2. The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

A. From around 2008 to April 2013, the Plaintiff served as a clerical officer in the Defendant (the name of the Plaintiff was “law firm △△△△,” and was changed to “law firm △△,” on February 23, 2012, and on March 20, 2013, the Plaintiff was changed to “law firm ○○,” respectively; hereinafter collectively referred to as “Defendant”).

B. At the time of February 2009, the Plaintiff agreed to the effect that “the Nonparty and the Nonparty representative attorney-at-law of the Defendant shall pay 30% of the contingent fees received by the Defendant and the Nonparty, even during and after the Plaintiff’s work, to the Plaintiff regarding the case (such as apartment defect lawsuits, etc.) (hereinafter “instant agreement”).

[Reasons for Recognition] Unsatisfy, Gap evidence Nos. 1 through 3, 5, Eul evidence No. 1, the purport of the whole pleadings

2. The parties' assertion

A. The plaintiff

Since the plaintiff as the defendant's employee supported the defendant to accept apartment defect lawsuits and acquired the contingent fees in the civil procedure that the defendant accepted, the defendant is obligated to pay the money stated in the purport of the claim, which is 30% of the contingent fees, and damages for delay thereof, in accordance with the agreement of this case that stipulates the plaintiff's wages.

B. Defendant

(1) The plaintiff is not the defendant's employee.

(2) The instant agreement is null and void in violation of Article 34(1)2 and (5) of the Attorney-at-Law Act.

(3) The instant agreement is a condition precedent that the Plaintiff should complete the pertinent lawsuit by working in the Defendant, and the Plaintiff did not fulfill the said condition.

3. Determination

A. We examine whether the agreement in this case constitutes a juristic act with a content contrary to good morals and other social order and thus null and void.

(1) Article 34(1) of the Attorney-at-Law Act provides, “No person shall provide or promise to provide money, valuables, entertainment or other benefits in return for introducing, arranging or inducing a party to a legal case or other interested persons to a specific attorney-at-law or his/her office staff members, or introducing, arranging or inducing a party to a legal case or other interested persons to a specific attorney-at-law or his/her office staff members, or in return for such inducing a specific attorney-at-law or staff members.” Furthermore, Article 34(2) of the Attorney-at-law Act provides, “No person shall provide or promise to provide money, valuables, entertainment or other benefits in return for introducing, arranging or inducing the acceptance of a legal case or legal service.”

(2) The above provision aims to prevent a person, other than an attorney-at-law, to ensure expertise, fairness, and reliability in handling legal affairs (see Constitutional Court en banc Decision 2012Hun-Ba62, Feb. 28, 2013). It is ultimately aimed at achieving the mission of an attorney-at-law to protect fundamental human rights and realize social justice by allowing an attorney-at-law with public nature to perform his/her duties independently and freely.

(3) Article 34 of the Attorney-at-Law Act, which provides for prohibition of partnership with a person who is not a lawyer, is subject to criminal sanctions such as "a imprisonment for not more than 7 years or a fine not exceeding 50 million won" (Article 109 subparagraph 2), and a person who violates the above provisions or a third party who knows such violation is subject to forfeiture of money, valuables or other benefits received by him (Article 116).

(4) As to the instant case, the instant agreement stipulates that the Plaintiff, the head of the office of the attorney-at-law office, should receive part of the success fees in the relevant lawsuit from the Defendant to introduce, mediate, or induce the parties to the apartment defect lawsuit or other interested persons to the Defendant, who is an attorney-at-law, and that the Defendant promises to provide the Plaintiff with money and valuables in return for introducing, arranging, or inducing the acceptance of the case.

(5) 따라서 이 사건 약정은 강행규정인 변호사법 제34조 제1항 및 제2항 을 위반한 것으로서, ㈀ 변호사 제도의 취지에 반하는 행위를 저지르는 변호사가 아닌 자의 출현을 막고 변호사가 이와 결탁하여 법률사건의 수임을 추구하는 것을 제한하려는 해당 규정의 입법 목적, ㈁ 변호사 업무의 공공성, ㈂ 해당 규정 위반자에 대하여 형사처벌이 가해지고 그 이익 또한 몰수되는 점, ㈃ 위 규정을 위반한 약정이 사법상 유효하다고 한다면 이른바 법조브로커의 근절을 위한 변호사법의 입법 취지가 잠탈되는 결과가 초래되는 점 등을 종합하여 볼 때, 이 사건 약정은 선량한 풍속 기타 사회질서에 위반한 사항을 내용으로 하는 법률행위로서 민법 제103조 에 따라 무효라고 할 것이다.

B. Therefore, we cannot accept the Plaintiff’s assertion based on the invalid agreement.

4. Conclusion

Therefore, the claim of this case is dismissed as it is without merit. It is so decided as per Disposition.

Judges Lee Jin-chul (Presiding Judge)