2. The costs of appeal between the Plaintiff and the Defendant are individually borne.

A. On October 22, 191, 191, E borrowed 40,000,000 won from Defendant C on behalf of the Plaintiff on June 22, 1993, and 30% per annum on interest (hereinafter “the instant loan”). On behalf of the Plaintiff, as of the same day, as to the real estate listed in the separate sheet (hereinafter “the instant real estate”) owned by D in order to secure the instant loan obligation on behalf of D, the Plaintiff completed the registration of establishment of a mortgage, the debtor, the mortgagee, the mortgagee, the Defendant C, and the Defendant C, the joint collateral, as of the amount of maximum debt, 60,000,000, with respect to the real estate listed in the separate sheet (hereinafter “the instant real estate”).

(3) Defendant C applied for a voluntary auction of real estate based on the instant right to collateral security (hereinafter “instant right to collateral security”) with respect to the instant real estate, the Suwon District Court rendered a decision to commence the auction on September 24, 1993, and the record of the decision to commence the auction was completed on the same day. However, the said decision to commence the auction was closed on May 16, 1994, and the record was discarded on the expiration of the preservation period. (4) Defendant B acquired the instant right to loan from Defendant C on February 15, 2012, and completed the additional registration on April 17, 2012 with respect to the instant right to collateral security on February 15, 2012.

5) On April 23, 2012, D filed a lawsuit against Defendant B seeking the cancellation of the instant right to collateral security with the Suwon District Court 2012Kadan13477, but D was sentenced to a dismissal ruling from the above court on January 23, 2013. Accordingly, D filed an appeal with the Suwon District Court 2013Na7896, but D’s assertion that “the instant obligation to collateral security was extinguished by prescription” was registered as of September 24, 1993 as to D’s assertion that “the instant obligation to collateral security was extinguished by prescription by seizure, or E’s loan agreement as of April 12, 1994 (hereinafter “the instant loan agreement”).

The extinctive prescription of the loan obligation of this case has not been completed as the repayment period has been suspended by reason of suspension.

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