1. According to the reasoning of the lower judgment as to the grounds of appeal Nos. 2 and 3, the lower court, based on its stated reasoning, held that the Defendant was jointly and severally liable with the co-defendant Construction Co-Defendant of the first instance trial to pay the Plaintiff a timber supply price, and rejected the Defendant’s partial payment defense. In so doing, contrary to what is alleged in the grounds of appeal, the lower court did not err by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence in violation of logical and empirical rules, or by failing

2. As to the ground of appeal No. 1, Article 3(2) of the Act on Special Cases Concerning Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings (hereinafter “Special Cases Act”) provides that “Where it is deemed reasonable for an obligor to dispute over the existence or scope of the obligation to perform before a fact-finding ruling declaring that the obligor has the obligation to perform the obligation to perform the obligation is rendered, Article 3(1) shall not apply to the reasonable scope.” As to the ground of appeal No. 1, the application of Article 3(1) of the Act on Special Cases

Article 3(2) of the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Establishment and Evaluation of a Liability for Performance refers to cases where it is deemed reasonable for an obligor to resist in relation to the existence or scope of the Liability for Performance. It refers to cases where it is deemed that there is a reasonable ground for the obligor’s argument as to the existence or scope of the Liability for Performance. Whether it is reasonable for an obligor to resist as above is a matter of fact-finding and evaluation by the court regarding the pertinent case (see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Decision 86Meu1876, May 26, 1987; Supreme Court Decision 2004Da39092, Nov. 25, 2005); and there is an obligor’s obligation for performance.