토지보상금
1. Revocation of the judgment of the first instance, and the plaintiff's claim is dismissed.
2. All costs of the lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff.
1. The following facts may be acknowledged in accordance with the respective entries and the overall purport of the pleadings, as well as Gap 1-4, 10, 11, 14, Eul 1, 3, and 7 (including branch numbers; hereinafter the same shall apply).
E is the plaintiff's assistance and I is the plaintiff's reference.
E on December 20, 1913, the ownership was initially acquired under the circumstances of 474 square meters in Gyeongnam-gun C (hereinafter referred to as the “C”) of Gyeongnam-gun (hereinafter referred to as the “C”).
E around 1933, while I died in around 1987, I inherited the property of E, and the plaintiff inherited the property of E in sequence.
B. On July 22, 1931, the above land was divided into three parcels of F 402 square meters, G 57 square meters (188 square meters; hereinafter “instant land”) and H 15 square meters. The instant land was subdivided into a road at the same time, and its land category was changed to a road. From around that time, the land was offered to the general public under the Defendant’s possession.
C. On May 8, 2008, the Plaintiff completed registration of preservation of ownership in the Plaintiff’s name in accordance with the former Act on Special Measures for the Registration, etc. of Ownership of Real Estate ( enacted by Act No. 7500 on May 26, 2005 and enforced January 1, 2006).
2. According to the facts found in Paragraph (1) of the judgment on the cause of the claim, the Defendant is obligated to return to the Plaintiff the amount of unjust enrichment equivalent to the rent, barring any special circumstance, as it acquired profit equivalent to the rent by occupying and using the instant land as the road and thereby, thereby incurring damages to the Plaintiff, who is the owner.
3. Judgment on the completion of the prescription period for possession
A. The summary of the defendant's assertion is that the defendant occupies and uses the land of this case as a road for more than 80 years from July 22, 1931, which was incorporated into the road, until around 80 years, and the defendant's possession is presumed to have occupied the land of this case in a peaceful and public performance manner with his own will under Article 197 (1) of the Civil Act. Thus, the defendant is presumed to have occupied