[2] The case holding that in case where Gap suffered bodily injury while being engaged in leasing a motor vehicle for a mutual aid agreement with a non-member of a motor vehicle mutual aid agreement with a driver, the mutual aid association does not have a duty to pay personal injury pursuant to the exemption clause as stipulated in the above provision since Gap constitutes a partner who consented to the motor vehicle mutual aid agreement

[3] The method of calculating liability insurance under Article 3(1)2 and 3 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act

[4] The case holding that the court below erred in the misapprehension of legal principle in failing to perform its duty, even though each of the above damages exceeds the amount of insurance coverage under the former Enforcement Decree of the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act, in a case where the calculation of compensation Ⅰ for personal injury under the automobile accident mutual aid agreement is at issue, since the victim's injury and the amount of damages caused by the aftermath disability should be calculated respectively, and the above amount of damages should be examined whether

[2] The case holding that, in case where Gap suffered bodily injury while performing the work of leasing a motor vehicle for a mutual aid contract with a registered operator of a motor vehicle mutual aid agreement, since the Korean Trucking Association's automobile mutual aid agreement provides that the duty to pay compensation to a mutual aid association is exempted in case where a person who operates a mutual aid agreement with the permission of a registered member after obtaining the permission of the motor vehicle mutual aid agreement is dead or injured, the mutual aid association can claim exemption from liability for payment of compensation under Section II in case where the deceased or injured victim constitutes the consent member as stipulated in the above exemption clause, and the mutual aid association does not have the duty to pay compensation under Section II in accordance with the above exemption clause on the ground that Gap constitutes a person who operates a mutual aid agreement with a registered member after obtaining permission from the registered member

[3] Article 3 (1) 2 and 3 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act (wholly amended by Presidential Decree No. 21036, Sep. 25, 2008); Article 3 (1) 2 and 3 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation (wholly amended by Presidential Decree No. 21036, Sep. 25, 2008); where a disability occurs due to the injury, each amount of damage exceeds the amount prescribed in [Attachment Table 1] and [Attachment Table 2] of the former Enforcement Decree of the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act; and where each amount of damage falls short of the amount prescribed in [Attachment Table 1] and [Attachment Table 2], the amount of damage shall be the amount of insurance proceeds responsible for the injury; and where the amount of damage from the injury falls short of the amount of medical expenses calculated according

[4] In a case where the calculation of compensation I for personal injury under an automobile mutual-aid contract is at issue, the case holding that the court below erred by misapprehending the legal principles on the part of the court below, although it is necessary to examine whether each of the above damages exceeds the maximum amount of liability insurance under the former Enforcement Decree of the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act (wholly amended by Presidential Decree No. 21036, Sep. 25, 2008) [Attachment 1] and [Attachment 2]

1. On the first, second, and third grounds for appeal

The interpretation of a standardized contract shall be interpreted fairly and reasonably in light of the purpose and purpose of the standardized contract in question in accordance with the principle of trust and good faith, and it shall be objectively and uniformly interpreted on the basis of average customer's understandability without considering the intended purpose or intent of each contracting party (see Supreme Court Decision 2008Da81633, May 28, 2009, etc.).

According to Article 13 of the Motor Vehicle Mutual Aid Terms and Conditions of the Korean Trucking Transport Mutual Aid Association, since the duty to pay compensation to a mutual aid association, if a person who operates a mutual aid contract with the permission of a registered member dies or is injured, is exempted from liability, the mutual aid association can assert the exemption from liability to pay compensation as stipulated in Article 13 of the Motor Vehicle Mutual Aid Terms and Conditions of the Korean Trucking Transport Mutual Aid Association.

