부당전직구제재심판정취소청구
2017Nu70153 Requests for the cancellation of an unfair ruling for relief from occupational change
○○○○○ Incorporated Company
The Chairman of the National Labor Relations Commission
1. Auditum;
2. Demotion;
3. The maximum Do governor;
4. 하▣▣
Seoul Administrative Court Decision 2016Guhap81857 decided August 17, 2017
January 18, 2018
February 1, 2018
1. The plaintiff's appeal is dismissed.
2. The costs of appeal, including the part arising from the supplementary participation, shall be borne by the Plaintiff.
The judgment of the first instance court is revoked. The National Labor Relations Commission on October 13, 2016 and the Intervenor joining the Plaintiff (hereinafter referred to as “the Intervenor”).
in the case of an application for unfair change of occupation between the participating parties in the Central 2016 Japan 818
(2) The decision of review shall be revoked.
1. The reasons why the court should explain this part of the decision on the retrial of this case, and the reasons why this part of the decision on the retrial of this case is legitimate, are as stated in the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance, except for the cases where the first to 25 pages : hereinafter referred to as "the 17th of the judgment of the court of first instance") and 25 pages : therefore, it is identical to the corresponding part of the judgment of the court of first instance as stated in Article 8(2) of the Administrative Litigation Act and the main sentence of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act (other grounds asserted by the plaintiff in the appeal of this court are not significantly different from the contents asserted by the plaintiff in the first instance court, and even if all the evidence presented by the
2. Parts to be dried;
After the establishment of the DS Team on December 2013, 2013, the current status of changes in human resources of the DS Team employees, including participants, are as follows:
[Grounds for Recognition] Unsatisfy, Gap's 1, 2, 4, 5, 11 through 16, 18, 20 through 24, 28 through 30, 32 through 37, 41, 47, 55, 63 through 65, 72, 73, 9, 101, Eul's 1, 3 through 9, Eul's 1, 2, 5, 9, 10, 12 through 19, 26 through 30, 34 through 36, 38, 39, 42 through 47, 50, 51, 51, 63, 67, 68, 94 through 914, 95, 925, 25, 34 through 36, 38, 39
(c) judgment.
1) Relevant legal principles
Article 23(1) of the Labor Standards Act provides that an employer shall not dismiss, lay off, suspend, transfer, reduce wages, or take other disciplinary measures without justifiable cause. An employer, as a personnel authority, has the authority to issue a personnel order to a worker as a matter of principle, but on the other hand, there is a limit to unilaterally modify the terms and conditions of a contract by a party to an employment contract. On the other hand, transfer or transfer to a worker brings about changes in the type, content, place, etc. of work provided by an employee, and thus, it is difficult to deem that such change is a legitimate exercise of personnel authority. Therefore, whether the transfer is within the scope of legitimate personnel authority should be determined by comparing and comparing the need for the transfer of duties of the relevant transfer order and the disadvantages of the employee’s livelihood according to the need for the transfer of such transfer order, and by taking into account whether the procedure required in the course of issuing the transfer order, such as consultation with the labor union to which the employee belongs, was undergone in accordance with the good faith principle.
In determining the necessity of occupational duties required for the legitimate placement of an employer, the circumstances, such as the need for management to change the number of employees, the rationality of the selection, and the suitability of the means, should be comprehensively taken into account through the pertinent placement order. The disadvantages of living due to the transfer, etc. may be deemed within the scope of legitimate personnel rights, unless the degree of the employee would normally have to accept. One element of determining whether a legitimate personnel right is exercised that has undergone consultation with the employee himself/herself, or that such procedure has not been followed.
The appointment of transfer shall not be deemed null and void as a matter of course on the sole basis of the circumstances. Provided, That where the contents or place of work are specially limited in a labor contract, the employer shall obtain the consent of the employee in order to transfer or change the position of the
2) The following circumstances are revealed by comprehensively taking account of the overall purport of arguments in the facts prior to the procedure of consent to an amendment to a labor contract or the violation of the principle of good faith, namely, ① the Plaintiff classify the technical post from 1994 under the labor-management agreement as a management position and conducts personnel management in an integrated manner under the occupational group such as business and general management. ② The 4th participant's labor contract provides that "it is possible to change the worker's work, and the general management position is not limited to the worker's work or area." There is no evidence to deem that the labor contract of the 1,2, and 3 participant who is the same occupational group as the 4th participant is specially limited to the participant's labor contract and the place of work, unlike the 4th participant's labor contract. ③ Article 26(3) of the collective agreement provides that the Plaintiff's participation in the labor contract should be reflected as much as possible in the Plaintiff's order to move to the department, etc., and that the Plaintiff did not provide the Plaintiff's participation in the employee's exercise of the right to appoint or work.
