The establishment of facts constituting a crime must be proved to the extent that there is no reasonable doubt (Article 307(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act). The preparation of evidence and the probative value of evidence conducted on the premise of fact-finding belong to the free judgment of the fact-finding court (Article 308 of the Criminal Procedure Act). For the reasons indicated in its reasoning, the lower court is insufficient evidence to prove (1) as to the part of compulsory indecent act among the facts charged in the instant case, that the Defendant’s act constitutes a forced indecent act or that the Defendant had a criminal intent to commit an indecent act

In light of the foregoing, the first instance judgment, which acquitted the Defendant of the facts of the prosecutor, did not accept the grounds for appeal as to the prosecutor’s mistake. (2) The part of the facts charged in the instant case, judged that it is insufficient to recognize the fact that the Defendant had intentionally inflicted an injury and inflicted an injury beyond the victim’s bridge, and thus, reversed the first instance judgment convicting the Defendant of this part of the facts charged, and sentenced the Defendant not guilty.

The allegation in the grounds of appeal is the purport of disputing the determination of the lower court’s fact-finding, and is merely an error of the lower court’s determination on the selection and probative value of evidence belonging to the free judgment of the fact-finding court. In addition, even when examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the aforementioned legal principles and records, the lower court did not err in its judgment by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the determination of credibility of forced indecent conduct and testimony, or by exceeding the bounds of free

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.