(b) The workers' refusal to provide collective labor and the obstruction of business are incompetence to the workers' refusal to provide collective labor, and whether the dismissed workers are recognized as workers or members of the company, who dispute the validity of the dismissal within a reasonable period of time (affirmative)

C. Whether the status as an employee or a partner is recognized for a person who contests the validity of dismissal of an dismissed worker within a reasonable period of time (affirmative)

D. Whether the act of workers under Paragraph (c) above, as a trade union member, of putting security guards into a trade union room and entering a trade union office in the company constitutes a crime of intrusion upon the structure (negative)

E. The case reversing the judgment of the court below which held that if the worker referred to in paragraph (c) of the above "" enters the company into the company and distributed printed articles, it did not constitute a crime of intrusion upon a structure under the premise that he entered the company's office, it did not constitute a crime of violation of the rules of evidence.

B. The failure of workers to collectively work during the working hours is nothing more than a failure to perform the duty to provide labor unless there is any other unlawful element. However, even if a refusal to provide labor is a mere refusal, if it is not a legitimate industrial action, or if it interferes with normal operation of business by force, the crime of interference with business under the Criminal Act may be established.

C. Generally, a labor-management relationship is terminated by dismissal and it would lose its position even if it is an employee who contests it. However, in light of the purport that the proviso of Article 3 subparag. 4 of the Trade Union Act aims to protect the establishment and existence of a trade union and to prevent the activities of a trade union from being obstructed by the employer’s unfair exercise of personnel rights, even the dismissed employee should recognize the status as an employee or a member for a reasonable period of time against the dismissed employee.

D. The above worker's entry into the company's office as a member of the union is justifiable and cannot be avoided from the company's side. Thus, the worker's removal of security guards from the company due to the purpose of entry into the company cannot be punished for the crime of intrusion upon the structure.

E. The case reversing the judgment of the court below on the ground that the defendant, an employee referred to in paragraph (c) above, spreads the security guards' restraint, enters the company into the company, and distributed printed materials in the restaurant, the defendant could not be deemed to have entered the company to go to the trade union office, but the court below did not establish a crime of intrusion upon a building without deliberation on the circumstances, on the premise that the defendant went to the trade union office without entering the company.

The prosecutor's remaining appeals are dismissed.

As stated in the crime of interference with business under Article 314 of the Criminal Act, the force refers to the force to suppress or cause confusion with human freedom. As labor dispute action is essentially an element of interference with business by force, since workers make collective efforts to force and pressure the employer. However, since workers' collective action rights are the rights guaranteed by the Constitution along with the right to organize and collective bargaining rights, even in the case where labor dispute action belonging to collective action rights constitutes a constituent element of interference with business, if it falls under the element of interference with business formally, it shall be dismissed as a justifiable act.

On the grounds of its reasoning, the lower court determined that the Defendant’s act of interference with business by holding an extraordinary general meeting of a trade union on December 14, 1989 with the consent of 97 members present at the company on December 14, 1989, and reported the occurrence of a dispute to the Sinnam Regional Labor Relations Commission on the 16th day of the same month after the Defendant decided to report the occurrence of the dispute if the Defendant refuses to do so, and that the Defendant delayed the commencement of work as in the facts charged from the 18th day of the same month, refused the remaining work, suspended work in a group, and suspended work in a group by getting the employees, including the Defendant, to take part in the company’s work by failing to work in group during working hours, and thereby bringing about interference with the company’s operation. The lower court determined that the crime of interference with business was not established only by the issue of the supply of labor duties to employees under the labor contract, but also by failing to take part in the company’s compliance with the law.

