 등이 관련 법령이 정한 기준을 초과하여 배출되어 주변에 피해가 발생하는지를 감독하거나 그에 따른 위반 행위에 대해서 각종 행정 조치를 통하여 인근 주민이나 주변 환경에 대한 피해를 막는 방안을 마련할 수도 있다고 할 것인 점 등을 앞서 인용한 여러 사정 및 위 법리와 모두 종합해 볼 때, 피고가 이 법원에서 추가로 주장하는 사정까지 모두 고려한다고 하더라도 이 사건 처분으로 인하여 원고가 입은 불이익보다는 그를 통하여 달성할 공익상 필요가 더 중대하다고 볼 수 없고, 달리 그를 인정할 객관적 증거도 발견할 수 없다. 결국, 그와 다른 전제에 기초하여 이 사건 처분이 적법하다는 피고의 이 부분 주장도 받아들일 수 없다.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the judgment of the court of first instance which accepted the plaintiff's primary claim of this case is justifiable, and the defendant's appeal is dismissed.

Judges Gangseo-gu

Judges Cho Young-soo