In that sense, even though the defendants prepared to tow ships on the second floor of each of the day of this case, the complainants first followed the second floor of the second floor, and thus, the complainants rather interfere with the defendants' towing.

Therefore, the Defendants’ act of blocking the worship on the part of the complainant does not constitute an obstruction of worship or constitutes a legitimate act.

Nevertheless, the judgment of the court below which convicted the charged facts of this case is erroneous in the misunderstanding of facts and legal principles.

2. The judgment of the court below also asserted the same purport, and the court below rejected the defendants' assertion that, in light of the circumstances acknowledged by the relevant legal principles and the evidence adopted by the court below, the act of preparation stages closely indivisiblely with the execution of worship constitutes a crime of interference with worship, and in case where the members of both parties divided in the same place during the same time and prepare for worship at the same time, one of the parties interfere with the other party, it constitutes a crime of interference with worship (see Supreme Court Decision 2008Do840, May 29, 2008, etc.). Thus, even though the second floor of the pro rata distribution of the "F church" used for worship times before the defendant's members and prepared two times at the time of each act of this case and prepared two times at the time of each act of this case, the complainant's members prepared for worship and praiseed, the defendants' interference with worship constitutes a crime of interference with worship by the members.

Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment by comparing it with relevant legal principles and records, the lower court’s judgment is justifiable and acceptable.