A. In fact-finding (Defendant P, Q) Defendant P and Q were seated with other Defendants on May 22, 2016 on the second floor distribution of the S bridge (hereinafter “instant church”) but do not specifically interfere with towing.

B. The Defendants’ act constitutes a legitimate act under Article 20 of the Criminal Act, in light of the legal principles (in preparatory case to Defendant P and Q).

2. Determination

A. Defendant P and Q argued to the same effect as the grounds for appeal in the lower court on the erroneous determination of facts as to Defendant P and Q. As to this, the lower court rejected the Defendants’ assertion and found the Defendants guilty of this part of the facts charged on the grounds of its stated reasoning.

Examining the reasoning of the lower court’s judgment based on the evidence duly admitted and examined by the lower court in a thorough comparison with the records of the instant case, the lower court’s aforementioned determination is justifiable. Therefore, the allegation of mistake of facts by the said Defendants cannot be accepted.

B. The Defendants asserted the same purport as the grounds for appeal in the lower judgment regarding the misapprehension of legal doctrine.

As stated in its holding, the court below held that the obstruction of worship is the legal interest protected by the law of peace and religious sentiment of the public, and it is also included in the legal interest protected by the law of peace and religious sentiment of the believers attending the course of worship. Thus, it is difficult to see the defendants' act of obstructing the ships that were in a peaceful progress by Twits merely because the defendants opposed to Twits cannot be deemed legitimate, and it cannot be deemed that the defendants have a substantial nature in the means and method, and there is no particular circumstance to see that the obstruction of worship of this case was urgent or inevitable to protect other legal interests. Thus, the defendants' act is against the social norms.