[영문판례]
National Assembly Election Redistricting PlanCase
[13-2 KCCR 502, 2000Hun-Ma92, 2000Hun-Ma240
(consolidated), October 25, 2001]
Contents of the Decision
1. Limits to legislative discretion in redistricting electoral districts.
2. Permissible limit on population disparity in electoral districts.
3. A case where the redistricting discriminating electors in a parti-cular district from those in other electoral districts was not re-garded as gerrymandering.
4. Whether to declare the entire Election Redistricting Plan uncon-stitutional when parts of the Plan has unconstitutional elements.
5. Reasons for giving temporary effects to provisions declared non-conforming to the Constitution.
Summary of the Decision
1. A wide scope of legislative discretion is recognized in devel- oping the National Assembly Election Redistricting Plan. However,the constitutional principle of equal election limits legislative discretionin the matter. First, the equality in the value of each vote is themost important and basic factor in constituency rezoning. Accord-ingly, unreasonable redrawing of electoral districts violating the con-stitutional mandate of equal weight of votes is arbitrary, and hence, is unconstitutional. Second, gerrymandering is not within the con-stitutional limits of legislative discretion, and is unconstitutional.Gerrymandering refers to intentional discrimination of electors in aparticular region through the arbitrary division of electoral districts.It would be a case of gerrymandering if electors in a particularelectoral district lose opportunities to participate in political affairsbecause of an arbitrary division of electoral districts, or if the con-stituency is redrawn to prevent the election of a candidate supported by electors from a particular region.
2. There are many suggestions for permissible limits on popula-tion disparity in electoral districts, and at this moment, the Court canconsider adopting two of these options. One is to set the permissi-ble maximum deviation of population in an electoral district from theaverage population of electoral districts at 33⅓% (equivalent to set-ting the permissible maximum ratio between the most populous districtand the least at 2:1). The other is to set the maximum deviation at50% (in this case, the maximum ratio between the most populousdistrict and the least populous district would be 3:1). Adoption of the33⅓% criterion would create many problems because factors otherthan population, such as administrative district division and the totalnumber of seats in the National Assembly, must be accounted forwhen readjusting the national electoral constituencies. It has onlybeen 5 years since the Court first deliberated on the problem of popu-lation disparity in electoral districts, and idealistic approach disre- garding practical limits would be imprudent. Therefore, the Courtwill review the instant case using the 50% criterion. However, theCourt will have to employ the 33⅓% or a more exacting criterionafter some time from now. In case of "Kyonggi Anyang Dongan-Ku" Electoral District, it has a population 57% more than the aver- age population of electoral districts. Such division of electoral dis-tricts is beyond the limits of legislative discretion, and it violates thecomplainants' constitutional right to vote and the right to equality.
3. In case of "Incheon Seo-Ku and Kangwha-Kun B" Electoral District, it can be concluded that the legislature did not arbitrarilyreadjust the electoral district to discriminate electors in Seo-Ku Kumdan-Dong. Right before the 16th General Election for theNational Assembly in 2000, Kangwha-Kun had a population less thanthe minimum required to constitute an independent electoral district.So the National Assembly members agreed to coalesce Kumdan-Dong,a part of Seo-Ku, to Kangwha-Kun to make a single electoral districtbecause Kumdan-Dong was the most populous and was relativelyclose to Kangwha-Kun compared to all other Dongs in Seo-Ku.
4. In the instant case, the right to equality and the right to voteare violated by a part of the Election Redistricting Plan, namely, zon-ing of ""Kyonggi Anyang Dongan-Ku" Electoral District. However, there is a problem whether to declare the entire Election Redistrict-ing Plan unconstitutional when only parts of the Plan has unconstitu-tional elements. This depends on whether the Redistricting Plan canbe divided into separate entities. In the 95Hun-Ma224 decision, the Court decided that the Election Redistricting Plan formed an insepa- rable entity, and that the whole Plan had to be declared unconstitu-tional if parts of the Plan had unconstitutional elements. This is stillreasonable for the defense of a constitutional order and the protec-tion of citizens' basic rights, and the Court will maintain the position.
5. The Court could render a decision of simple unconstitutional-ity. However, the following facts have to be considered in doing so:that General Elections for the National Assembly have already been held based on the current Redistricting Plan; that there may arise avacuum in law if a special election or re-election for a particulardistrict is to be held before the revision of the Plan, because thespeedy revision of the Plan would be impossible due to its politicalnature; and that in order to maintain homogeneity in the composi- tion to the National Assembly and to prevent confusion caused bychanges in the electoral district, it is better that a special election orre-election is held under the present Redistricting Plan. Therefore, the Court finds the instant Redistricting Plan nonconforming to the Constitution, but orders it to remain effective temporarily until De-cember 31, 2003, by which the legislature must revise the Plan.
Justice Kwon Seong's Concurring Opinion
Equality in the value of each vote is not the foremost concern indrawing up the National Assembly Election Redistricting Plan, but itis only one of many important factors to be considered. Anotherfactor to be considered is proper representation of electors in a parti-cular electoral district. The most clear example to substantiate theclaim that a National Assembly member indeed represents the peopleis given when a National Assembly member is elected into the officeby electors of an independent electoral district (such as an adminis-trative district). Considering the historical development of the legis-lature, the principle of protection of minority and the principle of na-tional solidarity, it is reasonable and justifiable to make each NationalAssembly member represent a certain electoral body. Since the present election system adopts the minor electorate system, or single-seat constituency system, ensuring a sense of connectionbetween electors and a National Assembly member is as important as achieving equality in the value of each vote when finalizing theElection Redistricting Plan.
Separating a part of an administrative district and adding it toanother administrative district to achieve mathematical equality in thevalue of each vote would weaken the link between electors and theelected. Such practice would also violate the right to vote of thoseelectors who were separated from others in the old electoral districtand were forced to vote in a newly formed electoral district, andhence, is unconstitutional. Under the current Act on the Election ofPublic Officials and the
Prevention of Election Malpractices, threeelectoral districts, namely, "Pusan Puk-Ku and Kangso-Ku B" ElectoralDistrict, "Haeundae-Ku and Kijang-Kun B" Electoral District, and"Incheon Seo-Ku and Kangwha-Kun B" Electoral District, are formedby adding electors separated from their original administrative dis-tricts, and these parts of the Redistricting Plan violate the sameelectors' right to vote. Because of the inseparability of the Redis-tricting Plan, the whole Plan is unconstitutional. The Court shouldalso point out the unconstitutionality of Article 3 of the Addenda tothe Act on the Election of Public Officials and the Prevention ofElection Malpractices allowing formation of the above electoral dis- tricts.
Dissenting Opinions of Justices Han Dae-hyun and
Ha Kyung-chull
According to the Court's decision in the 95Hun-Ma224 case onDecember 27, 1995, an electoral district with a population not ex-ceeding the 60% maximum deviation limit from the average populationof electoral districts is not unconstitutional. As of March 22, 2000,population in "Kyonggi Anyang Dongan-Ku" Electoral District is328,383, about 57% more than the average population of electoral dis-tricts, namely, 208,917. Therefore, under the criterion set by the95Hun-Ma224 decision, the present Redistricting Plan is not uncon-stitutional.
