Attorney C, D, E, and F

Law Firm G.

Attorney H, AS, ATS, AU, AV

The accused shall notify publicly the summary of the judgment of innocence.

A. Defendant (Misunderstanding or misunderstanding of legal principles)

1) Among the main evidence submitted by the prosecutor, there are many parts prepared or omitted differently from the actual remarks, and thus, it cannot be readily concluded that the Defendant made the same remarks as the facts charged (hereinafter referred to as “instant remarks”). The instant remarks are not expressed by specifying a candidate who was a Lparty candidate at the time of the instant remarks, but are merely a L party representing the vice versa.

2) Even if the instant remarks relate to M candidates who were candidates for Lparty at the time of the instant remarks, the Defendant cannot be deemed to have publicly stated specific facts merely because it is merely a simple expression of opinion or a political investigation of the negative layer represented by L Party, not M, but M, and that of the ordinary people represented by J market.

3) At the time of the instant speech, the Defendant had no intention to publish false facts in the Defendant, and did not have known that the content of the instant speech was false, and there was no intention to attract M candidates.

4) The instant remarks are legitimate acts permissible by social norms, which do not go against social norms.

applicable to this section.

(b) An inspection;

The sentence of the court below against the defendant (the 2.5 million suspended sentence of a fine) is too unfluent and unfair.

2. Judgment on the Defendant’s misconception of facts or misapprehension of legal principles

A. As to the Defendant’s assertion that the instant remarks did not indicate M candidates, the lower court rejected the Defendant’s assertion on the following grounds: (a) on the grounds that the Defendant’s assertion that the instant remarks did not indicate M candidates, based on the following circumstances: (i) the accuracy and credibility of the on-site Plaintiff prepared by the 4th 21 to 17th 17th 11th of the judgment; (ii) the details and details of the instant remarks; (iii) the statement by on-site visitors; and (iv) the statement by the field visitors

Examining the various circumstances admitted by the court below in comparison with the evidence duly adopted and examined, the judgment of the court below is just.

Therefore, the judgment of the court below does not contain any error of mistake or misunderstanding of legal principles as alleged by the defendant, and this part of the defendant's assertion is without merit.

B. The assertion that the instant speech is merely a mere statement of fact, not a statement of fact

1) Relevant legal principles

The term “facts” in the crime of publishing false facts under Article 250(2) of the Public Official Election Act means that an elector has the physical strength so that it can mislead accurate judgment on a candidate. The term “facts” means reports or statements with respect to specific past or current facts, time and space, and the contents of the expression can be proved by evidence, as a concept substituted for expression of opinion that is a value judgment or evaluation. The distinction between a statement of fact and an expression of opinion or abstract judgment is not simply by the term used, but rather by the legislative intent of ensuring the fairness of the election, with the full view of the legislative intent of ensuring the fairness of the election, namely, the ordinary meaning and usage of the language, the entire contents of the expression, the context in which the expression at issue was used, the communication method and counterpart of the expression, the likelihood of proving the contents of the expression, and the identity of the speaker and candidate (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 201Do1847, Dec. 12, 2011).

2) In the instant case:

In full view of the following circumstances recognized by the evidence duly adopted and examined by the court below, the Defendant’s statement in this case is merely an abstract expression or opinion describing the consumption behavior or living method of the subordinate class, which the Defendant considers as a candidate or a major force of the Lparty to which he belongs, and it is difficult to readily conclude that the Defendant indicated the facts concerning his specific consumption behavior or living method by specifying the candidate’s individual. Accordingly, the Defendant’s assertion pointing this out has merit.

① 유세현장에서 피고인의 연설을 들은 P 기자는 "피고인이 '여러분, 4년간 다른 당 국회의원 뽑아보셨죠?'라는 발언을 하였고, 손으로 가리키면서 '저기 VIP룸 커피 숍'이라고 말하여 M 후보자를 지칭해서 말한다고 생각했다."라는 취지로 진술하였다.

