2. The plaintiff's appeal against the remainder shall be dismissed and the costs of appeal shall be borne by the plaintiff.

As of August 9, 1945, the court below recognized the fact that the real estate was owned by Japan as of August 9, 1945, and determined that it was property devolving upon the State under Article 2 of the Act on Special Measures for the Disposal of Property devolving upon Transfer to the Government of the Republic of Korea in accordance with Article 33 of the Military Affairs Act and Article 5 of the first Agreement on Finance and Property between Han and Hanmi, and held that (7), (8), and (2), (3), (5), and (6) real estate was owned by the non-party 1 corporation and the non-party 29 (4) of the second list of the judgment attached to this case. Since the above non-party 1 corporation established the so-called "Dormant Corporation" as of August 9, 1945, the court below recognized that it was property devolving upon the non-party 1 corporation's transfer to the State under Article 9 of the Act on Special Measures for the Disposal of Property devolving upon Transfer to the Government.

However, pursuant to Article 4 of the Addenda to the Act on Special Measures cited by the court below, for the sale (1) of all or part of the property of a Dormant Corporation belonging to the State prior to the enforcement of this Act (excluding sale by taking the procedure for dissolution) by the Minister of Finance and Economy or the Director-General of Local Government, an interested party who has an objection to the cancellation of a sales contract or lease contract for the property devolving upon the State (except sale by taking the procedure for dissolution), may file a lawsuit within two months from the enforcement date of this Act, only if the period for filing a lawsuit has not been expired by the date of enforcement of this Act, or the prescription has not been completed. However, in the case of paragraph (2) of this Article, it shall be deemed that there has been no filing of a lawsuit after the lapse of two months, or that the period for filing a lawsuit has already expired, or that the period for filing a lawsuit has already expired by this Act and Article 8 of the Act on Special Measures for the Management of Property Belonging to the State, where there is no dispute between the parties concerned,

(5) As to (6) the above list of real estate, the above provision and the remaining Dormant properties shall not be applicable to the cancellation of the registration of ownership transfer, and as such, the above provision cannot be applied to the remaining Dormant properties (see Supreme Court Decision 6Da844, 845, May 24, 196) because the above provision cannot be applied to the plaintiff as to the above Dormant properties under the name of the court below because the ownership transfer registration cannot be viewed as legitimate disposition of the first and second Dormant properties, regardless of their ownership transfer registration, since the above provision and the above provision cannot be applied to the plaintiff as to the above Dormant properties under the name of the court below, and as such, it cannot be seen that the above Dormant properties cannot be seen as belonging to the plaintiff without any legal reasoning that the ownership transfer registration would be cancelled due to the lack of authority, and thus, it cannot be seen that the above provision of Article 4 of the Addenda of the Special Measures for the Prevention of Ownership and Removal of Ownership cannot be applied to the plaintiff as well as that the above Dormant properties will continue to exist.

Therefore, the appeal on this point is eventually justified within the scope of (5) and (6) of the attached Table 1 list among the original judgment, that is, the ownership confirmation and delivery of the property devolving upon the State, and that there is no reason for the remainder.

As to ground of appeal No. 2

In all the reasons for the judgment, the court below concluded a provisional contract with the Gyeongnam-gu Office (the director of the bureau in writing), the plaintiff's agency on April 13, 1949, with respect to the facts that the contract was converted into the main contract on August 8, 1951 and paid in full the amount of the non-payment on August 14, 1951, and that there was no dispute between the parties as to the facts that the contract was converted into the main contract on August 8, 1951 and the non-party litigation performer and the legal representative of the defendant's legal representative (see, e.g., records 198, 278). However, the court below's decision that the parties did not dispute is unlawful, such as an argument. However, according to the evidence Nos. 1, 2, 9-2, and the recognition of the authorized portion of the above evidence No. 9-1, 2, and 12-1, 2, etc., the entire authenticity of the contract, the appeal is not affected.

As to ground of appeal No. 3

The court below held that the short-term acquisition by September 13, 1962, which was 10 years from September 13, 1952 since September 13, 1962, on the ground that all of the above real estate at issue in family theory was owned by the plaintiff, even if the above real estate was owned by the plaintiff due to the cancellation of provisional payment, the above net order was formed on April 13, 1949, and was converted into the principal loan contract on August 8, 1951, and continued to be occupied after the completion of the registration of ownership transfer on September 13, 1952, since it was presumed that the possession was bona fide, peaceful, and openly occupied with the intention to own it at the beginning of possession, and that all of the above real estate at issue was purchased from the plaintiff who is treated as the property to which it belongs, and the registration under its name was made by a final judgment in favor of the lawsuit for the registration of ownership transfer.

Since the title of the above real estate was entered into a provisional contract with the Plaintiff, if it was cancelled on September 13, 1951 (the above order of the deceased and the last order was finalized against November 27, 1959), it cannot be said that the title was bona fide in possession even if it was determined in the name by filing a lawsuit for the registration of transfer of ownership, and it cannot be said that the title was bona fide in possession even if it was registered in the name by filing the lawsuit for the registration of transfer of ownership, and it cannot be said that the short-term acquisition is no longer possible, regardless of whether other requirements are met. In particular, in the case of property devolving upon ownership, even if the title was occupied with the intention of possession in accordance with the military law, it is impossible to hold it in possession with the intention of possession in order to hold it in possession for all countries of possession of the property devolving upon ownership, in view of the nature of the title, the court below recognized it as an independent possession, and there is a ground for appeal as to this point.

However, this is merely a matter of family theory, and as seen in the first ground of appeal, the judgment of the court below does not affect the conclusion within the reasonable scope.

Accordingly, among the original judgment, the part on the plaintiff's failure on the confirmation and delivery of ownership of real estate in Schedule 1 (5) and (6) attached thereto shall be reversed and remanded to the court below. The remaining part of the appeal shall be dismissed and the costs of appeal shall be borne by the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating judges.

Justices Red Man-Man (Presiding Justice)