[2] Where the specific and direct judgment on the matters alleged by the parties is not indicated, but it is possible to identify whether to accept the assertion in light of the overall purport of the reasoning of the judgment, or where it is obvious that the assertion will be rejected, whether there is an error of omission of judgment (negative)

[3] Whether issuing a statement of grounds for disposition to the relevant public official when the appointing authority removes a public official from his/her position pursuant to Article 67 (1) of the former Local Public Officials Act is a requirement for the validity of the disposition (negative)

1. As to the Defendant’s ground of appeal

The lower court determined that the Defendant’s request for disciplinary action on September 21, 2009 was not made on July 17, 2008 on the ground that the head of the Gyeonggi Provincial Police Agency had not been included in the notification of the commencement of an investigation to the Defendant on July 17, 2008, prior to the expiration of the prescription period of the relevant disciplinary cause; the investigative agency only conducted an investigation on the Plaintiff’s abandonment of duties falling under the ground for the ground for the ground for the ground for the ground for the ground for the ground for the ground for the 1 to 3 disciplinary action; and the Defendant’s failure to conduct an investigation on the ground that the grounds for the 1 to 3 disciplinary action had not been made on July 11, 2009, after the expiration of the prescription period of the ground for the ground for the disciplinary action on the receipt of money and valuables, and thereafter, on September 21, 2009, the Defendant could not be deemed to have been subject to the Defendant’s request for disciplinary action on the ground for the ground for the ground for the disciplinary action.

In light of the relevant legal principles and records, the above determination by the court below is just, and contrary to the allegations in the grounds of appeal, there were no errors in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the effective scope of "Notification of Commencement of Investigation" and the period of prescription under Article 73 (2) of the former Local Public Officials Act (amended by Act No. 9301, Dec. 31, 2008; hereinafter the same), and there were no errors

In addition, the starting point of the statute of limitations for disciplinary action shall be deemed to be the time when the person having authority to take an action becomes aware of the existence of the cause of disciplinary action, or when the person having authority to take an action is unable to know the existence of the cause of disciplinary action without negligence, the right to take disciplinary action may be exercised regardless of the expiration of the statute of limitations for disciplinary action, or the defendant's argument in the grounds of appeal is inconsistent with the principle of good faith or cannot be accepted in light of the above legal principles. In addition, the defendant's ground of appeal that the defendant's ground of appeal is against the principle of good faith. The Supreme Court Decision 94Da14650 Decided March 10, 195

2. Plaintiff’s ground of appeal

A. As to the substantive defect of removal from position

1) The removal from position under Article 65-3 (1) 2 of the former Local Public Officials Act is intended to prevent a local public official who continues to hold a position and perform his/her duties, and there is a risk of undermining the fairness of the performance of public duties and the trust of the people. Such removal from position is a separate disposition that differs from that of disciplinary action, which is punitive action. Therefore, in light of the purpose of the removal from position system, etc., whether the removal from position based on the ground under Article 65-3 (1) 2 of the former Local Public Officials Act is legitimate should be determined by taking into account specific circumstances, such as whether the local public official is highly probable to undergo a disciplinary resolution corresponding to removal, removal, and suspension from position, whether the local public official continues to perform his/her duties, thereby causing danger to fair performance of public duties. After that, the removal from position does not immediately mean that the relevant disciplinary action has been revoked by a court judgment on the ground that it has no grounds for disciplinary action, expiration of prescription, etc.

In addition, it is insufficient to say that an administrative disposition is void as a matter of course. The defect is serious and objectively obvious as it violates the important part of the law. Whether it is serious and clear must be objectively examined the purpose, meaning, function, etc. of the law from a teleological perspective, and at the same time, reasonably examined and determined the specificity of the specific case itself (see Supreme Court Decisions 2003Du2403, Nov. 26, 2004; 2005Du11937, Sept. 21, 2007). In addition, in a case where an administrative disposition was taken by applying a provision of a law to a certain legal relation or fact, it is clearly stated that the legal principle that the provision of the law cannot be applied to the legal relation or fact, and if an administrative disposition was taken by applying the above provision, it is obvious that the defect is grave and obvious, or that the legal relation or fact cannot be applied, and it is obvious that there is room for 2010Du58480, May 29, 2001.