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below acknowledged the following facts based on its adopted evidence: (a) the Plaintiff entered into a mutual aid agreement between Jinsan Transportation Co., Ltd. on October 25, 2006, which covers personal compensation I, II, etc. for the instant vehicle; (b) the Defendant leased the instant vehicle from Jinsan Transportation along with the Nonparty, a driver for the purpose of moving the erop pumps, which is a material used at his own construction site; and (c) the Defendant was engaged in the work of covering the erop pumps at a height of about 4 meters of the erop pumps on October 19, 207, which combines the erop pumps to the erop pumps, but it was found that the Nonparty caused injury by the fall of the Defendant who suffered from the eroke due to erroneous operation of the eros, and the Defendant constitutes a person who operates a mutual aid agreement with a registered member with permission, and thus, the Plaintiff was not obligated to pay compensation to the Defendant pursuant to Article II.

In light of the above legal principles and records, the above fact-finding and judgment of the court below are justified.

The judgment of the court below is not erroneous in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the interpretation of the provision on the exemption from liability of the consenting partner, as otherwise alleged in the ground of appeal.

2. As to the fourth ground for appeal

Article 5(1) of the former Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act (wholly amended by Act No. 9065, Mar. 28, 2008; hereinafter “former Act”) provides that “The owner of an automobile shall subscribe to liability insurance or liability mutual aid (hereinafter “liability insurance, etc.”) that shall pay the amount prescribed by the Presidential Decree to a victim (where a victim dies or is injured due to the operation of an automobile, referring to a person entitled to compensation for damage; hereinafter the same shall apply).” Article 3(1) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Act (wholly amended by Presidential Decree No. 21036, Sep. 25, 2008; hereinafter “liability insurance”) provides that “The amount of damages arising from the victim’s injury or liability mutual aid (hereinafter “liability insurance, etc.”) under Article 5(1) of the former Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act (wholly amended by the Presidential Decree No. 9065, Mar. 28, 2008) shall be limited to the amount set forth in attached Table 1 / [Attachment Table 3].

The provisions of Article 3(1)2 and 3 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Act provide that each of the damages shall be the amount prescribed in [Attachment Table 1] and [Attachment Table 2] of the former Enforcement Decree of the Act in cases where the amount of damage exceeds the amount prescribed in [Attachment Table 1] and [Attachment Table 2], and each of the damages shall be the insurance proceeds for liability if the amount of damage caused by the injury falls short of the amount prescribed in [Attachment Table 1] and [Attachment Table 1] and [Attachment Table 2]. However, if the amount of damage caused by the injury falls short of the amount of medical expenses calculated in accordance with the standards for medical fees covered by automobile insurance, the amount of the medical expenses shall be the insurance proceeds from the injury (see Supreme Court Decision 2010Da2862, Jul. 8, 2010).

The court below acknowledged that the Defendant’s injury grade due to the instant accident falls under class 12 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Act [Attachment Table 1] and class 11 of class 10 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Act [Attachment Table 2], but held that the Defendant is obligated to return to the Plaintiff the amount exceeding the above compensation No. 1 for personal injury No. 2522,00 won out of the amount already paid by the Plaintiff to the Defendant as the amount of compensation No. 6789,000 won.

However, according to the former Enforcement Decree of the Act, the maximum amount of insurance proceeds for the grade of injury in [Attachment 1] 1-12 is KRW 20 million, and the maximum amount of insurance proceeds for the latter grade of disability in [Attachment 2] 10-11 of [Attachment 2] is KRW 18-8 million. Thus, the lower court should have first determined the amount of compensation for personal injury first by examining whether each of the above damages exceeds the maximum amount of insurance proceeds for the Defendant’s injury and the amount of damages for the latter grade of disability in accordance with the former Enforcement Decree.

Nevertheless, the court below held that KRW 2,522,00 out of the compensation paid without any ground without examining it constitutes the amount of compensation I. Thus, the court below erred by misapprehending the legal principles on Article 3(1)2 and 3 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Act or by failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations, which affected the conclusion of the judgment.

The ground of appeal pointing this out is with merit.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the judgment of the court below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the court below for a new trial and determination. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Yang Chang-soo (Presiding Justice)