2. In light of the fact that the sentencing based on the statutory penalty is a discretionary judgment that takes place within a reasonable and appropriate scope, taking into account the factors constituting the conditions for sentencing under Article 51 of the Criminal Act, and the fact that the sentencing of the first instance court does not change in the conditions for sentencing compared with the first instance court, and the sentencing of the first instance court does not deviate from the reasonable scope of discretion, it is reasonable to respect it. Although the first instance court’s sentencing falls within the reasonable scope of discretion, it is desirable to reverse the first instance court’s judgment and to refrain from imposing a sentence that does not differ from the first instance court’s opinion on the grounds that it is somewhat different from

(See Supreme Court en banc Decision 2015Do3260 Decided July 23, 2015). The lower court determined the sentence against the Defendant by taking into account all the conditions of sentencing favorable or unfavorable to the Defendant, as well as the circumstances prescribed in Article 51 of the Criminal Act, which led to no special change in the conditions of sentencing compared to the lower court’s judgment, and even if considering the legislative intent of the instant penal provision that intends to strictly limit the methods of election campaigns to ensure that elections are held fairly in accordance with the free will of the people and democratic procedures, the lower court’s sentencing is too unfilled and thus, is not recognized to have exceeded the reasonable scope of discretion.

Therefore, the prosecutor's assertion of unfair sentencing is without merit.

3. In conclusion, the prosecutor's appeal is without merit, and it is dismissed in accordance with Article 364 (4) of the Criminal Procedure Act. It is so decided as per Disposition.