Considering deference to the legislative power, it would be im-prudent for the Court to change its earlier holding in 1995. But we agree with the opinion of the Justices of the majority regarding theElection Redistricting Plan to be employed for the National AssemblyElection in 2004. Instead of rendering a decision of nonconformity tothe Constitution, the Court should reject the complaint, while sug- gesting that the new Redistricting Plan for the National AssemblyElection in 2004 should set the permissible maximum deviation ofpopulation in an electoral district from the average population ofelectoral districts at 50% and that the new criterion will be used for constitutional review from then on.
Provisions on Review
Act on the Election of Public Officials and the Pre-vention of Election Malpractices(amended by Act No. 6265on February 16, 2000)
Parts on "Kyonggi Anyang Dongan-Ku" Electoral District and"Incheon Seo-Ku and Kangwha-Kun B" Electoral District in theNational Assembly Election Redistricting Plan, Table 1, Article 25(2):omitted
Related Provisions
The Constitution
Articles 11(1), 41(1), (2), (3)
Act on the Election of Public Officials and the Pre-vention of Election Malpractices(amended by Act No. 6265on February 16, 2000)
Article 21 (Full Number of National Assembly Members)
(1) The full number of National Assembly members, for local con-stituency members and proportional representatives combined, shallbe 273.
(2) The full number of National Assembly members to be electedin a single local constituency shall be one.
Article 25 (Demarcation of Local Election Districts for NationalAssembly)
(1) The local constituency for National Assembly (hereinafterreferred to as the "election district for National Assembly") shall bedemarcated in the area under jurisdiction of the City/Province, inconsideration of the population, administrative districts, geographicalfeatures, traffic, and other conditions, but a Ku (including an auto-nomous Ku), Shi (meaning a Shi where a Ku is not established), or Kun (hereinafter referred to as a "Ku/Shi/Kun"1)) shall not be partlydivided and made to belong to another election district for NationalAssembly.
(2) [omitted]
Article 3 of Addenda (Special Cases concerning Demarcation ofLocal Election Districts for National Assembly Members)
Notwithstanding the provision of the latter part of Article 25(1),in the election of National Assembly members (including the specialelection, etc.), a divided part of the Haeundae Ku of the Pusan Metro-politan City may be made to belong to the local election district forthe National Assembly member for Kijang Kun B, Haeundae Ku, anda divided part of the Puk Ku of Pusan Metropolitan City to the localelection district for the National Assembly member for Kangso Ku B,Puk Ku, and a divided part of the Seo Ku of the Incheon Metro-politan City to the local election district for the National Assemblymember for Kangwha Kun B, Seo Ku.
Related Precedents
7-2 KCCR 760, 95Hun-Ma224 et. al., December 27, 1995
10-2 KCCR 742, 96Hun-Ma54, November 26, 1998
10-2 KCCR 764, 96Hun-Ma74 et. al., November 26, 1998
Parties
Complainants
1. Jeong Jin-sup (2000Hun-Ma92)
Counsel
(1) Attorney Han Kyung-soo
(2) Legal Corporation Hanjoong
Attorney-in-charge: Lee Hee-suk
2. Yang Yong-suk and 11 others (2000Hun-Ma240)
Counsel: Ryu Kwon-hong
Holding
1. Table 1, "the National Assembly Election Redistricting Plan,"pursuant to Article 25(2) of the Act on the Election of Public Officialsand the Prevention of Election Malpractices (amended by Act No. 6265on February 16, 2000) is nonconforming to the Constitution.
2. The above National Assembly Election Redistricting Plan shallremain effective temporarily until December 31, 2003, by which thelegislature must revise the Plan.
Reasoning
1.Overview of the Case and the Subject Matter of Review
A. Overview of the Case
(1) 2000Hun-Ma92
Complainant resides in "Kyonggi Anyang Dongan-Ku" ElectoralDistrict, and plans to vote in the 16th National Assembly election on April 13, 2000. As of December, 1999, the district has a population of 331,458, about 59% more than the average population of electoraldistricts (total population 47,330,000 ÷ 227 electoral districts). Thesmallest electoral district in the National Assembly Election Redis-tricting Plan, "Kyongbuk Koryong-Kun and Seongju-Kun" ElectoralDistrict, has a population of 90,656. So, "Kyonggi Anyang Dongan-Ku" Electoral District has a population 3.65 times larger than that of"Kyongbuk Koryong-Kun and Seongju-Kun" Electoral District. OnFebruary 10, 2000, the complainant filed a constitutional complaintalleging that the present National Assembly Election Redistricting Planwas against the principle of equal election and that the Plan, underwhich the value of the complainant's vote is only 1/3.65 of a vote ofan elector in "Kyongbuk Koryong-Kun and Seongju-Kun" ElectoralDistrict, infringed on the complainant's right to equality and the rightto vote.
(2) 2000Hun-Ma240
Complainants reside in "Incheon Seo-Ku and Kangwha-Kun B"Electoral District, and plan to vote in the 16th National Assemblyelection on April 13, 2000. On April 7, 2000, the complainants fileda constitutional complaint alleging that the present National AssemblyElection Redistricting Plan, forming a single electoral district byadding Kumdan-Dong to Kangwha-Kun, violated the constitutional right to vote and the right of equality because Kumdan-Dong andKangwha-kun are geographically separated from each other andthere is no sense of social or economic solidarity between residentsof Kumdan-Dong and Kangwha-Kun.
B. Subject Matter of Review
The subject matter of review is the constitutionality of "KyonggiAnyang Dongan-Ku" Electoral District and "Incheon Seo-Ku andKangwha-Kun B" Electoral District in Table 1, "the National Assem-bly Election Redistricting Plan" (hereinafter called the "instant Elec- tion Redistricting Plan"), pursuant to Article 25(2) of the Act on the Election of Public Officials and the Prevention of Election Malprac-tices (amended by Act No.6265 on February 16, 2000, hereinaftercalled the "Public Election Act"). Contents of the instant ElectionRedistricting Plan are as shown in "Attachment 1".
2. Complainants' Arguments
A. 2000Hun-Ma92
(1) Population disparity in electoral districts cause inequality inthe weight of each vote, thereby violating the right to equality inelections. This is contrary to the Preamble and Article 11(1) of the Constitution stipulating protection of the right to equality. Violationof the right to equality in political spheres ultimately leads to thedisintegration of the representative democratic system necessary for the realization of the democratic order which the Constitution holdsas its fundamental objective.
(2) As of December 31, 1999, "Kyonggi Anyang Dongan-Ku"Electoral District where the complainant resides has a population of331,458, about 59% more than the average population of electoral dis-tricts, or 208,502 (total population 47,330,000 ÷ 227 electoral districts).The district has a population about 3.65 times that of the smallestelectoral district in the instant Election Redistricting Plan, "KyongbukKoryong-Kun and Seongju-Kun" Electoral District, which has a popu-lation of 90,656. Under the instant Election Redistricting Plan, thevalue of the complainant's vote is only 1/3.65 of a vote of an elec-tor in "Kyongbuk Koryong-Kun and Seongju-Kun" Electoral District.Therefore, the Plan infringes on the complainant's constitutional rightto equality and the right to vote.
