일반교통방해
The prosecutor's appeal is dismissed.
1. The summary of the grounds for appeal is as follows: (a) the road indicated in the facts charged in this case constitutes the land which is a place used for the general public’s traffic, but the court below acquitted the Defendant of the facts charged in this case; and (b) the court below erred by misunderstanding the facts
2. Determination
A. On January 11, 2018, the Defendant received a summary order of KRW 1 million as a result of general traffic obstruction from the Hongsung Branch of the Daejeon District Court on March 28, 2018, and the summary order was finalized on March 28, 2018. The summary of the facts constituting the crime in the above summary order was that the Defendant interfered with traffic by stockpiling up approximately 2.2m high fences with the width of KRW 2.5m high and approximately 2.5m wide on the road located in Chungcheongnam-gu, Chungcheongnam-gu, Chungcheongnam-do (hereinafter “instant road”) from October 16 to October 18, 2017.
From January 12, 2018 to July 27, 2018, the Defendant interfered with traffic by leaving the fences installed on the instant road as above on the ground that it interfered with the traffic by making the above land, which is a public place for the traffic of the general public.
B. The lower court found the Defendant guilty of the instant charges on the following grounds: (a) the first instance court found that the first instance court found that the first instance court acknowledged that the first instance court was insufficient to recognize that the first instance court was “a place of public nature with which many and unspecified persons, or vehicles and horses are allowed to freely pass through without any specific person,” and that the first instance court acquitted the Defendant of the instant charges, on the ground that the first instance court found that the first instance court was insufficient to recognize that the first instance roads were “a place of public nature with which they are allowed to freely pass through, without any specific person,” and that the second instance roads were “a place of public character with which many and unspecified persons, or vehicles and horses are allowed to freely pass through,” in
C. Examining the reasoning of the judgment of the court below in comparison with the records, the above judgment of the court below is just and acceptable, and there is no error of mistake of facts alleged by the prosecutor.
Furthermore, this case.