Therefore, the instant transfer order cannot be deemed null and void solely on the ground that the Plaintiff did not obtain consent from the Intervenor on the instant transfer order and did not undergo prior consultation with the Intervenor. 3) Whether the instant transfer order needs to be conducted in the course of business
Examining the aforementioned facts and the circumstances acknowledged by the first instance court and the evidence presented in this court in light of the aforementioned legal principles, even if measures to newly establish and transfer a separate organization for low-ranking persons, such as intervenors, are not helpful for economic profitability for a certain period of time, management may be deemed necessary for reorganization according to the management strategy, promotion of work efficiency, maintenance or recovery of workplace order, and simplification between workers. However, the instant transfer order cannot be deemed to be appropriate for the management necessity. Thus, it is difficult to see that the instant transfer order was actually necessary for actual business as asserted by the Plaintiff. As such, the instant transfer order is not deemed to have been necessary for the management necessity of the establishment and transfer of a separate organization for low-ranking persons: (1) Generally, there are diverse circumstances such as economic profitability, organizational reorganization according to the management strategy, promotion of work efficiency, maintenance or recovery of workplace order, etc.
(2) The Plaintiff may set up a new team to provide workers whose previous work has ceased or who have failed to achieve the performance in the previous work, with an opportunity to improve their ability to work, and with an opportunity to create new achievements. Even if such organization does not in itself economic profitability, if the employees in question recover their ability to work and desire to work in a long term or through the entire company’s standard, they may benefit the company. Therefore, the need to take the above measures cannot be denied solely on the ground that there is no economic profitability. (3) The Plaintiff paid the Intervenor wages exceeding KRW 100 million per year, and the Intervenor failed to provide the amount of labor equivalent to the level required by the Plaintiff according to the changing business environment, such as receiving an annual personnel evaluation of the lower 50%, and the Intervenor was unable to provide the Intervenor with labor equivalent to the level required by the Plaintiff. In such circumstances, the Plaintiff attempted to promote the Plaintiff’s desire to work by changing the Intervenor’s new team to the new team and actively change his/her business understanding and to actively change his/her business understanding.
B) Conformity as a means of issuing the instant transfer: (i) illegality: (ii) economic profitability, efficiency, etc. of the transfer of AI products; and (iii) abstract and necessary information pertaining to the transfer purpose, grounds; (iv) it can not be justified; and (v) the pertinent transfer order should be an appropriate means to achieve such objective. Therefore, in issuing the transfer order, the Plaintiff shall select human resources meeting its business needs and transfer them to a place suitable for its necessity. (ii) The Plaintiff asserted that the Plaintiff had established a ES team to develop new distribution channels in line with the change in the market environment, establish a customer’s experience related to direct sales and improve products; (iv) it is difficult to view that the Plaintiff had difficulty in directly selecting new type of smartphone products or artificial intelligence instruments, which are new sales markets, and thus, it is difficult to recognize the necessity and utility of its use; and (v) it is difficult for the Plaintiff to directly select the Plaintiff’s new type of products or artificial intelligence instruments, which are relevant to the instant sales market, and (v) it is suitable for the Plaintiff to directly select the Plaintiff’s business performance.
(4) The Plaintiff asserts that the Plaintiff placed the DS team in order to raise the desire to work, restore the sense of achievement, and improve the work capacity to the employees undermining the atmosphere of the organization without having achieved the performance in the existing team. However, if the previous task is not necessary to raise the employee’s desire to work, restore the sense of achievement, and improve the work capacity, the Plaintiff is reasonable to give him/her the work appropriate or supporting to him/her or to provide him/her with an opportunity to provide him/her with an opportunity for education appropriate for it. If the Plaintiff grants him/her any work that is not related to, or is not helpful to, the current department’s work, or gives him/her new work without any practical education, under the pretext of improving the work capacity of the author and the author, thereby making it difficult for him/her to feel his/her will to achieve his/her retirement.
