매매대금반환
1. All appeals filed by the plaintiff and the defendant are dismissed.
2. Of the costs of appeal, the costs of appeal by the Plaintiff are assessed against the Plaintiff.
1. The reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance excluding the conclusion among the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance excluding the reasoning of the judgment excluding the conclusion is as follows 2. Thus, it is consistent with the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance excluding the reasoning of the judgment excluding the conclusion as set forth in the following 2. The grounds for appeal by the plaintiff and the defendant are not significantly different from the argument in the court of first instance, and according to the evidence duly adopted and examined by the court of first instance excluding the grounds for appeal by the court of first instance excluding the grounds for appeal by the court of first instance excluding the reasoning of the judgment excluding the conclusion excluding the conclusion as set forth in the judgment as set forth in the following
“C) As to this, the Defendant, while serving the decision on the application for appointment and transfer of right of the custodian of the instant case, was served on the Defendant during the instant lawsuit, and there is reason and practical benefit in dispute as to the existence and scope of the obligation to perform until the judgment of the court of first instance is rendered. Thus, the Defendant asserts that the delayed damages calculated at the rate of 12% per annum as prescribed by the Act on Special Cases concerning the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings cannot be added up until
Article 3 (2) of the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings is reasonable to resist whether a person who owes an obligation has an obligation or its scope.
"Cases recognized" refers to cases where there are reasonable grounds for the debtor's argument that disputes over the existence or scope of the duty of performance. Thus, the issue of whether such a dispute is unreasonable is the recognition and evaluation of the facts of the court with respect to the case in question.
In addition, the "reasonable extent" is not "the scope of the obligation to resist by the obligor," but "a reasonable period of time for the obligor to resist". Thus, the period during which the obligor may resist at the fact-finding court of the case should be deemed to be the time until the decision of the fact-finding court of the case is rendered, and it is reasonable to say that the application of Article 3 (1) of the above Act cannot be excluded for any reason after the decision of the court of fact-finding, and the fact-finding here refers to.