(3) It might be impossible to achieve perfect equality in the valueof each vote. According to the prevailing views of academics andprecedents in courts around the world for the last thirty years, thepermissible maximum ratio between the most populous and the leastpopulous electoral districts is 3:1. However, under the instant ElectionRedistricting Plan, it is 3.88:1, and this is against the reasoning ofthe Court's earlier ruling five years ago. The instant Election Redis- tricting Plan completely ignores equality in the value of each vote, ormore specifically, equality in the value of a vote contributing to theoutcome of an election. It violates the right of equality in theNational Assembly elections, and thereby infringes on the basic rightof equality.
B. 2000Hun-Ma240
(1) The demarcation of electoral constituencies should be done byconsidering the social, geographical, historical, economical or admin-istrative association between localities. Unless there are specialinevitable circumstances, adjacent localities should form an electoraldistrict. And the formation of a single electoral district out of twogeographically separated localities without justifiable reasons, wouldbe arbitrary, thus exceeding the limits of legislative discretion, andhence, is unconstitutional.
(2) In case of the "Incheon Seo-Ku and Kangwha-Kun B" Elec-toral District, Incheon Seo-Ku Kumdan-Dong and Incheon Kangwha-Kun became parts of the Incheon Metropolitan City in March 1995,and they are located 20 km apart. Residents in Kumdan-Dong mostlywork in factories, while those in Kangwha-Kun are mostly farmers.Therefore, there is no sense of solidarity between residents in the twolocalities. In case of Kumdan-Dong, problems in terms of trafficand environment have worsened since it became a part of IncheonMetropolitan City, and these issues require immediate attention.Despite these facts, Kumdan-Dong of Seo-Ku was isolated and addedto Kangwha-Kun to form an electoral district for the National As-sembly election. Such a realignment of electoral districts has made it very difficult for the complainants and other Kumdan-Dong resi-dents to accurately convey their messages to the National Assembly,and this infringes on the right to pursue happiness, the right toequality, and the right to vote.
3. Review
A. Representative Democracy and the Principle of
Equal Election
Article 1(2) of the Constitution explicitly states the principle ofthe people's sovereignty. However, under the representative democ-racy system adopted by most countries, the people holding the su-preme power of the land delegate their power to the State agencies except in some rare cases. Success in a representative democraticsystem depends on how accurately and effectively people's opinionsare reflected in the political decision making process. In this light,the electoral constituencies rezoning should be done in such a way toaccurately represent electors' choice. Violation of equality in votingrights caused by arbitrary redistricting would distort people's opin- ions, and this would seriously undermine the basis of representativedemocracy. Article 11(1) of the Constitution declares the general"principle of equality," and Article 41(1) of the Constitution declaresthe "principle of equal election" in the National Assembly electionthrough the provision that reads "the National Assembly shall becomposed of members elected by universal, equal, direct, and secretballot by the citizens." The principle of equal election is a manifes-tation of the principle of equality in the election process. It man- dates the principle of equality in the number of votes, namely, onevote per person, and equality in their weight, that is, the extent thatone vote contributes to the entire system of election (one vote, onevalue) (7-2 KCCR 760, 771, 95Hun-Ma224 and etc., December 27,1995). Also it means the denial of gerrymandering, or discriminatory constituency rezoning, designed to prevent a certain group of people'spolitical opinions from being reflected in the political process (10-2KCCR 742, 747, 96Hun-Ma54, November 26, 1998; 10-2 KCCR 764, 773,96Hun-Ma74 and etc., November 26, 1998).
B. Legislative Discretion in Constituency Rezoning
and Its Limits
Article 41(3) of the Constitution states that "the constituencies ofmembers of the National Assembly, proportional representation, andother matters pertaining to National Assembly elections shall be de-termined by Statute," thereby delegating the decision making powerconcerning details of the election system and constituency rezoningto legislative discretion.
Therefore, a wide scope of legislative discretion is recognized increating the National Assembly Election Redistricting Plan. The leg-islature can take into consideration not only the population disparity,but also administrative districts, geography of particular area, traffic,living sphere, sense of historical or traditional solidarity, or any otherpolicy or technical factors when realigning the electoral districts.Article 25(1) of the Public Election Act embodies such understanding asit states that "the local constituency for National Assembly shall bedemarcated in the area under jurisdiction of the City/Province, inconsideration of the population, administrative districts, geographical features, traffic, and other conditions... ."
Article 41(2) of the Constitution states that "the number of mem-bers of the National Assembly shall be determined by Act, but thenumber shall not be less than 200," and Article 21 of the Public Elec-tion Act sets the full number of National Assembly seats, includingall local constituency members and proportional representatives at 273.227 members of the National Assembly are elected from local consti- tuencies according to the relative majority representation system, and 46 proportional representatives are elected from one national constitu-ency. The total number of National Assembly seats, or the size ofthe legislature, is also a factor to be considered in rezoning theelectoral districts. In other words, the legislature has to consider thefact that while the number of National Assembly seats should be morethan 200 as stipulated by the Constitution, an excessive number of Assembly members would be detrimental to effective parliamentaryactivities. This means that the
formation of an efficient and ade-quate legislative body should also be considered in constituencyrezoning.
But, a wide scope of legislative discretion in constituency rezon-ing does not mean that the redistricting of electoral districts is freefrom constitutional control. In other words, the constitutional prin-ciple of equal election limits legislative discretion in such matters.
First, the equality in the value of each vote is the most important and basic factor in constituency rezoning. Accordingly, unreasonableredrawing of electoral districts, violating the constitutional mandateof equal weight of votes, is arbitrary, and hence, is unconstitutional.In this light, there is an inherent limit to legislative discretion inreadjusting the electoral constituencies.
On this point, the Court earlier ruled that "while the NationalAssembly may consider factors other than population, it is unconsti- tutional if there exists grave inequality beyond any reasonable limitsin the value of votes among electors" (7-2 KCCR 760, 773, 95Hun-Ma224 and etc., December 27, 1995).
Second, gerrymandering is not within the constitutional limits of legislative discretion, and is unconstitutional. Gerrymandering refersto an intentional discrimination of electors in a particular regionthrough arbitrary division of electoral districts. It would be gerry-mandering if electors in a particular electoral district lose opportu-nities to participate in political affairs, because of an arbitrary divisionof electoral districts, or if a district is redrawn to prevent the elec-tion of a candidate supported by electors from a particular region(10-2 KCCR 742, 748, 96Hun-Ma54, November 26, 1998; 10-2 KCCR764, 775, 96Hun-Ma74 and etc., November 26, 1998).
The Court earlier ruled that "in redistricting the electoral consti- tuencies, the legislature has to take into its consideration such factors as social, geographical, historical, economical and administrative asso-ciation between localities, and an electoral district should be composedof a contiguous geographic area except for certain and inevitablecircumstances." The Court further decided that unless there areinevitable circumstances, the redistricting of an electoral district byjoining two completely separated localities without a common bound-ary, unless there are inevitable circumstances, was arbitrary andbeyond the limits of legislative discretion, and hence unconstitutional (7-2 KCCR 760, 788-789, 95Hun-Ma224 and etc., December 27, 1995).
