2. The crime of this case is not likely to be a crime of assaulting the victim D, who is an acting driver, and inflicting an injury on the victim, without any special reason, and assaulting the police officer to restrain the assault in the earth.

However, considering the following circumstances: (a) the victim D who is an acting driver, did not limit the extent and degree of injury; (b) the Defendant agreed with the victim D and police officer G; (c) the victims wanted to take the Defendant’s preference; (d) the Defendant did not have any record of committing the instant crime except for those punished three times as a fine; and (e) the Defendant has a depth-off of the instant crime; and (e) taking into account other circumstances revealed in the records and arguments, such as the Defendant’s age, sexual behavior, environment, motive or circumstance of the instant crime, and circumstances after the crime, the lower court’s sentencing judgment exceeded the reasonable bounds of discretion.

There is no circumstance that the assessment or maintenance of it is deemed unfair (see Supreme Court Decision 2015Do3260, Jul. 23, 2015). Therefore, the prosecutor’s assertion is without merit, since the sentence imposed by the lower court is too unfasible and unreasonable.

3. In conclusion, the prosecutor’s appeal is dismissed in accordance with Article 364(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act on the ground that it is without merit, and it is obvious that the “Article 157(1) (the point of injury) of the Criminal Act” under Article 257(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act is a clerical error in the “Article 257(1) of the Criminal Act” under Article 25 of the Rules on the Criminal Procedure. Thus, the prosecutor’s appeal is dismissed in accordance with Article 364(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act, and