Article 2 of the Enforcement Decree of the Corporate Tax Act

2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

The reasoning for this Court’s explanation concerning this case is the same as that for the judgment of the first instance except for the following additional parts, and thus, this Court’s explanation is cited in accordance with Article 8(2) of the Administrative Litigation Act and Article 420 of the

2. Additional statements

A. Whether each of the lands of this case is land directly used for the plaintiff's proper purpose business

In light of all circumstances, such as the fact that each land of this case was leased to the literatureA for the purpose of the Youth Training Institute and amusement facilities, even after considering the evidence submitted by the plaintiff in the trial, it is difficult to regard the land of this case as "land directly used for the plaintiff's proper purpose business for at least three consecutive years as of the date of disposal". Therefore, this part of the plaintiff's assertion is without merit.

B. Whether the actual price of each of the instant lands was 300 million won or not

As seen earlier, the Plaintiff entered the initial price in KRW 1.8 billion in preparing a letter of agreement on the transfer of each of the instant lands with the rightB, and corrected the price in KRW 2 billion thereafter by increasing the amount of KRW 200 million. Thus, barring any special circumstance, it is reasonable to view the transfer price as KRW 2 billion.

In this regard, the Plaintiff asserts to the effect that, in light of the market price of each land of this case, the transfer price is formally indicated as above, because it is difficult to obtain approval from the Korea Buddhist ○○○ Class General Institute, in a case where the transfer price is indicated as KRW 100 million or increased, the transfer price was reduced in consideration of all the circumstances at the time. Therefore, the Plaintiff asserts to the effect that only the

However, in relation to the above assertion, the witness BB filed by the Plaintiff may reverse the purport of the testimony according to the person questioning, and ② its significant detailed contents are expressed simply by the Plaintiff’s agent's simple understanding of the detailed questions compared to the witness's direct statement. ③ Furthermore, even though the Plaintiff agreed to be terminated upon upon the transfer of the rights to each land, etc. of this case from the literatureA and the withdrawal of the Plaintiff's claim for damages and provisional seizure against the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff did not think that the Plaintiff would have been paid the amount of claims against the literatureA at the time of transfer of each land of this case," or that the Plaintiff transferred the land of this case to the container rather than considering the fact that the Plaintiff testified to the effect that "It is nothing more than the point of resolving the claims and obligations in relation to the literatureA, it is difficult to believe that the testimony was delivered to the Plaintiff at the time of the transfer of each land of this case, and there is insufficient evidence to acknowledge the Plaintiff's assertion otherwise submitted by the Plaintiff."

Rather, the following circumstances are considered comprehensively taking into account the statements in the evidence Nos. 9, 10, and 12, witness rightsB’s testimony and the overall purport of arguments in the trial of the party branch of the witness rightsB: ① the circumstance that the Plaintiff transferred each of the instant land to the rightB was designed to compensate the Plaintiff for damages out of the lawsuit in order to resolve the dispute with the rightB smoothly; ② the agreement between the Plaintiff and the rightB was a condition that the Plaintiff withdraws the claim for damages against the Plaintiff in the case of the doorB; ③ the rightB appears to have waived its claim against the doorB on the condition that the withdrawal was made; ④ even though the rightB did not pay the Plaintiff the purchase price to KRW 1.8 billion, the rightB specified the purchase price as KRW 1.7 billion in lieu of the Plaintiff, and ⑤ the Plaintiff’s intent to directly provide compensation to the Plaintiff for the damages of each of the instant land at the time of the above agreement, and ultimately, it is reasonable to interpret the Plaintiff’s assertion that the Plaintiff did not have any specific intent to provide compensation to the doorB.

Therefore, even if the Plaintiff did not actually receive KRW 1.7 billion, it is reasonable to evaluate that the Plaintiff had the corresponding benefits between the Plaintiff and the rightB. Therefore, this part of the Plaintiff’s assertion is without merit.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the judgment of the first instance is just, and the plaintiff's appeal is dismissed as it is without merit, and it is so decided as per Disposition.