Even if the Intervenor’s results of regular personnel management were very low for several years, and the Intervenor’s age from the 40th to the 50th 50th sold age is relatively old, there is no circumstance to deem that there was conflict in human relations with employees or damaged order in the workplace to the extent that it is necessary to isolate and place the Intervenor in other teams or new teams, and it is difficult to deem that the experience in the DSS team substantially contributed to improving the work capacity necessary for the present department. Furthermore, it is difficult to view the Intervenor’s aforementioned contents of personnel management policy (Article 10 of the Personnel Management Regulation) to the extent that it substantially contributes to the purpose of the establishment of the DSS team and the reasons for the selection of products for sale. (5) The Plaintiff’s personnel management policy (Article 10 of the Personnel Management Regulation) provides that the Intervenor’s performance can be developed and created by changing his duties in charge of employees in a systematic and planned manner, and that the Intervenor’s performance can be activated through the placement of loaded personnel positions to the 20th 7th 7th s.
3. The proportion of the number of persons actually retired from the special retirement among those meeting the conditions of the special retirement in the light of the light of DS team is 47% (DS1 team), 53% (DS2 team). At the time, most of the DS team members at the time were those meeting the conditions of the special retirement, whose proportion was higher than that of other teams. At the beginning of 2015, 26 members were totaled, but 34 persons including the intervenors in 2015 were newly transferred from the same year, and 24 persons among them were newly transferred from the same year, and on December 2013.
Since the establishment of the DS team, 31 members retired from the DS team, and 28 members retired from the DS team, it is recognized that the operation form of the DS team had been operated to de facto withdraw human resources who did not comply with special retirement. (7) The Plaintiff asserted that the DS team is not an organization formed to return to the existing team if it is improved in the future. However, according to the above-mentioned facts, the Plaintiff’s 20-year period of 20-year period of 20-year period of 20 years of 20-year of 20 years of 20-year of 20 years of 20-year of 20, 16, 107, 107, or 127, and 133, the Plaintiff’s 16-year period of 20-year of 20-year of 4 years of 20-year of 20-year of 4 years of 20-year of 20-year of NA.
4) Whether the instant transfer order is disadvantageous to life due to the instant transfer order
In light of the following circumstances that can be seen in full view of the purport of the entire arguments in the facts as seen earlier, the intervenors were exposed to a certain degree of living disadvantage for the intervenors upon the instant transfer order, taking into account the following circumstances: (a) the fact that the intervenors were out of work that had been dynamicly performed upon the issuance of the DS Team and actively secured customers; (b) the active business methods demanded by the DS Team have considerably increased mental tension among the intervenors; and (c) the perceptions and evaluations within the company that had been issued to an organization where workers have been born.
However, comprehensively taking account of the overall purport of oral arguments as seen earlier, the following circumstances, namely, ① the Intervenor 2, 3, and 4’s living base is Seoul where the ES Team was located, and there was no disadvantage in living at the working site; ② the Intervenor 2 and 4 were living base due to the instant transfer order while serving in Daegu and Gwangju; ② the Intervenor 1 minimizeds living base, including Daejeon or the Plaintiff’s provision of personal housing cost and weekend transportation cost to the Intervenor 1; ③ the Intervenor 1 received benefits of the same level as before the instant transfer order; ④ the Intervenor’s payment standard was applied to the same performance rate as before the instant transfer order; ④ the Intervenor did not receive performance rate for 2016, regardless of the ES Team’s work, and it was difficult for the Intervenor to be seen that the Intervenor did not receive performance rate for 2015 at the time of the instant transfer order; ⑤ the Intervenor’s daily personnel management performance by the Plaintiff for reasons that it was difficult for the Intervenor to be seen as being subject to disciplinary action for 2015 years prior to the Plaintiff’s.
As seen earlier, the Plaintiff cannot be deemed null and void solely on the ground that the Plaintiff did not obtain the consent of or hold consultation with the Intervenor prior to the instant transfer order. Although it cannot be deemed that the Intervenor’s living disadvantage due to the instant transfer order considerably deviates from the level of normal acceptance as an employee. However, since the instant transfer order cannot be deemed as a means suitable for the Plaintiff’s management necessity, its business necessity is not recognized, and thus, the instant transfer order cannot be deemed as being made within the scope of legitimate personnel authority, and thus, is unlawful. Accordingly, the instant transfer order cannot be deemed as being made within the scope of legitimate personnel authority. Accordingly, the instant review ruling based on the conclusion
3. Conclusion
Therefore, the plaintiff's claim is dismissed as it is without merit, and the judgment of the court of first instance is just, and the plaintiff's appeal is dismissed as it is without merit. It is so decided as per Disposition.
Judges Yoon Sung-won
Judges Park Jong-young
Judges Lee Jong-hwan