On the other hand, this reporter stated that "I think that I would not see that I would refer to a specific member of the facts, and I think I think I would like to be an election tax on the candidate's reasonable candidate for the ruling party." He asked that "I would like to memory his speech from the defendant? I would like to say I would like to say I would like to see I would like to see I would like to say I would like to see I would like to see I would like to see I would like to see I would like to see? I would like to see I would like to see I would like to see I would like to see I would like to see I would like to 'I would like to see I would like to see? I would like to see I would like to 'I would like to see I would like to 'I would like to see I would like to see I would like to 'I would like to see I would like to 'I would like to see I would like to see the M's behavior or appearance of the candidate.

② Of the instant remarks, the part that referred food at the Gangnam department store referred to in the “Gangnam department store” or referred to in the VIP room does not specify the specific place or time, and the description also lacks the composition, and there is a high room for understanding that the said expression as a general elector in contact with the said expression represents the general consumption behavior of the subordinate floor.

Therefore, it is natural to interpret that the Defendant described politically in comparison with the expression "(main use by ordinary people, such as the J market)" that the Defendant is able to represent the ordinary people more easily, and rather than the statement of specific facts concerning the individual life of the M candidate, it is naturally natural to interpret that the Defendant’s speech was made during the election campaign for K, a political party candidate at the entrance of the J market. The election campaign speech was made by AW, a proportional representative candidate of a political party, and R, a representative of the Defendant and a political party, and then the K candidate was made in the way of making a speech.

However, the main contents of “WW’s speech that had been made earlier than the Defendant was to create a political party, which is a party for ordinary people, as the first party,” and the content of the R’s speech that followed the Defendant was elected and that if the National Assembly is multi-party election, K would modify the economic policies of Lparty, as a whole criticizes the economic policies of L party and emphasizes that the economic policies of the political party are common people, and did not mention specific facts about K candidates and M candidates. Considering that the context of the speech before and after and after and after, and the place where the election was held at that time, the Defendant made the instant speech in order to criticize the economic policies of L party favorable to the vice-party by using more favorable expressions to the merchants or consumers.

(c) the assertion that there was no intention to publish false and false information.

1) Relevant legal principles

In the crime of publishing false facts under Article 250(2) of the Public Official Election Act, it is necessary to recognize that the facts disclosed as the content of the actor’s intentional act are false. As long as it is difficult to know or prove such subjective perception in light of its nature, the existence or absence of such subjective perception ought to be determined normatively by comprehensively taking into account all the circumstances, such as the Defendant’s academic background, career, social status, process of publication, timing of publication, and objectively anticipated ripple effect (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 2008Do11847, Dec. 22, 2011; 2015Do7172, Aug. 13, 2015).

2) In the instant case:

As seen earlier, the Defendant’s remarks in this case do not indicate specific and direct facts about M candidates, but are merely abstract expressions or opinions about M candidates.

However, in light of the following facts and circumstances acknowledged by the evidence duly adopted and examined by the lower court, even if the instant speech constitutes a public allegation of facts regarding M candidates, it appears that the Defendant made an ambiguous speech as if he/she had expressed his/her speech in the process of symbolicly expressing that his/her speech constitutes false facts in the process of expressing the fact that he/she represents the common people, or without intent, or without intent to do so. The evidence submitted by the prosecutor alone is insufficient to acknowledge that the Defendant had a perception and intent to publish false facts at the time of the instant speech, and there is no other evidence to acknowledge otherwise.

Therefore, this part of the defendant's assertion is also reasonable (the defendant's remaining assertion on the facts charged of this case (the defendant's assertion that this case's statement is a legitimate act that does not go against the social rules).

① At the time of the instant statement, it does not seem that the Defendant was aware of the Defendant’s individual as to the consumption behavior or means of living of M candidates to the extent that the Defendant stated specific and direct facts.