However, workers' collective failure to work during working hours can only be deemed to have failed to fulfill their duty to provide labor unless there is any other unlawful element. However, even if refusal to provide labor is a legitimate industrial action, the crime of interference with business under the Criminal Act may be established if it interferes with normal operation of the business by force (see Supreme Court Decision 90Do2771, Apr. 23, 191). The defendant's leading act of refusing or delaying the work in this case (hereinafter "act of refusing work") causing damages by impeding normal operation of the business, such as the production, sale, etc. of the company, and the above pro-con voting by union members cannot be deemed to be unlawful because it was clearly recorded that it did not go against the rules of the law to carry out the act of interference with business, and the court below's decision to refuse to comply with the business cannot be deemed to have been justifiable or legitimate because it did not constitute a strike of interference with business as an act of violating the law, such as obstruction of compliance with the law, even if it did not constitute a legitimate act of refusing work.

2. We examine the second ground for appeal.

Article 3 of the Trade Union Act provides that "if a trade union provides for the definition of a trade union and does not fall under it, a person who is not a worker shall not be interpreted as a person who is not a worker." Article 3 subparagraph 4 of the same Act provides that "if a person who claims the validity of dismissal is not a worker, he/she shall not be interpreted as a person who is not a worker." Thus, the proviso of Article 3 subparagraph 4 of the same Act provides for the qualifications that a trade union may become a member in order to protect the existence of a trade union, and does not provide for the labor relations with an employer. Thus, a labor-management relationship is terminated by dismissal and is not a worker who contests this, even if the above provision of the Trade Union Act loses his/her status. However, in light of the purport that the above provision of the Trade Union Act aims to protect the establishment and existence of a trade union and to prevent interference with the activities of a trade union by exercising unfair personnel rights, a dismissed worker shall be recognized as a worker or a member of the trade union within a reasonable period of time

The court below acknowledged the fact that the defendant was subject to disciplinary action by the side of the company around January 3, 1990, and thereafter filed a request for remedy against unfair labor practices with the ordinary Nam-do Regional Labor Relations Commission, and that the defendant raised a lawsuit seeking nullification of dismissal with the Busan District Court's Busan District Court's Ulsan District Court's decision, against the above dismissal measures, and entered the labor union office into the company for 18 times from May of the same month to March 15 of the same year, and made a strike for attendance at the labor union office. The proviso of Article 3 subparagraph 4 of the Trade Union Act provides that the defendant shall not be construed as a person who contests the validity of the dismissal as a non-worker, unless the dismissal becomes final and conclusive. Thus, the defendant's entry into the labor union office as a member's qualification cannot be avoided from the company as a legitimate act, and therefore, it cannot be proven that the defendant did not violate the purpose of entry into the company or enters the company's office within the purpose of entry into each of the facts charged.

The court below's decision on the status as a member of the defendant, who is dismissed, is just in accordance with the above legal principles and there is no ground to discuss this point.

However, the court below, on the other hand, determined that the defendant's act of intrusion upon the structure under paragraph (3) of the facts charged (the crime was committed on the premise that the defendant's act of violation was committed jointly with non-indicted C, although the court below judged that the above crime was committed solely by the defendant's act of violation of the attached crime list Nos. 16, 17, and 18 of the judgment of the court below, but it appears to be an obvious error) was committed on 18 occasions by the defendant, and that the defendant's act of violation of the above legal principles cannot be brought an action against the company as a legitimate act, and that the defendant's act of violation of the law cannot be brought an action against the company's act of violation of the law, and that the defendant's act of violation of the rules of evidence cannot be punished as a crime of invasion upon the company's formation of security guards' removal of security guards or entry into the above crime No. 13 of the above crime list No. 209:20 of Feb. 7, 19990.

3. Therefore, since the court below found the defendant not guilty of the crime of interference with business and the crime of violation of the Punishment of Violences, etc. by breaking the structure on February 7, 1990, this part of the judgment of the court below cannot be reversed, and the arguments are justified.

For the reasons above, the part of the judgment of the court below which is not guilty is reversed, and the case is remanded to the court below. The remaining appeal by the prosecutor is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices

Justices Park Jong-ho (Presiding Justice)