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(영문) 수원지방법원 2020.06.08 2020노40

폭력행위등처벌에관한법률위반(공동상해)

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All appeals by the Defendants are dismissed.

Reasons

1. Summary of grounds for appeal;

A. Although there was a fact that the Defendants were 3 to 4 times the victims of mistake, the Defendants did not jointly leave the victim.

Nevertheless, the judgment of the court below which found the defendant guilty of the facts charged of this case is erroneous.

B. The lower court’s punishment of unreasonable sentencing (one million won by each fine) is too unreasonable.

2. Determination

A. "When two or more persons jointly commit the crime of injury or assault" under Article 2 (2) of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act as to the assertion of mistake of facts require that there exists a so-called co-offender relationship between them, and where several persons have recognized the crimes of another person on the same opportunity at the same place and used them to commit the crime.

(2) In light of the following circumstances established by the evidence duly adopted and examined by the lower court, the Defendants jointly and severally inflicted injury on the victim as indicated in the facts charged of this case, i.e., Defendant B and the victim during the period when the Defendants were in need of vision due to the return of the victim’s cell phone, i.e., e., the head of fat and the victim, and fighting began, and Defendant A also carried out fighting, and Defendant A also carried out the same injury as indicated in the facts charged of this case. The injury suffered by the victim was caused by these series of assaults by the Defendants, and the Defendants knew of the situation of exercising force against the victim at the same place, and used such circumstances.

Therefore, the defendants' assertion of mistake is without merit.

B. The Criminal Procedure Act, which adopts the trial-oriented principle and the principle of directness on the assertion of unfair sentencing, has a unique area for sentencing determination in the first instance court, and there is no change in the conditions of sentencing compared to the first instance court, and the sentencing in the first instance court is reasonable scope of discretion.