In other words, the Defendant, as a candidate for a single political party in the election of the 20th National Assembly member, is the proportional representative candidate, who is another candidate for the 1st political party in the election of the 20th National Assembly member, and is at least 6 to 14 places per day during the election period. From March 31, 2016 to April 12, 2016, U provided support oil at six to 14 places. The Defendant, together with the Defendant, should make a speech at least 5 to 8 times per day, and the Defendant was unable to make a prior preparation and was sufficiently informed of the political party or other candidates, and thus, he tried to pay attention, i.e., the period of experience entered in the banner or the 5th election of the 20th National Assembly member. From March 31, 2016 to April 12, 2016. In light of the above U.S. methods and methods, the previous candidate was aware that the former candidate was a candidate for the National Assembly member.

② The Defendant made the instant speech without the Plaintiff during a short period of time, namely, in a situation in which the Defendant ought to make a speech without the Plaintiff, and contrary to his intent, it is highly likely that the Defendant would have made the Defendant make an ambiguous speech. At the time of the instant case, AX, an election campaigne, “AX, who is the election campaigne, shall hear the Defendant before the R representative makes a clerical error,” and immediately thereafter, appears to have completed the Defendant’s speech within a short period of time. In fact, the Defendant’s speech time was limited to approximately two minutes, and that the P proposer at the time was in a situation in which the Defendant promptly and promptly finished the speech.”

3. Conclusion

Thus, since the defendant's appeal is well-grounded, the judgment of the court below is reversed pursuant to Article 364 (6) of the Criminal Procedure Act without examining the prosecutor's argument of unfair sentencing, and the following decision is rendered

[Grounds for multi-use Judgment]

1. Summary of the facts charged

The defendant is a person who was elected as a political party proportional representative in the 20th election of a National Assembly member.

피고인은 2016. 4. 5. 16:00경 J시장에서, 정당 K 국회의원 후보자를 위하여 지원유세를 하면서 경쟁후보자인 L정당 국회의원 M를 지칭하며 "여러분, 4년간 다른 당 국회의원 뽑아보셨죠? 여기 J시장 같은데 와서 장 봐 보셨을 것 같아요?, 아니요, 강남 백화점에서 음식 사먹어요., VIP룸에서 커피 마시는 분이에요. 구관이 명관이라죠, 4년 맡겨 놨더니 아닌 거 아시죠, 다시 꼭 K 후보를 뽑아주세요. 자신의 일신을 위해서 고민하지 않는, 서민을 위해서라면 자신의 불편을 감수하는 용기 있는 후보 K 후보를 꼭 지지해 주십시요"라고 말하였다. 그러나 사실 제20대 국회의원 공직선거후보자 재산신고서에 따르면 위 K는 시가 2억 3,900만 원 상당의 면적 99.95m 아파트에 거주하면서 재산합계액 2억 6,649만 원을 소유하고 있는 반면, 위 M는 시가 1억 5천만 원 상당의 면적 58 아파트에 거주하면서 재산합계액 4억 6,293만 원을 소유하고 있는 등 두 후보자 사이에 큰 편차가 없었고, 위 M 부부는 서울에 있는 백화점의 VIP 회원이었던 적이 없어 백화점 VIP룸을 직접 이용한 사실이 없었다. 또한 M와 그의 처는 평소 J시장에서 식료품 등을 구입하였던 사실도 있다.

As such, the Defendant published false facts about M through a speech with the aim of preventing candidates from being elected.

2. Determination

The facts charged in this case constitute a case where there is no proof of facts constituting a crime on the grounds stated in Article 2-b and (c) of the Criminal Procedure Act, and thus, the summary of the judgment of innocence is publicly announced in accordance with the latter part of Article 325 of the Criminal Procedure Act.

It is so decided as per Disposition for the above reasons.

Judges Lee Jin-hee

Judges Choi Ki-won