도로교통법위반(음주측정거부)
The prosecutor's appeal is dismissed.
1. The summary of the grounds for appeal (e.g., imprisonment with prison labor for one year, three years of probation, and one hundred and twenty hours of community service order) of the lower court is deemed unreasonable.
2. The determination of sentencing is based on the statutory penalty, with a discretionary determination that takes place within a reasonable and appropriate scope, taking into account the factors constituting the conditions for sentencing prescribed in Article 51 of the Criminal Act, based on which our Criminal Procedure Act, which takes the trial-oriented principle and the principle of directness, has a unique area of the first instance trial regarding the
In addition to these circumstances and the ex post facto nature of the appellate court, it is reasonable to respect the sentencing conditions in cases where there is no change in the conditions of sentencing compared with the first instance court, and the sentencing of the first instance court does not deviate from the reasonable scope of discretion, and to refrain from rendering a sentence that does not differ from the first instance court on the sole ground that the sentence of the first instance falls within the reasonable scope of discretion, even though the sentence of the first instance court is somewhat different from the opinion of the appellate court,
(2) In light of the aforementioned facts, the lower court’s judgment is not deemed to have exceeded the reasonable scope of discretion, and there is no particular change in circumstances in sentencing conditions in the first instance court, and thus, the lower court’s judgment is not deemed to have exceeded the reasonable scope of discretion, in light of the following: (a) the Defendant, even before the instant case, was sentenced to the aforementioned punishment on the grounds of sentencing; (b) the Defendant repeated the same crime despite a majority of criminal punishment for drinking driving; and (c) the circumstance unfavorable to the sentencing asserted by the prosecutor in the first instance court, including the Defendant’s repeating of the same crime despite the fact that he/she had been subject to criminal punishment due to drinking driving; (d) the Defendant was led to the confession of and against the offense; (e) there was no fact that the Defendant incurred a traffic accident due to drinking driving; and (e) the judgment ordering probation and community service, along with