C.Unconstitutionality of "Kyonggi Anyang Dongan-Ku"
Electoral District Part of the ElectionRedistricting
Plan (Equality in the Value of Each Vote)
(1) Precedents on Population Disparity in Electoral Districts
In the first case about permissible limits on population disparityin electoral districts (95Hun-Ma224 and etc., December 27, 1995), theCourt found the then National Assembly Election Redistricting Plannonconforming to the Constitution, and suggested the following crite-rion for the constitutionality of population disparity in the constitu- encies.
In the decision, five Justices, Justices Kim Yong-joon, Kim Chin-woo, Kim moon-hee, Hwang Do-yun, and Shin Chang-on, ruled thatthe permissible maximum deviation of population in the National As- sembly Election should be 60% of the average population of electoraldistricts, or the quotient of the national population divided by thenumber of electoral districts2), and that it would be unconstitutionalto have a single
electoral district which did not satisfy such popu-lation requirement.
Four Justices, Justices Lee Jae-hwa, Cho Seung-hyung, Chung Kyung-sik, and Koh Joong-suk, proposed to separate the electoraldistricts into the urban districts and the rural districts. The fourJustices ruled that constituency redistricting which violates the 60%deviation of population limit and at the same time exceeds the 50% deviation limit in the same type of electoral district is beyond thelimits of legislative discretion and hence, is unconstitutional.
Three Justices, Justices Kim Moon-hee, Hwang Do-yun, and ShinChang-on, issued a concurring opinion to the majority opinion. Inthe opinion, three Justices pointed out that the legislature should takesteps to remedy the existing population disparities among electoraldistricts within a reasonable period of time, and under the new Re- districting Plan, the largest electoral district should not have a pop-ulation more than twice that of the smallest electoral district.Furthermore, the three Justices suggested that the Court should em-ploy a new criterion which sets the permissible maximum ratio ofpopulation between the most populous district and the least at 2:1 after a reasonable period of time. Justice Kim Chin-woo wrote aconcurring opinion also stating that the Court should employ thepermissible maximum ratio of population between the most populous district and the least at 2:1 from the next case on.
(2) Population Disparity in Electoral Districts in the
Instant Election Redistricting Plan
"Facts on the 16th National Assembly Election" published by theCentral Commission on Election Management provides various statis-tical information regarding the election, including population of each electoral district as of March 22, 2000. A table analyzing population ratio of each National Assembly electoral district is attached to Ap- pendix 2, and a table analyzing population disparity in the electoral districts is attached to Appendix 3.
The smallest electoral district in the instant Election Redistrict-ing Plan, "Kyongbuk Koryong-Kun and Seongju-Kun" Electoral Dis-trict, has a population of 90,190 (Strictly speaking, the number ofqualified electors should be the basis of comparison, but since thenumber of electors is proportional to population in most cases, all figures hereinafter will be in terms of "population"). On the otherhand, "Kyonggi Anyang Dongan-Ku" Electoral District where thecomplainant resides has a population of 328,383, and this is 3.64 timesthe population of "Kyongbuk Koryong-Kun and Seongju-Kun" Elec-toral District. The largest electoral district in the instant ElectionRedistricting Plan, "Kyonggi Uijongbu" Electoral District, has a popu-lation of 350,118, or a population 3.88 times that of the "Kyongbuk Koryong-Kun and Seongju-Kun" Electoral District. There are 154electoral districts with a population more than twice the population of the smallest electoral district, and 45 of them have a population threetimes or more than the population of the smallest electoral district.
The average population of electoral districts is 208,917 (Nationalpopulation, 47,424,300 ÷ number of electoral districts, 227). "Kyonggi Anyang Dongan-Ku" Electoral District, where the complainant residesin, has a population 57% more than this figure, and the smallest elec-toral district, "Kyongbuk Koryong-Kun and Seongju-Kun" ElectoralDistrict, has a population 57% less than this figure. The largest elec-toral district, "Kyonggi Uijongbu" Electoral District, has a popula-tion 68% more than the average figure.
There are 81 electoral districts with a population exceeding thepermissible maximum deviation of ±33⅓% (equivalent to setting thepermissible maximum ratio
between the most populous district and theleast at 2:1) or more from the average population of electoral dis-tricts. 30 of these districts have a population exceeding the permis-sible maximum deviation of ±50% (equivalent to setting the permis-sible maximum ratio between the most populous district and the leastat 3:1) or more.
It is noteworthy that there are 10 electoral districts with popu-lation disparities of ±60% (equivalent to setting the permissible maxi-mum ratio between the most populous district and the least at 4:1)or more (all of the cases exceeded the upper limit). This is directlyagainst the holding in the 95Hun-Ma224 case in which the Courtruled that a population disparity of ±60% would be the maximumpopulation under the Constitution.
(3) Permissible Limit on Population Disparity
(A) In suggesting the permissible limit on population disparity,the Court could employ either the population of the smallest electoraldistrict or the average population of electoral districts as a basis ofcomparison. In the 95Hun-Ma224 case, the Court chose to use theaverage population of electoral districts, following the provision ofFederal Election Act of Germany, precedents of the German Constitu-tional Court, and the opinion of the Central Commission on Election Management, and this Court will maintain the decision.
(B) Next, the Court needs to decide whether to use differentstandards in reviewing the constitutionality of population disparitiesin urban electoral districts and rural electoral districts.
In the 95Hun-Ma224 case, some Justices proposed to use differentpermissible maximum deviation standards for rural electoral districtsand urban electoral districts. However, because it is not easy todistinguish an urban electoral district from a rural electoral district,such classification would be either improper or unnecessary. There-fore, the Court will not distinguish between an urban electoral dis-trict from a rural electoral district when reviewing the instant case.
However, the existing difference between population in urban andrural areas resulting from the concentration of population to urbanareas should be taken into consideration when formulating the per-missible maximum deviation of population in an electoral district.
(C) Population disparity in electoral constituencies is not a problemlimited only to Korea, and over the years, the standards used to re-view the constitutionality of population disparities have become moreexacting in countries around the world. In the case of Germany,Article 3(1)[3] of the revised Federal Election Act (Bundeswahlgesetz)stipulates that the deviation of population in an electoral district, fromthe average population of electoral districts, should not exceed 15% and that rezoning constituency rezoning is required if the deviationexceeds 25%. In short, while setting the 15% deviation limit as aprinciple, and compelling the observance of 25% as a maximum devi-ation limit, the Act was flexibly legislated.
When compared to Article 3(1)[2] of the old Federal Election Act,which stated that the deviation of population in an electoral districtfrom the average population of electoral districts should not exceed25% and that rezoning of constituencies would be required if thedeviation exceeded 33⅓%, it is clear that the standard in reviewing the constitutionality of constituency rezoning has become more strict in Germany.
