The lower court prior to the amendment by Act No. 11462, Jun. 1, 2012 (amended by Act No. 11462, Jun. 1, 2012)

(E) Article 35(1) of the former Act on the Assistance to Market Development (hereinafter “former Act”); Article 35(1) of the former Act on the Promotion of the Purchase of Small and Medium Enterprise Products and the Assistance to Market Development (amended by Act No. 12499, Mar. 18, 2014)

(B) Article 35(1)2 of the Act on the Promotion of the Purchase of Small and Medium Enterprise Products and the Assistance to the Market Development (hereinafter “Market Support Act”) premised on the premise that Article 35(1)2 of the same Act (hereinafter “instant penal provision”) provides that a person who is issued a certificate of direct production of competing products under the former Market Support Act or a certificate of direct production of competing products under the Act on the Assistance to the Market Development shall be punished for the act of directly issuing a certificate of confirmation of production or supplying non-production products by unlawful means. However, insofar as the instant automatic fire extinguishing device does not fall under the “smaller” designated as competing products under the former Act on the Assistance to the Market Development and the Assistance to the Market Development, the instant penal provision cannot be applied on the ground that each of the facts charged in the instant case did not constitute a case of Defendant

The judgment below

Examining the reasons in light of the provisions of relevant Acts and subordinate statutes and the records, the reasoning of the judgment below is not appropriate, but the automatic fire extinguishing device of this case was designated as competing products under the former Act on Assistance to Market Development and Markets

As long as it is difficult to see the penal provisions of this case, the lower court’s conclusion that the penal provisions of this case cannot be applied is just and acceptable. In so doing, contrary to what is alleged in the grounds of appeal, there were no errors in the misapprehension of the legal doctrine as to Article 35(1) of the former Market Support Act and Article 35(1)2 of the former Market Support Act, thereby affecting the conclusion of the judgment.

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed.