beta
(영문) 서울고등법원 2015.01.14 2014누52277

부당해고구제재심판정취소

Text

1. The plaintiff's appeal is dismissed.

2. The costs of appeal include the part arising from the participation in the appeal.

Reasons

1. The contents of the Plaintiff’s assertion in the trial of the court of first instance are different from those of the Plaintiff already asserted in the trial of first instance. However, even if evidence, etc. newly submitted in the trial of the court of first instance were examined, the Plaintiff’s assertion cannot

The reasoning for this Court’s explanation on this case is as follows: “The plaintiff shall use the part “when concluding a renewal contract with the intervenor on March 16, 2012 after the intervenor served as a fixed-term lecturer for two years,” which reads “the plaintiff shall enter into the first contract with the intervenor on March 16, 2010, at the time when the first contract was entered into with the intervenor on March 16, 2010.” The plaintiff shall add the following judgments on the repeated arguments of the plaintiff as stated in the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance.

Therefore, it is accepted by Article 8 (2) of the Administrative Litigation Act and Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act as it is.

[Supplementary judgment] The plaintiff asserts that "the plaintiff is against the good faith or the principle of gold speech, even though the intervenor made a re-contract by deceiving the plaintiff that he is not subject to Article 4 (2) of the Fixed-term Act, it has been converted to an inorganic worker pursuant to Article 4 (2) of the Fixed-term Contract Act."

According to the statement in Gap evidence No. 12, it can be acknowledged that the intervenor stated to the effect that "the intervenor knows that he is able to work for a period of four years without the conversion of the arms contract position."

However, this merely appears to be a speech due to misunderstanding that the “professional instructor in English language” and “instructors” under Article 22 of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act and Article 42(1) of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act are legally separate qualifications, and it does not seem to be a part of the Plaintiff, even if the Intervenor actively works for the “professional instructor in English language” more than two years, it does not constitute a conversion into an employee who entered into an employment contract without a fixed period of time.

The Intervenor’s above remarks are legal experts.