In case of Japan, Article 3(1) of the Act to Institute the Con-stituency Redistricting Commission for the Diet Election, enacted inFebruary 4, 1994, stipulates that a revised redistricting plan shouldstrive to achieve balanced population among electoral districts, thatin the new redistricting plan, the number earned by dividing the
pop-ulation of the largest electoral district by that of the smallest shouldnot exceed 2, and that consideration should be given to adminis-trative districts, geography, traffic, and other special conditions.
(D) In the 95Hun-Ma224 case, the Court suggested some factorsother than population to be taken into consideration when readjustingthe national electoral constituencies. In the case, the Court first in-dicated that in Korea which adopts the unicameral system, a NationalAssembly member, while representing the Korean people as a whole,also represents the electors from a particular locality. The Court alsocited population disparity between urban and rural electoral districtsresulting from population concentration in metropolitan areas and ex-isting inequality of development in all spheres as reasons to be lenientin suggesting the permissible limit on population disparity. On theother hand, the Court stated that many votes are wasted under theelection system currently employed by Korea, namely, the minor con-stituency system combined with the majority representation system.The Court went on to point out that to permit excessive populationdisparities between electoral districts under such election system wouldsignificantly undermine the basis of the representative democratic system (7-2 KCCR 760, 775, 95Hun-Ma224 and etc., December 27,1995). Such conditions have not changed much since then.
(E) Population remains the most important factor in redistrictingconstituencies, but secondary factors other than population have to betaken into consideration as well. To set limits on legislative dis-cretion in constituency rezoning, or more specifically, to suggestconstitutionally permissible limits on population disparity in electoral districts, is a problem of easing the strict application of the princi-ple of equality in the value of each vote by considering factors otherthan population. Considering all the factors we have seen so far,among the suggestions regarding the permissible limits on populationdisparity, the one that says a population that is within the 33⅓%deviation limit (equivalent to setting the permissible maximum ratiobetween the most populous district and the least at 2:1) would bestill unconstitutional if there is no reasonable justification for such adisparity. This standard is too rigorous, and it is too early to adoptthis suggestion as the standard for constitutional review of the Elec-tion Redistricting Plan under the present political realities in Korea.To adopt the 60% criterion (equivalent to setting the permissible max-imum ratio between the most populous district and the least at 4:1) five years after the Court adopted it in the 95Hun-Ma224 decision would be improper in the light of the concurring opinion of the case,suggesting employment of a more strict criterion in the future dis-pute, or the fact that the standard adopted by the Court in the instantcase would serve as guidelines in revising the Election RedistrictingPlan for the National Assembly Election in 2004. It would be alsoagainst the worldwide trend of setting a more exacting standard toreview the constitutionality of population disparities in electoral dis- tricts.
Then, the Court could choose between two other options at thistime. One is to set the permissible maximum deviation of populationin an electoral district from the average population of electoral dis-tricts at ±33⅓%. The other is to set the maximum deviation at±50% (in this case, the maximum ratio between the most populous district and the least populous district would be 3:1).
Needless to say, the 33⅓% criterion is a superior option to achieveequality in voting rights. But adoption of this criterion would entailmany problems, because it would make it very difficult to considerfactors other than population, such as administrative district divisionsand the total number of seats in the National Assembly in constitu- ency rezoning.
The problem regarding division of administrative districts could besolved through revision of the current Public Election Act. WhileArticle 25(1) of the Public Election Act stipulates that "... Ku/Shi/Kunshall not be partly divided and made to belong to another electiondistrict for the National Assembly member," this is not a constitu-
tional requirement. Therefore, the provision would have to concedein order to achieve the constitutional requirement of equality in thevoting rights, and revising the administrative districts itself could beconsidered.
Article 41(2) of the Constitution only stipulates that the totalnumber of seats in the National Assembly should be more than 200, so this number could be adjusted to remedy population disparities.
However, in reality, formation of an electoral district by separat-ing a part of an administrative district and adding it to another orincreasing the total number of seats in the National Assembly wouldnot be easy considering public opinion. Also, as we have seenearlier, there are 30 electoral districts with a population exceeding thepermissible maximum deviation from the average population of elec- toral districts of ±50% (equivalent to setting the permissible maxi- mum ratio between the most populous district and the least at 3:1),but there are 81 electoral districts with a population exceeding thepermissible maximum deviation from the average population of elec-toral districts of ±33⅓% (equivalent to setting the permissible maxi-mum ratio between the most populous district and the least at 2:1).Under such circumstance, it would not be difficult to predict thatthere would arise many problems if the Court adopted the 33⅓%criterion.
It has only been 5 years since the Court first deliberated on theproblem of population disparity in electoral districts, and a too ideal-istic of an approach disregarding practical limits would be imprudent.Therefore, the Court will review the instant case using the 50%criterion.
However, the Court would like to make it clear once more, as didthree Justices, Justices Kim Moon-hee, Hwang Do-yun, and ShinChang-on, in their concurring opinion to the majority opinion in the 95Hun-Ma224 case, that, while the legislature could take into consi-deration factors other than population such as administrative districts,the total number of seats in the National Assembly, population dis- parities between urban and rural districts when realigning the elec-toral districts, the legislature should take steps to remedy the existingpopulation disparities among electoral districts to ensure that thelargest electoral district does not have a population more than twicethat of the smallest electoral district to uphold the constitutionalprinciple of equal election. The Court will employ the 33⅓% (equiv- alent to setting the permissible maximum ratio of population betweenthe most populous district and the least at 2:1) or a more strictcriterion after some time from now.
(4) Unconstitutionality of "Kyonggi Anyang Dongan-Ku"
Electoral District Part of the Election Redistricting Plan
In case of "Kyonggi Anyang Dongan-Ku" Electoral District, ithas a population 57% more than the average population of electoraldistricts. Such division of electoral districts is beyond the limits oflegislative discretion, and violates the complainants' constitutionalright to vote and the right to equality.
D. Constitutionality of "Incheon Seo-Ku and Kangwha-
Kun B" Electoral District Part of the Election
Redistricting Plan (regarding gerrymandering)
(1) Formation of the Instant Electoral District
Before the Act on the Election of Public Officials and the Pre-vention of Election Malpractices was amended on February 16, 2000,the electoral districts in Incheon Seo-Ku, Kyeyang-Ku and Kangwha- Kun were divided to "Kyeyang-Ku and Kangwha-Kun
A", "Kyeyang-Ku and Kangwha-Kun B", and "Incheon Seo-Ku" Electoral Districts.Under such division, Incheon Seo-Ku as a whole formed an inde-pendent electoral district, and "Kyeyang-Ku and Kangwha-Kun A"Electoral District was formed of all of Kyeyang-Ku except Kyeyang- Ku Kyeyang 1-Dong. Kyeyang-Ku Kyeyang 1-Dong and the districtof Kangwha-Kun formed the "Kyeyang-Ku and Kangwha-Kun B"Electoral District.
A constitutional complaint challenging the constitutionality offorming "Kyeyang-Ku and Kangwha-Kun B" Electoral District byseparating only Kyeyang-Ku Kyeyang 1-Dong from Kyeyang-Ku andadding it to Kangwha-Kun was filed. In the 96Hun-Ma54 casedecided on November 26, 1998, the Court ruled that the particularElection Redistricting Plan had an unconstitutional element becausethe legislature departed from the scope of legislative discretion informing such electoral district, but considering lack of time in pre-paring the Plan for the 15th National Assembly Election and thetemporary nature of such constituency rezoning, the Plan was heldconstitutional.
