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(영문) 대법원 1981. 7. 14. 선고 81다64,65 판결

[건물철거등][집29(2)민,215;공1981.9.15.(664) 14194]

Main Issues

The meaning of "a person who withdraws the action" under Paragraph 2 of Article 240 of the Civil Procedure Act and "the same action"

Summary of Judgment

The "person who has withdrawn a lawsuit" under Article 240 (2) of the Civil Procedure Act includes a specific successor after the closing of argument, but the "the same lawsuit" must also be the same as the benefit of the protection of rights. Therefore, even if the former owner of the land is the same as the legal relationship between the former and the former owner of the land against the defendant, the former owner of the land shall be deemed to have a new benefit of the protection of rights to seek exclusion against the defendant whose ownership is infringed after the withdrawal of the preceding lawsuit. Therefore, the foregoing prior suit and the present lawsuit shall not be deemed the same as the previous lawsuit

[Reference Provisions]

Article 240(2) of the Civil Procedure Act

Reference Cases

Supreme Court Decision 69Da760 Decided July 22, 1969

Plaintiff-Counterclaim Defendant-Appellee

Plaintiff

Defendant-Counterclaim Plaintiff-Appellant

Defendant-Appellant Han-hee, Counsel for defendant-appellant

Judgment of the lower court

Daegu High Court Decision 79Na947,948 delivered on December 10, 1980

Text

The judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Daegu High Court.

Reasons

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. Article 240 (2) of the Civil Procedure Act provides that a person who has withdrawn a lawsuit after the final judgment has been rendered on the merits of the lawsuit shall not file the same lawsuit, and the prohibition of re-litigation shall be established. The person who has withdrawn the lawsuit shall also include a specific successor after the closing of argument (see Supreme Court Decision 67Da760, Jul. 22, 1969). However, the same lawsuit shall be interpreted to include not only the same legal relationship with the parties, but also the situation that requires the institution of lawsuit, i.e., the benefit of the protection of rights. Thus, even though the legal relationship between the former and the former owner of the plaintiff's lawsuit is the same, it shall be deemed that the plaintiff who acquired the ownership of the land after the withdrawal of the previous lawsuit has a new benefit of the protection of rights to seek the exclusion against the defendant whose ownership is infringed. Thus, the judgment of the court below that rejected the defendant's defense of the prohibition of re-instigation of the previous lawsuit shall not be deemed the same as the previous lawsuit.

2. The lower court rejected the Defendant’s assertion that the Defendant’s claim for prescriptive acquisition against the Defendant: (a) purchased the land from Nonparty 2, who was the former owner on February 7, 1958, and occupied it by Nonparty 3; and (b) succeeded to the possession by succession; and (c) concluded that Nonparty 2 constructed the building on the same site on which the thickness was owned in 1931, and sold only the said building to Nonparty 3 on November 4, 1975, and the Defendant purchased only the said building.

However, according to the records, each of the evidence evidence No. 6-1, No. 2, No. 8, and No. 9 of the above building building No. 6-1, No. 2, and No. 8 and No. 9 was examined, and it was judged that the defendant had legal superficies on the building to be removed in the front suit between the above non-party No. 1 and the defendant, and the testimony of the non-party No. 4 was related to the situation after the filing of the preceding suit, and it is not a material to conclude that the non-party No. 2 and the non-party No. 3 had no trade of the land. And the evidence No. 1 and No. 2 of the above building No. 1 are a disposal document that is acceptable as alleged by the defendant, barring any special circumstance, the court below should take it in accordance with our rule of experience, and thus, it is not erroneous in the rules of evidence.

3. Furthermore, the court below concluded that the defendant recognized the ownership of the non-party 1 and decided that the non-party 1 voluntarily withdrawn the above lawsuit, and therefore, the progress of the prescription is suspended by this approval. The evidence of the court below is that there is no evidence to deem that the defendant explicitly recognized the ownership of the non-party 1, and that there was a negotiation with the defendant to purchase the above site. Thus, it cannot be concluded that the above purchase negotiation alone recognized the ownership of the above non-party 1 as a final claim for the dispute resolution during the ongoing of the lawsuit. Thus, it cannot be concluded that the above purchase negotiation alone can not be said that the above purchase negotiation itself recognized the ownership of the non-party 1 by violating the rules of evidence or misunderstanding the legal principles as to the approval, which is the cause of interruption of prescription.

Therefore, the judgment of the court below shall be reversed and remanded for the reasons for this issue. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all Justices who reviewed the appeal.

Justices Jeon Soo-hee (Presiding Justice)

심급 사건
-대구고등법원 1980.12.10.선고 79나947