The part against the Defendant is reversed, and that part of the case is remanded to the Seoul High Court.

1. Although there are special circumstances where it is impossible to expect the exercise of rights due to de facto disability that prevents the exercise of rights before the completion of extinctive prescription, the obligor’s assertion for the completion of extinctive prescription is an abuse of rights against the good faith principle.

(2) In light of the above legal principles, the court below erred by misapprehending the legal principles as to tort liability under Article 766(1)1 of the Civil Act, and did not err by misapprehending the legal principles as to tort liability under Article 766(1)1 of the Civil Act. In so doing, the court below erred by misapprehending the legal principles as to tort liability under Article 766(1)1 of the Civil Act, thereby adversely affecting the conclusion of the judgment of innocence. In so doing, the court below did not err by misapprehending the legal principles as to tort liability under Article 766(1)1 of the Civil Act, as otherwise alleged in the ground of appeal.

Therefore, it is not permissible for the state, which is the debtor, to claim the completion of extinctive prescription as an abuse of rights.

However, in such a case, the creditor shall exercise his right within the six-month period equivalent to the suspension of prescription under the Civil Act from the date of the final judgment of acquittal on which the failure was terminated, barring any special circumstances, and in principle, whether he exercised his right within the said period.