In the above case, the Court suggested that since IncheonKyeyang-Ku and Kangwha-Kun were separated from each other byIncheon Seo-Ku and Kyonggi Kimpo-Kun (currently Kimpo-Shi), itwould be more reasonable to form an electoral district by combiningKangwha-Kun with Ongjin-Kun which was geographically very closeto and administratively very similar to Kangwha-Kun, or to form anelectoral district by combining Kangwha-Kun and some parts ofIncheon Seo-Ku which were geographically closer to Kangwha-Kuninstead of Kyeyang-Ku.
Following the holding of the Court, the legislature made Kyeyang-Ku a single electoral district, combined Kangwha-Kun and IncheonSeo-Ku, and formed two electoral districts, namely, "Incheon Seo-Kuand Kangwha-Kun A" Electoral District, composed of all parts of Incheon Seo-Ku except Kumdan-Dong, and "Incheon Seo-Ku andKangwha-Kun B" Electoral District compossd of Kumdan-Dong andall parts of Kangwha-Kun, as it amended the Act on the Election ofPublic Officials and the Prevention of Election Malpractices throughAct No.6265 on February 16, 2000.
(2) Constitutionality of the Instant Electoral District Part
of the Election Redistricting Plan
According to the case records and "Facts on the 16th NationalAssembly Election" published by the Central Commission on ElectionManagement, Firstly, Incheon Seo-Ku Kumdan-Dong and Kangwha-Kun both were parts of Kyonggi-Do, but became parts of IncheonMetropolitan City on March 1, 1995. Incheon Seo-Ku Kumdan-Dong,located in the north part of Incheon, is partly urban and partly rural in composition. It is composed of eight smaller counties, and mostresidents of Kumdan-Dong work in factories (less than 10% of allhouseholds are farmers). Kangwha-Kun is located in the northwestpart of Incheon, and is composed of 15 islands. More than 70% ofall residents are farmers. Secondly, Incheon Seo-Ku Kumdan-Dongand Kangwha-Kun are approximately 20 km apart, and have KyonggiKimpo-shi in between them. Thirdly, as of March 22, 2000, popula-tion of Kangwha-Kun is 67,621, that of Ongjin-Kun, an administrativedistrict composed of small islands close to Kangwha-kun, is 13,979,and that of Incheon Seo-Ku is 339,583. Incheon Seo-Ku is composedof 14 smaller administrative districts called Dongs, and of these,Kumdan-Dong has the largest population of 51,450 which is about15% of the total population of Incheon Seo-Ku. Finally, after be- coming a part of Incheon, population of Kumdan-Dong has rapidlyincreased, and about 1900 factories are located within its boundary.There is also the Metropolitan Area refuse disposal site in Kumdan- Dong, and Kumdan-Dong currently faces many problems in terms of traffic and environment.
When revising the Election Redistricting Plan for the 16th NationalAssembly Election,
the legislature decided to set the minimumpopulation of an electoral district at 90,000. Under such a guideline,Kangwha-Kun did not have enough population to form an indepen-dent electoral district, and it still would not meet the minimum pop-ulation requirement if Kangwha-Kun was combined with Ongjin-Kunto form an electoral district3). Thus, the legislature decided to sep-arate a part of Incheon Seo-Ku, which is closer to Kangwha-Kun than Incheon Kyeyang-Ku, and combine it with Kangwha-Kun to form an independent electoral district. The reason the legislaturechose to separate Kumdan-Dong was because Kumdan-Dong, beinglocated in the north part of Incheon Seo-Ku, was relatively close to Kangwha-Kun, and because it would be easier to meet the minimum population requirement to add Kumdan-Dong, the most populated of all administrative districts in Seo-Ku, to Kangwha-Kun.
Such constituency rezoning by the legislature is not against the Court's decision in the 96Hun-Ma54 case. Also, since population ofKumdan-Dong is about 43% of total population of "Incheon Seo-Kuand Kangwha-Kun B" Electoral District, it would be difficult to sayKumdan-Dong was incorporated into Kangwha-Kun. When all factorsare considered, it cannot be concluded that the legislators arbitrarilyrealigned the electoral districts with an intention to discriminateagainst the people of Kumdan-Dong.
Thus, the "Incheon Seo-Ku and Kangwha-Kun B" Electoral Dis-trict part of the instant Election Redistricting Plan does not violatethe complainants' right to vote or right to equality, and hence, isconstitutional.
E. Inseparability of the Election Redistricting Plan
and the Scope of Decision of Unconstitutionality
As seen above, the complainants' rights to equality and to voteare violated by only a part of the Election Redistricting Plan, namely,zoning of ""Kyonggi Anyang Dongan-Ku" Electoral District. However,there is a problem whether to declare the entire Election Redistrict-ing Plan unconstitutional when only parts of the Plan has unconsti-tutional elements. This depends on whether the Redistricting Plancan be divided into separate entities.
In its earlier decision in the 95Hun-Ma224 case, the Court ruled on the inseparability of the Election Redistricting Plan as follows:
The electoral districts in the Election Redistricting Plan form an organic whole, and changes in one electoral district inevitably influ-ence composition of other electoral districts in a chain reaction. Thus,if a part of the Election Redistricting Plan has unconstitutional ele-ments, the whole Plan has unconstitutional elements. If the Courtwere to render a decision of unconstitutionality only for a part ofthe Election Redistricting Plan concerning the electoral district whoseresidents filed a constitutional complaint because of population dis-parity, there would be cases where other parts in the Plan withworse population disparities remain effective because there is a timelimit for filing a constitutional complaint. This would be clearlyunfair. Therefore, if rezoning of some constituencies violated theConstitution, the whole Election Redistricting Plan would have to be declared unconstitutional.
Such conclusion is still reasonable for defense of a constitutionalorder and protection of citizens' basic rights, and the Court will main-tain the position.
F. Decision of Nonconformity to the Constitution
The Court should render a decision of unconstitutionality. How-ever, the following
facts have to be considered in doing so: thatGeneral Elections for the National Assembly have already been heldbased on the current Redistricting Plan; that there may arise a vacu-um in law if a special election or reelection for a particular districtis to be held before the revision of the Plan, because speedy revi-sion of the Plan would be impossible due to its political nature; and that in order to maintain homogeneity in the composition of the Na-tional Assembly and to prevent confusion caused by changes in theelectoral district, it is better that a special election or reelection isheld under the present Redistricting Plan. Therefore, the Court findsthe instant Redistricting Plan nonconforming to the Constitution, but orders it to remain effective temporarily until the legislature revises the Plan by December 31, 2003.