On the other hand, even if there is no specific and direct judgment on the matters alleged by the parties in the judgment of the court, if it is possible to find out that the claims have been cited or rejected in light of the overall purport of the reasons for the judgment, it cannot be said to be an omission of judgment. Even if the court did not make a decision, if it is obvious that the assertion would be rejected, it cannot be said that there is an

2) As seen earlier, the statute of limitations expired for the grounds for disciplinary action Nos. 1 through 3 regarding the instant disposition of suspension from office. According to the records, there is no evidence that the Plaintiff, even with the knowledge of the Nonparty’s illegal subcontracting caused by the Plaintiff’s neglect of duties, should not be deemed to have knowingly neglected or renounced the relevant disciplinary action. Thus, there is room to see that there is high probability for the Plaintiff to be subject to disciplinary action for dismissal, removal, and suspension from office at the time of the second removal from office. However, as seen earlier, there is room for dispute as to whether the statute of limitations has been extended for the grounds for disciplinary action Nos. 1 through 3 with respect to the receipt of money by the notification of commencement of investigation of July 17, 2008, and the remaining grounds for disciplinary action No. 1 through 3 with the exception of the grounds for disciplinary action No. 4 are difficult to conclude that the resolution of removal from office or suspension from office against the Plaintiff was unlawful as of the date of the second removal from office.

The lower court determined that the instant disposition was unlawful on the ground that the period of the instant disciplinary action was expired and the grounds for the instant disciplinary action was nonexistent on the ground that the instant disciplinary measure had not existed as to the grounds for the instant disciplinary measure, as long as the instant disposition was revoked due to its illegality and illegality, and that the instant disposition did not specifically state the grounds for its determination on the Plaintiff’s assertion that the defect was serious and obvious, but that the second disposition cannot be deemed null and void as a matter of course, citing the reasoning of the first instance judgment, and that the instant disposition was unlawful on the ground that the grounds for

The above judgment of the court below can be deemed to include the purport that the plaintiff's assertion is not accepted, and even if the court below omitted its judgment, it is clear that this part of the argument is dismissed for the reasons as seen earlier. Thus, the court below did not err by misapprehending the legal principles on the substantive defect of the removal from position, as alleged in the ground of appeal, thereby affecting the conclusion of the judgment

B. Regarding the procedural defect of removal from position

Article 67 (1) of the former Local Public Officials Act provides that the appointment authority shall issue an explanatory note stating the grounds for the disposition to the relevant public official when the public official is subject to removal from his/her office to the public official. Since the purpose of Article 67 (1) of the former Local Public Officials Act is to enable the relevant public official to have the opportunity to file a lawsuit where the public official is dissatisfied with the disposition by clearly stating the grounds for such removal from office, it cannot be deemed that the issuance of an explanatory note for the disposition becomes effective (see Supreme Court Decision 90Nu100

In light of the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance, the court below determined that the procedural defect of the non-issuance of the explanatory statement could not be deemed to have caused deprivation of the opportunity to object to the second removal, on the ground that even if the defendant did not deliver the explanatory statement to the plaintiff, it cannot be deemed that such circumstance resulted in deprivation of the opportunity to object to the second removal from the position, since the plaintiff was notified in writing of the fact that the defendant requested a resolution of disciplinary action from the defendant around January 6, 2010, and was deemed to have sufficiently known at the time of the second removal from position.

In light of the above legal principles and records, the above judgment of the court below is just, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the validity of non-delivery of an explanatory statement as alleged in the grounds

3. Conclusion

Therefore, all appeals are dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against each losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Lee In-bok (Presiding Justice)