부당이득금반환
1. The plaintiff's appeal is dismissed.
2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiff.
The purport of the claim and appeal is the purport of the appeal.
1. The reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance cited by the court of first instance is the same as that of the judgment of the court of first instance, and thus, this is cited pursuant to the main sentence of Article 420
Meanwhile, in the first instance court, the Plaintiff claimed that the ownership of each of the instant real estate was in title trust with the Defendant, and that it was a bilateral registration title trust, and the Plaintiff asserted that it was in fact a donation of each of the instant real estate to L, who is an son, according to the demand of the first-class relative, that the wife had concerns over the Plaintiff in the funeral ceremony of the deceased K, and that it was not in the future L’s name but in the event that the title was trusted to the Defendant by concern about the increase of L’s property, it is also argued that it is a three-party registered title trust.
However, the facts acknowledged earlier and the overall purport of the arguments revealed in full view of the following circumstances: (i) where the title holder of each real estate was entrusted to another person, the documents proving the legal relationship, such as the registration right certificate, are held by the title truster, the actual owner (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2000Da6858, Apr. 25, 2000); (ii) from the time the ownership of each of the instant real estate was transferred to the Defendant, it appears that the Defendant was holding the registration right certificate or L, not the Plaintiff or L; (iii) the Plaintiff or L appears to have claimed the right to each of the instant real estate for at least 10 years, or paid taxes and public charges; and (iii) the Plaintiff asserted that a bilateral title trust was made with respect to each of the instant real estate for the future of L, but the court at the same time asserted that L was a “donation” and a three-party title trust was not consistent; and (iv) contrary to the Plaintiff’s assertion, if a criminal title trust between the Plaintiff’s three-party.