4. Conclusion
"Kyonggi Anyang Dongan-Ku" Electoral District part is beyondthe permissible limits of population disparities in electoral districts,and hence constitutes an arbitrary constituency rezoning. Thus, theCourt should grant the complainants' constitutional complaint, and atthe same time, the Court should declare the entire Election Redis-tricting Plan unconstitutional because of the inseparability of theElection Redistricting Plan. However, for reasons shown above, theCourt finds the instant Redistricting Plan nonconforming to the Con- stitution but orders it to remain effective temporarily until the legis-lature revises the Plan by December 31, 2003. The constitutionalcomplaint against "Incheon Seo-Ku and Kangwha-Kun B" ElectoralDistrict part of the instant Election Redistricting Plan should berejected, but since the whole Plan is declared nonconforming to theConstitution due to the unconstitutionality of another part, the Court will not issue a separate adjudication rejecting that complaint.
This decision is pursuant to the consensus of all Justices exceptKwon Seong who wrote a separate concurring opinion and JusticesHan Dae-hyun and Ha Kyung-chull who wrote a dissenting opinion.
5. Justice Kwon-seong's Concurring Opinion
A. Limit to Equality in the Value of Each Vote
It is very difficult to achieve a mathematical equality in the valueof each vote when a country has adopted the minor electorate systembased on the administrative district divisions. The permissible maxi-mum ratio between the most populous district and the least of 3:1and that of 4:1 are not that different. To say the ratio of 3:1 isacceptable but not 4:1 is too artificial and unnatural.
Equality in the value of each vote is not the foremost concernin developing the National Assembly Election Redistricting Plan. Itis only one of many important factors to be considered.
B. Representatives' Ties with a Region or with Electors
Another of such factors would be proper representation of electorsfrom a particular electoral district. In a country adopting the repre-sentative democratic system and allowing universal and direct election,there is no other option but to elect a member of the National As-sembly from an electoral district composed of particular administra-tive districts. Such election system could be classified into the minorelectorate system, the medium electorate system, or the major elec- torate system, depending on the size of the electoral districts. If allmembers of the National Assembly are elected from a
single national electoral district, such representatives will have weak ties with elec-tors. This is clear when one thinks of proportional representativesunder the current election system. Each National Assembly memberrepresents the entire people, but at the same time, he or she alsorepresents the people who elected him or her into the office. Tosay that a member of the National Assembly represents all the peoplearound the nation is to articulate the legal status and political re-sponsibilities of a legislator. It means that a National Assemblymember should not work only for the interests of his or her electors,but for the interests of the entire nation. However, it does notstipulate method of election of a legislator nor does it negate the tiesbetween a legislator and his or her electors. The most clear wayfor a National Assembly member to properly represent the people ispossible when a National Assembly member is elected into the officeby electors of an independent electoral district (such as an adminis- trative district).
C. Legitimacy of Representing Electors' Interests
To guarantee proper representation of electors from a particular electoral district is not just a matter of sentiment, but it is reason- able and legitimate because of the following reasons:
① In the light of the historical development of the parliamentarysystem, a legislator has always been elected by residents of a partic-ular locality, and it was only natural to do so.
② In the light of the principle of protection of minority, a rep-resentative from a larger electoral district and a representative from a smaller electoral district have been and should be given equal status.
③ To achieve national solidarity, a representative from a popu-lous, well-developed electoral district and a representative from asmaller, less-developed electoral district have been and should begiven equal status.
④ Self-respect, sense of honor, and sense of duty of a legisla-tor are strengthened when he or she represents people of a partic- ular locality.
Since the present election system adopts the minor electorate sys-tem, ensuring a sense of connection between electors and a NationalAssembly member is as important as ensuring equality in the valueof each vote when finalizing the Election Redistricting Plan.
D. Unconstitutionality of Separating Residents of a
Particular Locality
Separating a part of an administrative district and adding it toanother administrative district to achieve mathematical equality in thevalue of each vote would weaken the link between electors and theelected. Such practice would also violate the right to vote of those electors who were separated from others in the old electoral district,and were forced to vote in a newly formed electoral district, andhence, is unconstitutional. There is a violation of the right to vote because of the following reasons: A legislature composed of repre-sentatives elected from certain administrative districts is a centralcomponent of the representative system which, in turn, is an integralelement of the parliamentary system; Thus the right to elect a Na-tional Assembly member representing the administrative district whereelectors reside constitutes the essence of the electors' right to vote in the National Assembly election; If some residents of an adminis-trative district were separated and were forced to belong to anotheradministrative district for the National Assembly election, this is tan-tamount to losing the electors' right to elect a National Assemblymember
representing their locality. Combining independent adminis-trative districts to form a single electoral district or separating a pop-ulous administrative district to form several electoral districts alsorestrict the electors' right to select a National Assembly member rep-resenting their locality to a certain degree, but this could be seen asthe election of a common representative or several representatives,and it is not contrary to the essential element of the representativesystem.
Contrary to the majority opinion of Justices that Article 25(1) ofthe Public Election Act stipulating that "... Ku/Shi/Kun shall not bepartly divided and made to belong to another election district for theNational Assembly" is not a constitutional requirement, I think it is aconstitutional requirement. As explained above, separating a part ofan administrative district and adding it to another administrative dis-trict to achieve the mathematical equality in the value of each votewould weaken the link between electors and the elected. Such apractice would also violate the right to vote of those electors whowere separated from others in the old electoral district to vote in anewly formed electoral district, and hence, is unconstitutional. There-fore, Article 25(1) of the Public Election Act reflects a constitutionalrequirement, and the Election Redistricting Plan is contrary to Article25(1), and is unconstitutional.
E. On the Instant Case
The following three electoral districts in the Election Redistrict-ing Plan under the present Public Election Act hinder proper repre-sentation of electors:
1. "Pusan Puk-Ku and Kangso-Ku B" Electoral District: Puk-KuKumkok-Dong, Hwamyong-Dong, Dukchun-je2-Dong, and parts ofKangso-Ku
2. "Haeundae-Ku and Kijang-Kun B" Electoral District: Haeundae-Ku Joa-Dong, Songjung-Dong, and parts of Kijang-Kun
3. "Incheon Seo-Ku and Kangwha-Kun B" Electoral District: Seo-Ku Kumdan-Dong and parts of Kangwha-Kun
Formation of these three electoral districts violates the right tovote of those electors separated from their original administrative dis-tricts and forced to be a part of another electoral district. Becauseof the inseparability of the Redistricting Plan, the whole Plan is un-constitutional. The Court should also point out the unconstitutional-ity of Article 3 of Addenda to the Act on the Election of PublicOfficials and the Prevention of Election Malpractices, allowing theformation of the above electoral districts.
6. Dissenting Opinion of Justices Han Dae-hyun and
Ha Kyung-chull
We agree with the majority opinion that the "Incheon Seo-Kuand Kangwha-Kun B" Electoral District part of the instant ElectionRedistricting Plan does not violate the complainants' right to voteor right to equality, and hence, is constitutional. However, for thefollowing reasons, we disagree with the majority opinion which foundthe "Kyonggi Anyang Dongan-Ku" Electoral District part of theinstant Election Redistricting Plan unconstitutional.
According to the Court's decision in the 95Hun-Ma224 case on December 27, 1995 which rendered a decision of unconstitutionalityon the National Assembly Election Redistricting Plan reviewed, anelectoral district not exceeding the 60% maximum deviation limit fromthe average population of electoral districts is not unconstitutional.
As of March 22, 2000, the population in "Kyonggi Anyang Dongan-Ku" Electoral
District is 328,383, about 57% more than the averagepopulation of electoral districts, namely, 208,917. Therefore, it is clearthat the present Redistricting Plan is not unconstitutional under thecriterion set forth by the 95Hun-Ma224 decision.
Considering deference to legislative power, it would be imprudentfor the Court to change its earlier decision in 1995. But we agreewith the opinions of the Justices of the majority that the permis-sible maximum deviation of population in an electoral district fromthe average population of electoral districts should be set at 50% forthe Redistricting Plan to be employed for the National AssemblyElection in 2004.
In conclusion, we think that the Court should reject the complaint,instead of rendering a decision of nonconformity to the Constitution,while suggesting that the new Redistricting Plan for the NationalAssembly Election in 2004 should set the permissible maximum devi-ation in an electoral district from the average population of electoral districts at 50%, and that the new criterion will be used for consti- tutional review from then on.
Justices Yun Young-chul (Presiding Justice), Han Dae-hyun,Ha Kyung-chull, Kim Young-il (Assigned Justice), Kwon Seong,Kim Hyo-jong, Kim Kyoung-il, Song In-jun, and Choo Sun-hoe
Appendix
Appendix 1 (revised on February 16, 2000)
The National Assembly Election Redistricting Plan: [omitted]
Appendix 2
Table of Population Ratio of Each National Assembly Electoral District
Classification Region | Population (as of 03/22/00) | Number of Electoral Districts | No. of Electoral Districts with population ratio of 2:1 or less | No. of Electoral Districts with population ratio between 2:1 and 3:1 | No. of Electoral Districts with population ratio between 3:1 and 4:1 |
Seoul | 10,291,043 | 45 | 6 | 31 | 8 |
Pusan | 3,812,489 | 17 | 2 | 10 | 5 |
Taegu | 2,513,380 | 11 | 3 | 4 | 4 |
Incheon | 2,514,144 | 11 | 2 | 6 | 3 |
Kwangju | 1,360,943 | 6 | 1 | 4 | 1 |
Taejon | 1,370,795 | 6 | 1 | 5 | 0 |
Ulsan | 1,027,815 | 5 | 2 | 2 | 1 |
Kyonggi-Do | 8,992,947 | 41 | 11 | 19 | 11 |
Kangwon-Do | 1,554,437 | 9 | 4 | 5 | 0 |
Chungchongbuk-Do | 1,492,293 | 7 | 2 | 4 | 1 |
Chungchongnam-Do | 1,919,230 | 11 | 4 | 7 | 0 |
Chollabuk-Do | 2,003,553 | 10 | 6 | 0 | 4 |
Chollanam-Do | 2,146,768 | 13 | 10 | 2 | 1 |
Kyongsangbuk-Do | 2,802,337 | 16 | 10 | 3 | 3 |
Kyongsangnam-Do | 3,082,607 | 16 | 7 | 7 | 2 |
Cheju-Do | 539,519 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 1 |
Total | 47,424,300 | 227 | 73 | 109 | 45 |
population ratio: population ratio between the population of a parti-cular electoral district and that of the least populous electoral district
1. Population of Smallest Electoral District ("Kyongbuk Koryong-Kunand Seongju-Kun" Electoral District): 90,190
2. Population of Largest Electoral District ("Kyonggi Uijongbu" Elec-toral District): 350,118 (3.88:1)
3. Population of Instant Electoral District ("Kyonggi Anyang
Dongan-Ku" Electoral District): 328,383 (3.64:1)
Appendix 3
Table of Population Disparity in the National Assembly ElectoralDistricts
Classification Region | Population (as of 03/22/00) | Number of Electoral Districts | No. of Electoral Districts with population disparity of ±33⅓ or less | No. of Electoral Districts with population disparity between ±33⅓ and ±50% | No. of Electoral Districts with population disparity between ±50 and ±60% | No. of Electoral Districts with population disparity of ±60 or more |
Seoul | 10,291,043 | 45 | 38 | 3 | 2 | 2 |
Pusan | 3,812,489 | 17 | 12 | 5 | 0 | 0 |
Taegu | 2,513,380 | 11 | 6 | 3 | 1 | 1 |
Incheon | 2,514,144 | 11 | 7 | 3 | 1 | 0 |
Kwangju | 1,360,943 | 6 | 5 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
Taejon | 1,370,795 | 6 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Ulsan | 1,027,815 | 5 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
Kyonggi-Do | 8,992,947 | 41 | 27 | 9 | 2 | 3 |
Kangwon-Do | 1,554,437 | 9 | 5 | 2 | 2 | 0 |
Chungchong- buk-Do | 1,492,293 | 7 | 5 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
Chungchong- nam-Do | 1,919,230 | 11 | 7 | 2 | 2 | 0 |
Chollabuk-Do | 2,003,553 | 10 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 1 |
Chollanam- Do | 2,146,768 | 13 | 6 | 5 | 2 | 0 |
Kyongsang- buk-Do | 2,802,337 | 16 | 6 | 7 | 2 | 1 |
Kyongsang- nam-Do | 3,082,607 | 16 | 8 | 5 | 2 | 1 |
Cheju-Do | 539,519 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
Total | 47,424,300 | 227 | 146 | 51 | 20 | 10 |
population disparity: population deviation from the average populationof electoral districts
1. Average Population of Electoral Districts: 208,917
2. Population of Smallest Electoral District ("Kyongbuk Koryong-Kunand Seongju-Kun" Electoral District): 90,190 (-57%)
3. Population of Largest Electoral District ("Kyonggi Uijongbu" Elec-toral District): 350,118 (+68%)
4. Population of Instant Electoral District ("Kyonggi Anyang Dongan-Ku" Electoral District): 328,383 (+57%)
Aftermath of the Case
The Constitutional Court rendered a decision of unconstitutionalityon December 27, 1995, in the first Redistricting Plan case broughtbefore the Court. At the time, the Court ruled that the permissiblemaximum deviation of population should be 60% of average populationof electoral districts (equivalent to setting the permissible maximumratio between the most populous district and the least at 4:1).Through the instant case, the Court changed its previous ruling and adopted the 50% deviation criterion (in this case, the maximum ratiobetween the most populous district and the least populous districtwould be 3:1), a stricter standard, to review the constitutionality of
population disparities, thus moving a step closer to achieving equal- ity in the value of votes.
The legislature is forced to overhaul the current Election Redis-tricting Plan following the Court's decision, and the National Assem-bly Election in 2004 will be held under the revised Redistricting Planemploying a more strict criterion on population disparities betweenelectoral districts.
People from various social circles, including those from the legalprofession and media, admitted that the Court's decision was inevi-table to remedy the existing population disparities between electoraldistricts. Politicians from the ruling and opposition parties issued comments that while they respected the Court's decision, it wouldrequire much work to prepare a revision for the present ElectionRedistricting Plan because such factors as representation of rural andurban areas and the total number of seats in the National Assemblyhave to be factored in, and that this would call for a prudent ap-proach, by gathering diverse opinions through debates and hearings.